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I 
SUMMARY 
The problem addressed in this thesis is the role of 
external development aid in the growth process with special refer- 
ence to Sudan's experience of growth and development with foreign 
aid resources over the past two decades (1960-1980). The study is 
taken in the light of the basic ideas on which foreign aid theories 
have been conceived and in view of the critics of aid argument. 
Chapter 1 presents the aim of the study, the method of 
approach and the outline of the study. 
In Chapters 2 and 3 we present a review of the basic approa 
to the theory of foreign aid in economic growth, and examine the 
criticisms regarding the validity of their assumptions and operation-11. 
al usefulness as well as the modifications introduced to them. 
In Chapters 4 and 5 we highlight the salient features of the 
structure of the Sudanese economy and analyze the development per- 
formance and constraints over the past two decades in the light of 
the growth constraints identified by aid growth models. 
Chapter 6 consists of an account of the general character- 
istics of the flow of external development aid received by the 
Sudan during the period of study. 
Chapters 7and 8 deal explicitly with the impact of foreign 
resources on domestic savings, investment and growth with reference 
to Sudan's experience over the past two decades. 
Chapter 9 considers the problems that hindered the effective 
use of foreign aid resources in the Sudan during the period of 
study and highlights the main areas in which reform measures are 
needed. 
In Chapter 10 an estimate of the savings gap and the foreign 
exchange gap for the Sudan for the forthcoming Six Year Plan 
1983/84-1988/89 is provided on the basis of the two gap approach. 
1. 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 AIM OF THE STUDY 
The general problem addressed in this thesis is the role 
of external development aid in the growth process. The analy- 
tical and philosophical basis for foreign aid flows to the Less 
Developed Countries (LDCs) asserts that economic development in 
such countries is frequently constrained by lack of finance; 
foreign aid resources enables this constraint to be overcome 
thereby allowing them to 'take-off' into self sustained economic 
growth. The logic is simple; developing countries require a 
certain amount of investment in order to achieve a target rate 
of economic growth. If domestic saving is insufficient to 
finance the required investment, then the target rate of growth 
will not be achieved unless domestic saving is raised (which is 
unlikely to be possible) or alternatively by using an inflow of 
foreign finance. However, even in cases where a country is able 
to generate sufficient domestic saving, it may still be unable 
to reach its growth target because of the inability to earn 
enough foreign exchange to buy the imported goods that are needed 
for development. Hence in addition to the domestic savings defic- 
iency, there may also be a foreign exchange constraint. Foreign 
aid resources may therefore be seen as playing a dual role in the 
development process as both a supplement to domestic saving and 
as a source of foreign exchange. 
The forgoing logic would lead one to expect positive growth 
effects from foreign aid resources to developing countries. 
a. 
However, the relevance of foreign aid resources to the growth 
process in LDCs has been questioned. It is argued that foreign 
aid inflows increase the capital-output ratio (that is, reduce 
the productivity of capital) and discourage domestic saving; in 
addition a large part of it is consumed rather than invested. 
The net result may therefore, be no extra growth at all or that 
the growth rate is even retarded or reduced. 
In order to clarify the debate over the effectiveness of 
foreign aid resources in the growth process of LDCs, it is 
essential to examine and analyse the experience of development* 
with foreign aid for individual countries. Over the past two 
decades 1960-1980 the Sudan has been relying on foreign resources 
as a strategic factor for accelerating economic development. 
This study is an attempt to examine explicitly whether foreign 
aid resources have promoted or retarded growth and development 
over the past two decades. The analysis is taken in the light 
of the basic ideas on which foreign aid theories have been 
conceived and in view of the critics of aid argument. 
1.2 METHOD OF APPROACH AND DATA PROBLEMS 
At the outset of this study it is important to note 
that the studies investigating the impact of foreign aid resources 
on growth and development in LDCs are usually beset by several 
methodological, conceptual, definitional and data problems. 
As the economic growth of a country is an aspect of nurerous 11 
factors (economic, political, social and global) some of them do 
3. 
not readily lend themselves to economic analysis, an isolated 
comparison of foreign aid resources and economic development is 
problematic. To establish a causal relationship among specified 
variables - such as foreign aid resources and economic growth - 
in a situation which is affected simultaneously by such numerous 
factors operating at various time lags, will make the analysis 
a partial one. Even for the quantifiable variables consistent 
series of reliable data is always a problem in LDCs. Hence, 
in analysing the impact of foreign aid resources on Sudan's growth 
and development, a qualitative approach and a rough quantitative 
analysis, using few variables, is used. 
There are many forms of foreign resources inflows such as 
long term concessional loans and grants, medium and short term 
loans and private foreign capital which are not likely to have the 
same impact on domestic saving, consumption, investment and 
growth. The problem that arises for most of the studies on the 
impact of foreign aid resources on such variables is that whereas 
the focus of the analysis is on the impact of foreign aid resources, 
what is being analysed is all forms of foreign capital inflow. 
In order to study the effect of foreign aid resources on growth 
one needs to examine it separately. Again this exercise will be 
limited by the availability of data series on each type of flow. 
However, in this thesis, while we used net foreign capital inflow 
represented by the current account deficit in the published data 
on National Income Accounts, a separate series on external develop- 
ment loans and grants received by the public sector is also con- 
sidered. This series, which is more likely to represent foreign 
aid flows than all other types of flows, includes published as well 
as unpublished data collected from the Foreign Aid and Technical 
4. 
Assistance section in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 
Bank of Sudan and the Ministry of Industry on all public and 
publicly guaranteed long and medium term external development 
loans and grants received during the period of study. 
The state of statistics in the Sudan - like many other LDCs - 
is poor. The National Income Accounts in the Sudan have been 
subjected to many alterations in methodologies and changes in the 
accounting year (fiscal and calendar year). Continuous series of 
production and income exist only for few economic activities and 
the gaps have to be filled by surveys which suffer from consider- 
able margins of error. Needless to say, the national accounts 
aggregates in LDCs are weak due to the predominant importance of 
the traditional (subsistence) sector which is difficult to 
quantify. The other major drawback in Sudan's National Accounts 
is that, because there is no official GDP deflator and the GDP 
data are presented on current prices, there is no acceptably 
reliable national accounts for the growth of real output. However 
this has not prevented us from using - for the purposes of our 
study - the available price data to estimate real GDP growth rate. 
Data series on actual withdrawals from public and publicly 
guaranteed medium and long term development loans also suffer from 
apparent shortcomings. The figures published by the Bank of Sudan 
for this series are known to be incomplete because the Bank of 
Sudan keeps records only for drawings made through letters of credit 
opened by it and also in the case of reimbursement (where the 
government pays to the supplier first in foreign currency and 
gives documents to the donor for reimbursement in the Bank of 
Sudan's account) which was not in much use as Sudan did not have 
enough foreign exchange to make initial payments out of its ow-n 
funds. But, for the direct payment procedure - which is followed 
5. 
in many cases (where the executing agency or the Foreign Aid 
Section in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (Planning) 
issues direct orders to the donor to pay for the supplier), the 
Bank of Sudan is not involved. Most of the drawings under this 
procedure are not recorded by the Central BBnk because of the 
lack of this information as the executing agencies or the Foreign 
Aid Section do not regularly provide the Central Bank with such 
information. Hence, for the purpose of our study, data regarding 
actual drawings from foreign development loans are collected from 
the records of the Foreign Loans and Technical Assistance Section 
in the Planning Ministry which also suffers from some problems 
such as the difficulty in obtaining information on a regular 
basis from the Bank of Sudan on loans received from some Socialist 
countries as the payment arrangements are undertaken by the Central 
Bank. The executing units also do not keep accounts of the external 
loans utilized and do not provide the Foreign Loans and Technical 
Assistance Section with regular loan accounts. 
With the above brief account of problems and limitations we 
set out to outline the contents of the study. 
1.3 OUTLINE OF STUDY 
In Chapters2 and 3 we present a review of the basic approaches 
to the theory of foreign aid in economic growth and examine the 
criticisms regarding the validity of their assumptions and 
operational usefulness, as well as the modifications introduced 
to them. Particular emphasis is given to the two gap approach to 
foreign aid theory, pioneered by Chenery and Bruno (1962), which 
is widely used in explaining the role of foreign aid resources in 
promoting growth and development in LDCs, and in forcasting future 
aid requirements. 
5. 
in Chapters 4 and 5 we highlight the salient features of 
the structure of the Sudanese economy, and analyse the development, 
performance and constraints - over the past two decades - in the 
light of the growth constraints identified by the aid growth 
models, namely the saving constraint, the foreign exchange con- 
straint, and the absorptive capacity constraint. The study of 
the external and internal structures and the development problems 
identified would also enable us to examine in subsequent chapters 
the impact of foreign aid in the growth and development of the 
country during the past two decades. 
Chapter 6 consists of an account of the general characteris- 
tics of the flow of external development aid received by the Sudan 
during the period 1960-1980. It includes the magnitudes, sources, 
conditions, forms and areas of utilization. An estimate for the 
grant element in such flows is also provided. This chapter is an 
important prelude to the study of the effects of foreign aid in 
the growth process, as the expected growth effects of foreign aid 
flows are largely influenced by such characteristics. 
Chapters 7 and 8 deal explicitly with the impact of foreign 
resources on domestic savings, investment and growth. The theoret- 
ical case and the empirical findings supporting the views that 
foreign aid discourages domestic savings and retards growth are 
critically analysed in view of Sudan's experience of growth with 
foreign aid during the past two decades. The favourable effects 
of foreign aid resources in raising public investment levels, 
contributing to the growth performance of the major sectors of the 
economy, and enhancing overall output growth in the Sudan are 
emphasized. 
Most of the objections of the critics of foreign aid deal 
with the policies of aid programmes, such as the forms of aid, 
7. 
repayment terms and aid allocation policies. However, such 
objections should not suggest that we bring it to a halt but 
rather indicate the need for reforming aid policies and programmes 
as well as aid machinery in both the donor and recipient countries 
so as to maximize the efficiency with which foreign aid resources 
are translated into income and growth. Chapter 9 considers these 
issues by examining the specific problems that hindered the effect- 
ive use of foreign aid resources in the Sudan during the period 
of study and highlighting the main areas in which reform measures 
are needed. 
In Chapter 10 an estimate of the savings gap and the 
foreign exchange gap for the Sudan for the forthcoming second 
Six Year Plan 1983/84-1988/89 is provided on the basis of the two- 
gap framework examined in previous chapters. Given the structure 
of Sudan's economy - the external sector's structure in particular - 
analysed in Chapters 4 and 5, it seems that the country will 
continue to depend on foreign aid resources if the past real out- 
put growth rate or the planned-growth rates are to be maintained 
during the rest of the 1980s. 
Finally, a summary of conclusions is provided. 
8. 
CHAPTER 2 
ROLE OF FOREIGN AID IN ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: THEORIES AND THEIR APPLICATION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In general, foreign aid theories deal primarily with 
the question of how foreign capital inflows alter the aggregate 
performance of the economy in LDCs. Many models have been con- 
structed to analyse in quantitative terms the process of develop- 
ment with external capital, and to determine the foreign aid 
requirements for either the LDCs as a group or for individual 
countries. In this chapter we shall briefly review these theories 
and examine the validity of their basic assumptions. 
Most of the aid growth models are Keynesian in spirit and 
are broadly based on the following assumptions: - 
1. The acceptance of a critical role for capital in the growth 
process, that is, increased income depends primarily upon the 
application of more capital either directly by increasing out- 
put when used in combination with local resources, or indirect- 
ly when the use of such capital will lead to more effective 
use of other resources. 
2. The rate of development will-increase if the ratio of invest- 
ment to national income rises and the investment ratio will 
rise if capital imports increase. 
3. The assumption of fixed or stable 'technical' relationships, 
such as fixed incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) and 
stable savings and import propensities. 
4. The ultimate objective of the recipient country is to achieve 
self sustaining growth at some target rate of growth of income. 
9. 
Self sustaining growth is defined as a stage where aid is not 
required any more while normal capital imports such as private 
foreign investment may continue (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1961, p. 
115). This assumption, however, implies that such foreign 
capital inflow should be linked with development policies 
leading to structural changes in the economy, such as increas- 
ed savings, import substitution and increased exports. 
However these assumptions are not unanimously accepted, and 
many economists have questioned their validity. The assumption of a 
predominal role of capital in the growth process has been denied 
by some economistsl. Increased investment as some economists 
maintained is neither necessary nor sufficient to achieve a high 
rate of growth in LDCs2. The assumption of constant coefficients 
such as the incremental capital output ratio and the marginal 
savings rate have also been criticized3. 
Following the theme of this chapter we shall review the 
basic approaches to the theories of foreign aid to developing 
countries, and examine the validity of their assumptions. In the 
next chapter we shall examine some further criticisms and modific- 
ations to the analytical framework of these theories. 
2.2 BASIC APPROACHES TO THE THEORIES OF FOREIGN AID IN LDCs 
2.2.1 Saving-Investment Gap Approach 
According to the saving-investment gap approach, the growth 
of the economy of a developing country is limited by the 
1See 
Kindleberger, C. P., Economic Development, 2nd ed. McGraw Hill 
Book Co., 1965, Chapter 5; Meier, G. Leading Issues in EconcrAc 
Devnelc nt, Oxford University Press 1976., Chapter 3; and Cairncrbss, 
A. K. actors in Economic Development' George Allen & Unwin 1962, 
pp. 111-114. 
2See Griffen; K. Foreign Capital, Domestic Savings & Econcmic Develo rent. 
Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Eccncmics & Statistics, May 1970, 
p. 100. 
3See Durr, E. 'Problems of ret: hod and of Policy in Calculating Development Assist- 
ance Requirenents. German Econcmic Review, Vol. 6 1968, p. 16. 
10. 
availability of domestic savings for investment. The need 
for external capital is therefore derived from the difference 
between the investment requirements to sustain the target rate 
of growth and domestic savings. The role of foreign aid in the 
growth process according to this approach can be explained by 
using the Harrod growth equation: 
r=S/k 
where r is the rate of growth of national income, s is the ratio 
of income saved and invested, and k is the (ICOR). 
If a developing country receives an amount of aid (f) 
expressed as a fraction of national income, then the growth rate 
rises to r1= (s. + f)/k. 
If r is the target rate of growth and if the ICOR (k) is 
assumed to be constant, then the rate of capital accumulation 
(I) necessary to achieve the target: rk = I. The difference 
between I and s indicates the saving-investment gap or the amount 
of aid necessary to achieve the target rate of growth, f=I-s. 
It is assumed that the marginal savings ratio is signific- 
antly above the average savings ratio. A given amount of foreign 
aid supplements domestic savings leading to a higher rate of 
capital accumulation and raises income per capita leading to an 
increase in the proportion of income saved, as a result of these 
effects foreign aid increases the recipients' capacity for growth 
leading eventually to a self-sustaining target rate of growth. 
The early aid-growth models developed by Rosenstein-Rodan 
(1961) and Fei and Paauw (1965) have focussed on the saving limitat-i 
ion to the achievement of"a reasonable rate of self-sustaining 
growth in LDCs. Rosenstein-Rodan developed a method for pro- 
jecting foreign assistance requirements for 83 LDCs in which 
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domestic savings constituted the effective growth limit. The 
following equation was used for determining aid requirements 
for a 5-year period: 
F= (Kr - b) Y+ 5Yo (b - 
Yö) 
where K= COR, r= rate of growth of GNP assumed according to 
the absorptive capacity, Yo = GNP in the initial year, b. = marginal 
saving rate, 
so 
= average saving rate in the initial year, and 
F= foreign capital inflow. 
The main objective of foreign aid in LDCs according to 
Rosenstein-Rodan is the achievement of a satisfactory rate of 
growth on a self-sustaining basis. The transformation of the 
country to self-sustaining growth occurs because additional 
resources and know-how provided by foreign aid produces an addit- 
ional product; the proportion of this additional product that can 
be saved may be higher than the average savings at the pre- 
existing income level, or as he puts it "... a marginal rate which 
is higher than the average rate of saving is the main lever of a 
development programme and should be the principal condition of aid 
to underdeveloped countries" (1961, p. 108). Hence, he emphasized 
that foreign aid should be used in those fields where it will have 
the maximum catalytic effect of mobilizing additional effort. 
Another key notion in Rosenstein-Rodan's model is that the 
capacity to absorb capital is considered as a limiting factor in 
l 
the growth process of the LDCs. It is determined according to 
him on the basis of the past investment record (5 years or more) 
the marginal savings record in the recent past, and a judgement 
1 She capacity to absorb capital has been euloyed as a constraint for 
development in aid-growth mocels in carýination with saving-investment gap 
approach (as in Rosenstein-Rrdan's m : )del) or with both the saving-investment 
and the foreign exchange gap approaches (see Chenery, H. B. and. Strout, A. 
'Foreign Assistance Econcmic Developxrent', The American Econamic Review, 
September 1966, p. 6. 
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on the efficiency of the country's overall administrative and 
development organization1 (p. 108). 
Moreover, the work of Rosenstein-Rodan has raised some 
of the important analytical questions associated with the 'self 
help' notion. "The general aim of aid .... is to provide in 
each underdeveloped country a positive incentive for maximum 
national effort to increase its rate of growth" (p. 107). The 
notion of 'self help' eventually became a condition for the 
United States foreign aid. 
Fei and Paauw (1965) have further analysed and developed 
the issues raised by Rosenstein-Rodan particularly the relation- 
ship between external assistance and the mobilization of domestic 
savings, which they considered to be the essence of self help 
problems. They argued that the appropriate recipient for economic 
aid is the country which is increasing its domestic savings rate 
fast enough over time to eventually sustain its target rate of 
growth without further need for foreign aid. Such a country - 
if given aid - would meet the criteria of showing self help by 
raising its domestic saving rate, assuring the donor that the 
need is only temporary and assuring that the target rate will in 
fact be achieved (p. 251). 
The reliability of the Rosenstein-Rodan model has been 
questioned by Balassa (1964). He compared the calculations made 
by Rosenstein-Rodan with an attempt made by GATT in 1962 on the 
basis of the trade gap, and found that the trade gap estimated by 
GATT of LDCs for the year 1975 exceeded the estimates made by 
Rasenstein-Rodan admitted that the third index (i. e. administrative 
efficiency and developnt organization) cannot be objectively neasured. 
See also Ranis, G., 'International Aid for Underdeveloped Countries: A 
Carrrent', The Revietir of Economics and Statistics, Novenber 1962, p. 203, 
tiro criticized the use of the three indices in determining absorptive 
capacity. 
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Rosenstein-Rodan by about four times. This wide discrepancy led 
him to question the reliability of both models because under 
proper definitions of the equilibrium conditions of income 
determination in an open economy the two gaps should be 
l. identical 
M-X = E-Y = I-S =F 
where: 
M= imports, X= exports, E= aggregate expenditure, 
Y= income, I= investment, S= savings, and F= 
net capital inflow. 
Balassa had also pointed out an important drawback on the 
method used by Rosenstein-Rodan concerning the error possibility 
of the model. Estimated capital requirements, according to him, 
are very sensitive to the changes in the values of parameters. 
To prove this sensitivity, he cited as an example an increase 
in ICOR from 3 to 3.15 which would raise the annual external 
capital requirement for the period 1961-1966 from $5.7 billion 
to $7.3 billion2. As a matter of fact Rosenstein-Rodan himself 
admitted an error possibility of 25%. 
It is interesting to look, in retrospect, at some results 
and conclusions arrived at by Rosenstein-Rodan with regard 
to the dates for aid termination. According to the results, 
Colombia will reach the stage of self-sustained growth in 1965, 
Argentina and Mexico will approach it gradually in the decade 
1965-1975, India will reach it at most in 1976, Pakistan may 
reach it three or five years later, that is in 1981. But a 
Balassa, B. 'The Capital Needs of the Developing Countries' Kyklos 
Vol. xvii, 1964, p. 197. 
2 See also Durr, E. 1968, p. 17. 
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glance at the World Bank Annual Reports for the last. three years 
including the 1981 Annual Report, would suggest that the countries 
mentioned above are still major recipients of foreign aid from the 
World Bank, indicating that they have not yet reached the stage 
of self-sustaining growth claimed by Rosenstein-Rodan. 
However, the major criticism to the saving gap models 
advanced by Rosenstein-Rodan (1961) and Fei and Paauw (1965) is 
that they have focussed only on the savings limitation to achieve 
a reasonable rate of self sustaining growth in LDCs. The require- 
ments for foreign capital to achieve a certain target rate of growth 
in LDCs - as many economists have argued - cannot be determined by 
domestic savings efforts alone. As many goods which are necessary 
for growth cannot be produced domestically and must therefore be 
imported, the availability of foreign exchange could be the 
dominant constraint to growth in LDCsl. Foreign aid in such a 
situation can be used to supplement foreign exchange earnings, and 
to act as leverage to underutilized domestic savings because the 
growth process would be constrained by the inability to import 
necessary imports. 
2.2.2 Two Gap Approach 
The recognition that foreign aid can be used to support 
either a domestic saving gap or a foreign exchange gap was first 
developed by Chenery and Bruno (1962) in examining development 
i 1 See Chenery, H. B. and Bruno, M. 'Development Alternatives in an Open Eccncrny: 
The Case of Israel'. The Econamic Journal 1962. McKinnon, R. I. 'Foreign 
Exchange Constraints in Economic Develognent and Efficient Aid Allocation'. 
The Economic Journal, June 1964; and Chenery, H. B. and Strout, A. (1966). 
In Chapters 4 and 5 we explain how the foreign exchange constraint has 
developed in the Sudan - during the 1970s in particular - and represented the 
dominant constraint to the growth process of the country. 
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alternatives for Israel's economy. Their analysis focussed on the 
probable limits to accelerated growth and the extent to which they 
can be overcome through the use of external finance. A balance of 
payments limitation has been introduced for the first time to the 
analysis of the traditional limits to growth such as capital and 
labour. The authors believe that the growth of income often 
requires a change in the structure of income use so that the pro- 
portion going to consumption is reduced and hence savings increase, 
but the growth of income may also require a change in the structure 
of production in order to reduce the ratio of imports to total 
output. Which of these structural relations is more likely to 
limit growth cannot be determined precisely but "the parallelism 
between the two is completed by the fact that a foreign capital 
inflow plays a dual role in adding to both investment and foreign 
exchange resources" (p. 117). 
Two aspects of Chenery and Bruno's views expressed in 
their model warrant emphasis. First, although foreign capital 
is assigned the task of easing either the foreign exchange con- 
straint or the domestic saving constraint, Chenery and Bruno allow 
for the possibility that it goes for consumption. Foreign capital 
goes entirely for investment until the economy reaches full 
employment, because unemployed labour is absorbed through rising 
investment. But after full employment the increase in foreign 
capital goes only to increase consumption. 
Secondly, Chenery and Bruno have provided in their study a 
measurement for the productivity of foreign assistance. Accord- 
ing to them the marginal productivity of aid is the increase in 
GNP that is achievable from a unit increase in foreign aid. This 
measure follows from the basic assumptions of the two gap theory, 
that is, since foreign aid is expected to add both to domestic 
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savings and foreign exchange availabilities, and since in a two-gap 
disequilibrium situation only one of the two constraints is likely 
to be binding at any point in time, the productivity of foreign 
assistance depends basically on which constraint is in fact binding. 
For the Israeli economy, however, the authors found that the pro- 
ductivity of foreign aid is higher when foreign exchange is more of 
a binding constraint than'the saving constraint. 
McKinnon (1964) in a model similar to that of Chenery and 
Bruno illustrates the idea of separate saving and foreign exchange 
constraints and emphasizes the implications of both for the 
efficiency of foreign aid. He assumes that savings out of domestic 
output (S), exports (E) and 'maintenance' imports (M) all depend 
on the level of current net domestic output (P). Requirements of 
imported capital (If) and domestically produced capital goods 
(Id) depend on the change in net domestic output (Pt - Po). 
Starting from the initial level of net domestic output (Po), the 
target level of net domestic output (Pt) determines the levels 
of savings, total investment (If + Id) exports, and total imports 
(If + M). The required foreign aid (F) is then determined by the 
larger of (a) the difference between the total investment and 
savings (gap I) and (b) the difference between total imports and 
exports (gap II). Whereas McKinnon's model basically illustrates 
the dual role of foreign aid in promoting growth, primary emphasis 
is given to the trade limitation (gap II). He asserts that foreign 
aid can have a large favourable impact on the growth rate even where 
the absolute amount of aid is small. This occurs when foreign aid 
is used to remove bottlenecks by providing strategic goods and 
services not produced in the developing economy. He shared with 
Chenery and Bruno the view that foreign aid will have proportion- 
ately greater effect upon the growth rate when the foreign exchange 
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constraint is dominant than if the saving constraint holds. 
McKinnon also discussed the time path of foreign aid 
transfers and the possibility for achieving self sustaining growth 
when savings is the only constraint to growth. In this respect 
he expressed views similar to those of his predecessors, Rosenstein- 
Rodan, Fei and Paauw, and Chenery and Bruno, namely, that a marginal 
saving rate which is higher than an average saving rate is a necess- 
ary condition for the eventual achievement of self sustaining 
growth. In the case of foreign exchange constraint, the possibility 
of self sustaining growth depends upon the existence of a net 
marginal propensity to export e *higher than the average propensity 
to export by a critical amount. The higher the amount that e 
exceeds this critical ratio, the smaller the total amount of aid 
and the shorter the time required for achieving self sustaining 
growth. The policy implication for this view is that a developing 
country must take the necessary policies to increase exports beyond 
the critical rate; otherwise, the foreign aid requirement for 
eliminating the foreign exchange constraint cannot be terminated 
without a reduction in the growth rate below the target level, 
a situation which is not desirable in LDCs politically and 
economically. 
The economic relevance of McKinnon's model has been 
questioned by Cohen (1966) who argued that for any target rate 
of growth the difference between the excess of ex ante investment 
over saving and the excess of total ex ante imports over exports 
is per se evidence of the misallocation of domestic resources. 
Foreign aid donors "rather than offering aid at the level indic- 
ated by the larger of the two projected gaps, might use the 
availability of aid to influence which policies the recipient 
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government selects to bring about the necessary equality of 
the two gaps" 
l. Cohen's suggestion is based on the fact that the 
actual difference between total investment and saving must equal 
the actual difference between total imports and exports - this is 
given by the usual national income identity. McKinnon brings out 
this equality by assuming that exports will be less than originally 
projected in the case of a saving gap originally exceeding the 
foreign exchange gap. If on the other hand the foreign exchange 
gap originally exceeds the saving gap then it is assumed that 
savings will be less than originally projected. These assumptions 
imply that governments in developing countries will adopt policies 
which will reduce either exports or savings below their maximum 
potential level. 
In reply to Cohen's comment McKinnon (1966) 
2 
acknowledged 
that his analysis, which is basically dual-gap analysis, does 
imply significant rigidities and lack of substitution possibilit- 
ies between the production for. exports (or import substitution) 
and the production of goods that do not enter foreign trade, and 
between the complementary use of domestically produced capital 
goods and imported capital goods as well as other imported inter- 
mediate inputs in the aggregate production function. In develop- 
ing countries this degree of rigidity seems to be relevant due 
to the fact that the economic policies of LDCs are non-optimal and 
because of the trade practices of the industrial developed 
countries. Although the developed countries have liberalized 
trade among themselves, quotas as well as inelastic foreign demand 
1 Cohen, B. I. 'Foreicrn Exchange Constraints in Econanic Development and 
Efficient Aid Allocation: Cc nt'. The Econcanic Journal, March 1966 (p. 169). 
2 
McKinnon, R. I. 'Foreign Exchange Constraints in Economic reveloprent and 
Efficient Aid Allocation: Rejoinder'. The Economic Journal, March 1966 
(pp. 170-171) . 
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have prevented an expansion of exports of many primary producing 
developing countries. McKinnon also blamed the policies of the 
LDCs themselves for causing the foreign exchange gap to exceed 
the savings gap; these are, the maintaining of an overvalued 
currency coupled with severe import restrictions. This policy 
restricts new exports and forces import substitution as a means 
for foreign exchange. This explanation clearly suggests that 
McKinnon believed that export expansion was a preferable way 
through which the two gaps could be equated. He emphasized - 
as Cohen did - that aid donors should put great pressure on 
recipients to rationalize their price structure and exchange 
rates which are inhibiting the immediate development of manufact- 
ured exports.. However, the success of exchange rate policies in 
promoting exports is debatable, because in many primary producing 
developing countries the supply of exportables is most likely to 
be rigidl. 
The question of whether the distinction between the two 
gaps is due to particular policies or due to some inherent 
characteristics of the development process gave rise to much of 
the controversy on the two-gap approach to aid and development. 
Chenery and Strout's (1966) paper which is perhaps the most 
popular work in the literature of the two-gap analysis, stressed 
the inherent inflexibilities in the LDCs in explaining the work- 
ing of the two-gap model. Their major argument is based on what 
they call "a hypothesis of limited structural flexibility" 
(p. 682); that is, an LDC can neither increase its exports nor 
1See 
Nashashibi, K. 'A Supply Framework for Exchange Reform in Developing 
Countries: The Experience of Sudan'. IPA' Staff Papers, March 1980; also 
in Chapter 5 (section 5.3.4) we explain hav in the Sudan the 1972 deval- 
uation has been undermined by supply rigidities in the export sector. 
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reduce imports without causing underutilization in the economy. 
Export earnings are largely determined by foreign demand condit- 
ions and a "rapid increase in exports typically requires the 
development of new export products which is limited by productive 
capacity and institutional factors"(pp. 689-90). Imports, on the 
other hand, are required by the nature and limited flexibility of 
the productive system and of the composition of consumers' demands. 
A typical LDC according to Chenery and Strout often starts 
in a skill limited phase (phase 1) with apparent lack of skills 
required to undertake investment programmes. Deficiency in skills 
represents the development bottleneck in this initial phase, a 
situation which corresponds to the concept of absorptive capacity 
constraint found in the work of Rosenstein-Rodan (1961) and 
Fei and Paauw (1965). As time passes, growing skill levels 
lead to a continuous expansion of the rate of growth of GNP. A 
target rate of growth will be adopted by the government to curb 
the rate of expansion of the demand for foreign aid resulting 
from the continuous increase in the rate of growth. Simultaneous- 
ly, domestic austerity measures are also adopted to ensure that 
the demand for foreign aid satisfies the criterion of self-help, 
which implies a decreasing reliance on foreign aid requirements 
leading to its termination (phase 2). But, despite the austerity 
measures the country is faced again with a pressing need for 
foreign aid arising from the inflexibility in the productive 
structure, that is, the inability to reduce imports through import 
substitution and/or to expand exports through export promotion. 
These rigidities become the effective limiting factor determining 
the requirements for foreign aid (phase 3). The trade gap 
resulting from this limited structural flexibility can only be 
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closed in the long run when export expansion and import substit- 
ution potentiality are larger than the growth rate. Ultimate 
aid termination date will then be achievable. 
In analysing the specific time sequence of the three limits 
mentioned above - that is, the skill limit, the savings limit 
and the foreign exchange limit - Chenery and Strout designed a 
basic model to explain the function of aid and to evaluate the 
performance of LDCs. Using data for 50 developing countries, the 
basic model is employed to construct three distinct models which 
are viewed as three growth regimes (three phases) appearing in a 
specific sequential order. Their model is based on an aggregate 
national income accounting system formed from the eight planning 
variables - GNP (Y), investment (I), consumption (C), saving (S), 
capital stock (K), imports (M), exports (E) and foreign aid (F) 
bounded by the following equations: - 
Y+M=I+E+C (equality of the supply & demand for total resources... (1) 
Y=C+S (disposition of inociie between nsunption & saving) 
M=E+F (source of iort financing) 
I=S+F (source of investment financing) 
I=AK (investment as the increnent of the capital stock) 
A, t 
and the following parameters: 
r target rate of growth of GNP (exogenously determined) 
rt rate of growth of GNP in year t 
dS 
aý marginal saving rate a=QS 
.... (3) 
. "". (5) 
a average saving rate in year t= 
St 
B exogenously determined maximum constant rate of 
growth of investment (absorptive capacity) 
1 In the previous models (Rosenstein-Podan 1961, Fei and Paauw 1964) alsorpt- 
ive capacity is reflected in the rate of growth rather than in investment. 
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K incremental gross capital output ratio K= I/ oy 
uý marginal import rate u= AM/ Ay 
u average import rate in year tu= 
Mt/y 
t 
f rate of foreign capital inflow to GNP in year t, f=lt 
t 
e exogenously determined constant export growth rate 
In phase (1) foreign aid fills the gap between investment 
and savings until the rate of investment is high enough to sustain 
the target rate of growth (r). The required amount of aid in year 
t will be: 
Ft = It - St + F0 + (BK - 6(' ) (Yt - Y0) .... (6) 
where F. = 10 -S0 in the initial year. Phase (1) ends in year 
n when investment reaches a level adequate to sustain the target 
rate of growth; that is 
I= Kr Y 
n .... 
(7) 
Phase 2 normally begins at the end of phase 1, when 
investment reaches the level required to sustain the target rate 
of growth. The economy is characterized by a savings limitation. 
Here, foreign aid requirement is determined by the saving-limited 
growth model, which corresponds to Rosenstein-Rodan's model 
mentioned earlier - namely by the difference between Kr and ýý . 
i 
The marginal savings rate a{ must exceed the investment rate Kr 
required by the growth target so that aid termination date will 
be achieved eventually. It is worth noting here that the role 
of foreign aid in both phase 1 and 2 is to fill the gap between 
investment and savings. As far as the adjustment process in 
imports and exports that makes the trade gap equal to the desired 
J 
1 
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gap between investment and saving is concerned, the authors 
assumed that this adjustment process whether achieved through 
market mechanism or through government controls does not affect 
the growth path or the aid requirements. But they maintained that 
in many countries in phase 2 this assumption may not hold as 
their empirical findings suggested that "many countries have been 
unable to bring about this required adjustment in their product- 
ive structure ... the resulting trade gap-is often 'structural' 
in the sense that it can only be reduced over time without 
reducing the rate of growth by a redirection of investment and 
other resources" (p. 689). Hence it is clear that according to 
Chenery and Strout the trade limit is caused by the limited 
flexibility of the productive structure rather than by maintaining 
an over-valued exchange rate or other inefficient policies. 
In phase 3 the balance of payments limit will be effective. 
The model for the determination of foreign aid 
fill the trade gap employs the marginal import 
the rate of growth of exports e. A minimum im] 
assumed to sustain a given level of GNP. This 
requirement is due to the relatively inelastic 
capital goods and intermediate goods which are 
domestically and essential for production. 
requirements to 
ratio u', and 
port requirement is 
minimum import 
demand for imported 
not produced 
The required inflow of foreign aid must be at least large 
enough to cover the minimum gap Fm between import requirements 
and export earnings: 
Ft = M. .... (8) 
For the elimination of the trade gap and progress towards a 
given rate of self sustained growth, either export growth rate 
e must exceed the target growth rate r, or the marginal import 
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ratio u'must be substantially below the initial average import 
ratio u. Both u and e are regarded as policy variables affecting 
import substitution and export expansion respectively. 
The total requirements for external capital to complete 
the transition to self sustained growth can be determined as 
the sum of the capital requirements for each phase that the 
economy goes through. 
Chenery and Strout designed a second version of their 
basic model, in which coordinated development policies and a 
planned adjustment of the two gaps is introduced. An import 
substitution activity is assumed in order to relax the rigidities 
assumed in the basic model. 
Under the assumptions of the basic model, foreign aid 
required to fill the larger gap in a given year more than fills 
the smaller one. Hence there will be a surplus of imports 
(M> M) in phase 2, or a loss of potential savings (Sc) in 
phase 3. In the second model it is assumed that a better 
coordinated development policy would reduce the capital inflow 
by substituting investment for imports - or vice versa - in order 
to equate the two gaps ex-anti over the long run. 
The operation of the basic model is applied'to Pakistan, 
which, as the authors believe, started from a low level of income 
and accelerated its rate of growth through the use of external 
assistance. In estimating the foreign aid requirements, the 
values for the parameters of the model, that is, absorptive 
capacity, capital output ratio, marginal saving rate and export 
growth, are determined from historical performance. Other 
optimistic parameter values are derived from the'Pakistan per- 
spective plan. The results for the two sets of projections of the 
model for the years 1962-75 are then presented. The second model 
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is also used to estimate the minimum capital inflow needed at 
various rates of growth of GNP for Pakistan and then extended 
to the other 50 developing countries. 
Notable among their projection results is the fact that 
the productivity of foreign aid in the case of Pakistan is much 
higher in phase 3 when the balance of payments is the factor 
limiting growth. Also evidence from the 50 LDCs considered in 
their study is found to support the proposition that a typical 
LDC must move through three phases of growth characterized by a 
difference in the gap-filling function of aid, that is a skill 
limited phase, a saving limited phase, and a trade limited phase. 
Chenery and Strout have suggested policies that will 
achieve increases in output and pointed out that the key elements 
in the process of growth with foreign aid are the responses of 
the recipient to the additional resources and its ability to 
replace these resources over time via policies that lead to 
changes in the structure of its production. For example, 
improvement in skills and organization, increased savings and 
the use of foreign exchange in the imports of raw material and 
spare parts to make effective use of existing capacity1. 
Clearly, the theoretical and empirical studies undertaken 
by Chenery and Bruno (1962), McKinnon (1966) and Chenery and 
Strout (1966) emphasize the possibility that goals for economic 
development (target rates of growth) and restrictions on foreign 
trade for LDCs might be such as to give rise to different needs, 
ex ante, for foreign capital with respect to requirements for 
1Such 
a policy would favour a 'programme' approach for granting aid as opposed 
to the project approach. In Chapter 6 we stress the importance of this policy 
in the effectiveness of aid resources in the Sudan. 
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savings and foreign exchange. The existence of the two gaps 
implied by this view rests mainly on structural rigidities assumed 
to be inherent in LDCs. However, the existence of two separate 
gaps due to structural rigidities has been criticized on the 
grounds that it is based on very extreme assumptionsl. Also 
that "... the distinction between the two gaps as an empirical 
phenomenon is a rarity, and its explanation, where it does 
exist, as a structural phenomenon ... is most unlikely"2. A 
further examination of these views is provided in the next section. 
2.3 SOME OBJECTIONS TO THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF TWO CAP 
ANALYSIS 
The main criticisms of the two gap approach may be divided 
into two headings: first a neoclassical critique which denies the 
validity of the trade limit concept. Secondly, scepticism that 
an increase in external resources is likely to lead to higher, 
investment rather than a rise in consumption. In this section 
we stress our analysis on the former criticism as well as on 
other specific objections to the two gap model developed by 
Chenery and Strout (1966), leaving the latter scepticism for 
detailed analysis in the next chapter, as well as in Chapters 7 
and 8, in view of Sudan's experience. 
The validity of the two gap models has been examined by 
Lal (1972) who provided a model to demonstrate that a foreign 
exchange constraint which is independent from a savings constraint 
1Joshi, V. 'Savings and Foreign Exchange Constraints', in rhier, G. M. 'Leading Issis in Eccncnuc Develoment' (ed) Oxford University Press 1976, p. 343. 
2Bruton, H. J. The Two Gap Approach to Aid and Development: Ccircrent. The 
American Econanic Review 1969, p. 443. 
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cannot exist in an economy unless three assumptions relating to 
the transformation possibilities open to that economy hold 
simultaneously 
1. These are, first technology does not permit 
any substitutability, after a point, of domestic for foreign 
inputs in the production of output. Second, the domestic rate 
of transformation of output into imports is zero (that is import 
substitution is impossible). Third, the foreign rate of trans- 
formation of domestic output into imports is zero. In other 
words, the economy is faced by "complete inelasticity of export 
earnings and hence, a fixed import capacity". 
The following figure (Fig. 2.1) has been used by Lal to 
illustrate the operation of the three assumptions. 
Assuming that the aggregate output of the economy is 
represented by good (X) which can be consumed, saved and 
invested, and exported) and the production of (X) requires input 
of itself, an imported input (M) and labour which is paid in (X). 
The aggregate production function can therefore be described by 
isoquants drawn in X-M space as shown in Figure 2.1. Isoquants 
X1, X2 and X3 show the domestic output (X) which can be produced 
in different time periods, given different quantities of current 
inputs of (X) and (M). Their shape is derived from assumption 1. 
They become horizontal after a certain stage because of the non- 
substitutability of domestic for foreign input. They cut the 
vertical axis because foreign input can be substituted indefinite- 
ly for domestic inputs. It is also assumed that the rate of 
substitution of domestic for foreign inputs is constant for a 
certain part of the isoquants, and then this rate falls until it 
1Lal, D. "The Foreign Exchange Bottleneck Revisited: A Gecmetric Note". Econcmic 
Develapment and Cultural Change, July 1972, p. 723. A fourth assumption has also 
been suggested by Lal which must hold before a strict foreign exchange constraint 
can arise 'given a social welfare functicn ... the marginal utility of present con- sumption must fall to zero before the rate of transforming present into future 
consumption falls to zero' (p. 727). 
Third Party Material excluded from digitised copy. 
Please refer to original text to see this material. 
29. 
becomes zero at the point where the isoquants become horizontal. 
Since the quantity of the imported input (M) available 
to the economy can only be acquired through trade (according to 
assumption 2) then from S11 S2 and S3 the foreign offer curve can 
be drawn. It shows the amounts of (M) the economy can obtain in 
exchange for (X) through foreign trade. The shape of the offer 
curve is determined by the assumption that the foreign rate of 
transformation of (X) into (M) is zero, after a certain stage, 
for movements along the offer curve (assumption 3). Hence at 
first (X) can be exchanged for (M) at constant terms of trade 
given by the slope of SP; after P the terms of trade steadily 
worsen, and after point C any further exports of X result in a 
lowering of total imports of (M). 
As shown in Figure 2.1 there will be one isoquant which 
is tangential to any given S offer curve. This point gives the 
maximum output of (X) (highest isoquant) consistent with any 
given level of saving (and S offer curve). Thus, given savings 
OS21 the economy would export S2T of (X) in exchange for OM1 of 
(M) which would be combined with OT of (X) to give output X2 in 
the next period. C is the point of optimum trade and production 
given the amount of domestic savings, the foreign offer curve, 
and technology. 
If, however, the economy is willing to save OS3 in order 
to achieve a higher output target at X3 in the next period, it 
will not be able to raise output beyond that of X2. Here the 
economy is in a strict foreign exchange bottleneck, as the 
foreign exchange imposes an independent constraint to domestic 
savings to achieving any target output higher than X2 even if 
potential savings are greater than OS2. 
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For this independent foreign exchange constraint to output 
growth to prevail it is necessary that all three assumptions must 
hold simultaneously. Because relaxing assumption 1 implies that 
the isoquants no longer become horizontal, hence output can be 
increased with increased saving, there will no longer be a fixed 
import capacity as long as the marginal rate of transformation 
along the offer curve remains positive. And if assumption 2 is 
relaxed and import substitution is possible then as long as 
domestic rate of transformation does not fall to zero there - 
will not be an independent foreign exchange constraint. 
Moreover, Lal distinguished between a strict foreign 
II 
exchange bottleneck case, a partial foreign exchange bottleneck 
case and the pure savings constraint. Whereas in the 'strict' 
case the economy can get no increase in future output from in- 
creasing current savings, in the partial case the economy can get 
an increase in future output, but given the planners utility 
function, the marginal utility of the increase in future output 
made possible by the transformation possibilities is less than 
the marginal utility of present consumption which has to be fore- 
gone to obtain this increase. In the pure saving constraint the 
economy will have transformation possibilities open to it which 
provide the means for achieving a higher level of output and a 
social welfare, but the only limitation will be the inability to 
mobilize the required amount of savings. 
in view of these minimal assumptions suggested by Lal, 
II 
the neoclassical case can be presented. Bruton (1969) argues 
that the trade limit is unlikely to occur in a well managed 
economy. The distinction between the two gaps according to him 
is not due to some inherent productive structure in the economy 
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but due to particular policies that are themselves growth 
impeding, and basing aid policy on the two-gap hypothesis 
provides the wrong incentives to LDCsl. Bruton cited a set of 
circumstances - on the basis of assumptions about the elasticity 
of foreign demand curve for domestically produced goods and the 
elasticity of domestic supply - in which savings can be trans- 
formed into capacity creating activities, and that the ability to 
save can be matched by the ability to improve foreign exchange 
earnings, so that no trade gap distinct from the saving gap will 
emerge. 
If foreign demand for domestically produced consumer goods 
is perfectly elastic, then, when saving rate is increased 
domestic consumption is reduced and exports and imported capital 
formation will increase by the same amount. In this case there 
can be no trade gap distinct from the savings gap. If, however, 
the elasticity of foreign demand exceeds unity and less than 
infinity and prices fall as domestic demand falls with an increase 
in the saving rate, the rate of capital formation will increase 
up to a certain maximum point beyond which a given increase in 
the rate of capital formation requires more savings than at the 
original price. If the target rate of growth requires a higher 
growth rate of capital formation than this maximum then a trade 
gap emerges which cannot be closed by increased saving rate. 
On the supply side, domestic suppliers may be unwilling to 
export at all at the set price even if the foreign demand is 
elastic. In such a situation an increase in savings will 
decrease the domestic demand, but exports will not increase. 
1Brutcn, 
H. J. The Two Gap Approach to Aid and Development: Cc ent. The 
American Economic Review 1969 p. 446. 
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Devaluation may help in this case. Because in terms of domestic 
currency a sufficient devaluation will raise the foreign demand 
curve leading to increases in exports and savings rates which will 
necessarily raise the rate of capital formation so that the poss- 
ibility of two gaps disappears. But devaluation raises the 
foreign exchange earnings only for the newly established export 
sector which is small compared to the traditional export sector for 
which foreign demand is quite inelastic and devaluation may reduce 
the rate of foreign exchange earnings. Hence, with a very large 
traditional export sector and a small new export sector, Bruton 
suggested devaluation plus a duty on traditional exports (or dual 
exchange rates) which would lead to an increase in foreign exchange 
earnings and the elimination of the distinction between the two gaps 
"... without devaluation and the export duty there can indeed be 
two gaps, but they exist not for structural reasons, but because 
of the inability or unwillingness to pursue a policy that would 
eliminate the distinction between the gaps" (p. 442). 
Bruton's other main objection to the two gap approach is that 
a shift to less import-intensive forms of investment - such as 
education, health, technical research and a variety of factors other 
than physical capital that do not require imported capital goods - 
can eliminate the 'gap between the gaps'. 
In replying to the criticisms raised by Bruton, Chenery 
(1969) has first emphasized that the two gap analysis is a 
manifestation of structural disequilibrium which he believed is 
a characteristic of LDCs attempting to accelerate growth and 
that there is no automatic way in which the two gaps become equat- 
ed in the manner of neoclassical equilibrium. However, Bruton's 
suggestion of the possibility of a wider range of alternative 
capital formations to absorb excess savings is acknowledged by 
h- 
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Chenery1, but in Chenery's view, using all the potential saving 
for less productive investment does not mean that there will be 
no trade limit because "... the effect of the trade limit will be 
reflected in the difference between the lower growth resulting 
from this constraint on the composition of investment and the 
higher growth produced with an optimal composition" (1969, p. 447). 
Clearly Bruton's argument does not reduce the possibility 
that a dominant trade limit will occur with some frequency as a 
result of either an unanticipated change in the external markets 
or ineffective national policies or both. As a matter of fact, 
the importance of the trade limit - distinct from the saving limit - 
appeared in many non-oil producing developing countries after 1973 
as a result of the rise in the price of oil and the slow down in 
world growth. 
A study undertaken by Wynn (1980) on Sudan's economy over 
the period 1955-71 concluded that ex-ante difference between 
gaps can occur at a point in time, and this is a real possibility 
in a country like the Sudan because of "the limited opportunities 
available over what must be regarded as early stages of the 
development process, the heavy reliance on the export of a single 
primary commodity (cotton), and the fact that avoidance of this 
phenomenon was not considered a subject for policy during this period"i 
1As 
a matter of fact several of the two gap models diaronstrate that a trade 
gap in excess of the savings gap will not appear if resources are optimally 
allocated over time. See Chenery, H. B. and MacEwan, A. 'Optimal Patterns 
of Growth and Aid: The Case of Pakistan'. The Pakistan. Developreent Review, 
1966,6(2); Adelman, I and Chenery, H. B. 'Foreign Aid and Economic Develop- 
ment - The Case of Greece'. The Review of Economics and Statistics, Feb. 1966; 
and Chenery, H. B. and Strout, A. 'Foreign Assistance and Ecan anic Developmnt'. 
The American Econanic Review, Sept. 1966. 
ýýYnn, 
R. F. 'Foreign Capital, Trade and Savings: The Sudan 1955-71. Malayan 
Econanic Review, 25(2), 1980, p. 16. 
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In Chapter 5 we shall explain how in the Sudan a foreign 
exchange limit caused by structural rigidities, ineffective 
domestic policies, as well as external shocks following the 1973 
oil price rises and the global inflation has developed and 
represented a separate limit to growth and development in the 
country. 
In the next chapter we shall examine some further 
objections to the validity and operational usefulness of aid 
growth models, highlight the respective modifications to them, 
and assess their usefulness in explaining the growth process with 
foreign aid and in estimating foreign aid requirements. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FURTHER CRITICISM AND MODIFICATIONS 
TO AID GROWTH MODELS 
In this chapter we shall examine some further criticisms 
and objections raised against the aid growth models - two gap 
models in particular - with regard to the inter-relationship 
between the internal and external variables of the models and 
the derivation of the values of the basic parameters, namely, 
the saving function, the ICOR, the propensity to import and 
export growth rate, as well as the refinements introduced to 
them. Particular attention is focussed on the criticisms and 
modifications made to the models specifications with respect to 
the saving function and to the assumption that foreign resources 
are exactly additive to domestic savings and domestically financed 
imports. 
3.1 THE SAVING FUNCTION 
The key parameter used in the aid. growth models is the 
marginal propensity to save (PAPS). The MPS is assumed to be 
stable and is determined by gross national income or in some models 
by per capita income. Objections have frequently been made to 
these assumptions on the grounds that the MPS may vary over time, 
and that aggregate saving is a function of a number of inter- 
dependent variables such as exports, taxation, investment oppor- 
tunities, institutional factors and foreign capital inflow, which 
together with income determine the saving function. 
Although the Keynesian explanation of saving behaviour is 
widely accepted, empirically tested - with a wide variety of 
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formulations1 - and has played an important role in the analysis 
of the development possibýlities in LDCs, doubt is cast by some 
economists on this saving income relationship. In a study of 
the behaviour of the aggregate savings co-efficient in the course 
of the Brazilian development (1939-1960) Leff (1968) found that 
the Brazilian savings coefficient showed no tendency to rise in 
the course of rapid development. Unit income elasticity of 
savings persisted despite the undertaking of several important 
policy measures thought to be on a priori grounds as conducive to 
raising marginal savings rates. 
In searching for an explanation for the failure of the 
Brazilian saving rate to rise with rising income, Leff (1968) 
also examined the relationship between saving and net capital 
inflow. He ran regression models for two periods 1940-1960 and 
1947-1960, in which annual domestic savings was taken as the 
dependent variable determined by the level of national income in 
the previous year and the current volume of net foreign capital 
inflow. Interestingly enough he obtained different results. For 
the period 1940-60 he found an inverse relationship between net, 
foreign capital inflow and domestic saving, but for the period 
1947-60 regression results showed a positive association. 
However, the relationship between domestic savings and the 
inflow of foreign capital has given rise to a debate which has 
become a central issue in the discussion of the role of foreign 
aid in the growth process. A number of essays2 have concluded 
that aid and other foreign inflows reduce domestic savings and 
See Mikesell and Zuiser for a sunnary of these formulations: savings functions 
in developing countries. Journal of Eccncanic Literature, March 1973. 
2They include Criffen, K. B. & Enos, J. 'Foreign Assistance, Objectives & CcSrse- 
nces', Econcanic Develo t& Cultural Change, April 1970; Griffin, K. B. 
Foreign Capit Dcrrestic Savings & Econcrnic tevelopm zt' , Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Econamics & Statistics May 1970; R na , A. 
` oreign 
Capital & Danestic Savings: A Test of Haavelmo's Hypothesis with Cross-Country 
Data', Pevi, ew of Economics & Stats. Feb. 1968" Weisskopf, T. 'The Impact of Foreign 
Capit in Undercvelcped Countries' Journal of Inter- 
National Econcmics. Feb. 1972. 
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are used in part for consumption. 
Rahman (1968) suggests a 'psychological' (behaviouristic) 
hypothesis to explain the negative effect of capital imports on 
domestic savings. Governments in LDCs may "voluntarily relax 
domestic saving efforts when more foreign aid is available than 
otherwise" (p. 137). In order to test this hypothesis Rahman 
ran least-squares regression of saving ratio Y on the ratio of 
capital inflow to GNP Y as estimated by Chenery and Strout's 
study (1966) for 31 LDCS for the year 1962. The following results 
were obtained: 
Y=0.1427 
- 0.2473 
Y 
(2.568) 
where 2.568 is the student's T. 
On the basis of this result he concluded that it is likely 
that foreign capital is used not only for augmenting investment 
but also is a substitute for domestic savings in LDCs. However, 
it is interesting to note that Gupta (1970) criticized Rahman's 
selection of only 31 countries out of the 50 countries included 
in Chenery-Strout's study (1966). Using the same source of data, 
i. e. Chenery-Strout study and the same equation, he ran a regression 
for all the 50 countries instead of the 31 selected by Rahman. He 
found that the coefficient on Y was positive (0.03) but not 
significantly different from zero. The result of his regression 
was: 
s=0.11083 + 0.0310 
Y 
(0.0088) (0.0804) 
(The standard errors of the regression coefficient are given in 
the parentheses). 
I 
6- 
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On the basis of this result he pointed out that foreign 
capital inflow has virtually no effect on domestic savings in 
LDCs. Gupta has further carried out another experiment based on 
the same set of data. He classified the 50 countries into three 
groups according to the level of income per capita. He found 
that the effect of foreign capital inflow on domestic savings 
is positive for countries in the lowest and the highest per capita 
income groups. Only in the middle income category are Rahman's 
results obtained, but with insignificant negative coefficient. 
Gupta left this insignificant negative coefficient to be explained, 
perhaps by non-economic factors. But, on the whole he found that 
inflows of foreign capital are likely to intensify domestic 
saving efforts instead of slackening them. 
A further empirical test of Rahman's psychological thesis 
has been provided by Landau (1971). He regressed the average tax 
rate against per capita GNP and the ratio of foreign capital 
inflow to GNP for 10 Latin American countries. He found that only 
two countries behaved in a manner that may be consistent with the 
psychological explanation, whereas the other 8 countries gave no 
evidence of the applicability of the hypothesis. 
Griffin (1970) argues that capital imports do not enable 
investment to rise by the full amount of the extra resources, 
but - increase consumption with a resultant-fall in domestic 
savings which partly offsets the increase in foreign savings. In 
particular he argues that foreign capital represents a transfer 
of resources or purchasing power from one nation to another. It 
is therefore reasonable to assume that consumption will he a 
positive function of total available resources, that is, national 
income plus net capital imports. He also emphasized three 
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channels through which an increase in foreign capital leads to 
a reduction in domestic savingsl First, public savings may 
decline because governments finding abundant resources from abroad 
expand their consumption and refrain from raising taxes to the 
extent that aid becomes'a substitute for tax reform. Secondly, 
private savings may decline because the availability of debt 
finance on soft terms may reduce the incentive of local investors 
to save. Thirdly, capital imports may reduce domestic savings 
by stimulating the consumption of importables and exportables. 
However, the main support for Griffin's argument comes from 
the various statistical studies that show a negative correlation 
between capital imports and domestic saving. A cross-country 
study of 32 LDCs using United Nations' data gave Griffin the 
following inverse relationship: 
11.2 - 0.73 
F R2 = 0.54 
Yy 
(0.11) 
where: 
S= 
gross domestic saving as a per cent of GDP Y (1962-1964) 
F= foreign capital inflow as a per cent of GDP Y (1962-1964) (foreign capital inflow defined 
as the net deficit in the current account of 
the balance of payment) 
A similar regression for 13 countries from Asia and the 
Middle East taken from the above sample produced similar results: 
16.1 - 0.82 
Y 
(0.52) 
R2 = 0.71 
Another study for a single country Colombia over a period 
Griffin, K., 'Foreign-Capital, Drnestic Savings and Econcrtic Deve] t' . Bulletin of the Oxford thiversity Institute of Econcmics and Statistics, 
May 1970, p. 106. 
T 
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of thirteen years (1950-1963) also yielded a negative relation- 
ship between domestic savings and foreign capital: 
Y= 21.5 - 0.84 
Y R2 = 0.43 
(0.29) 
Weisskopf (1972) carried out a pooled regression to 
estimate the ex-ante savings function. He obtained the 
following result: 
S=a+0.183Y - 0.227F + 0.176E 
(t=65.9) (t=-5.3) (t=4.6) 
where S= ex-ante gross domestic savings, Y= GDP, F= net 
foreign capital inflow, and E= export earnings. 
According to this result, approximately 23% of net foreign 
capital inflow substitutes for domestic savings. Weisskopf's 
theoretical explanation for this finding follows the same 
reasons put forward by Rahman and Griffin. Foreign capital 
inflow - according to them - represents an addition to the 
total supply of resources available to a country which will 
increase the possible magnitude of domestic expenditures 
... "to the extent that the government or the private sector wish 
to use the additional available resources to increase public 
as well as private consumption, there will be a decline in 
intended domestic savings"l. However, the validity of this 
explanation depends on whether the use of the additional resources 
from abroad is free or not. 
1 
Weisskopf, T. 'The Impact of Foreign Capital Inflow on Danestic Savings 
in Underdeveloped Countries', Journal of International Economics 1972, 
p. 26. 
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It is important to note that Weisskopf points out that 
the negative impact of foreign capital inflow on domestic 
savings applies to ex-ante savings but not necessarily to ex- 
post savings. When the trade gap is the binding constraint the 
impact of foreign capital inflow on ex-post savings is more like- 
ly to be positive because foreign capital in such a case will 
help to relieve the independent limitation on investment imposed 
by a shortage of specific imports -a view which (as we have 
seen in Chapter 2) is emphasized by the foreign exchange gap 
model. 
A further empirical evidence for a negative relationship 
between foreign capital inflow and domestic savings has been 
reported by Singh (1975). He investigated the relationship 
between an increase in the ratio of foreign capital inflow to 
GNP (Fly ) and the average propensity to save. Unlike other 
investigators he also studied the relationship between an increase 
in the ratio of foreign capital inflow to national savings 
FIS 
and the average propensity to save. He found both correlations 
to be significantly negative. 
However, Singh has also found that the degree of substitution 
varies inversely with the level of average saving behaviour; for 
an APS> 0.15 an increase in foreign capital inflow will lead to 
increased saving1. This finding gives support to the 'self-help' 
criterion mentioned earlier that the stronger the country in its 
self-help efforts the more it can be helped by foreign capital 
inflow. 
1 
Singh, S. K. 'Develognent Economics: Score Findings'. D. C. Heath and 
Company, Lexington Books, Toronto, London 1975, p. 145. 
L- 
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Hazari (1975/76) suggested a mechanism for expecting the 
inverse relationship between domestic savings and foreign capital 
inflow which operates through the impact of the latter on 
taxation effort, income inequalities and conspicuous consumption. 
"Insofar as foreign aid goes to perpetuate income inequalities 
and differences in living standards it provides strong incentive 
to consume"'. But Hazari was careful to acknowledge'that not 
all aid goes to perpetuate income inequalities. In his view the 
US PL480 scheme which provides food grains to LDCs reduces income 
inequalities. No empirical evidence regarding his hypothesis has 
been offered. 
Chenery and Eckstein's (1970) study on Latin American 
countries also revealed a negative association between foreign 
capital inflow and domestic savings. But their interpretation 
of the saving experience in these countries follows the impli- 
cations of the two-gap model which assumes explicitly that when 
the foreign exchange gap is dominant and foreign capital available 
is more than enough to fill the ex-ante savings gap, a possible 
adjustment mechanism for equalizing the two gaps ex-post would 
be for consumption to increase in step with the amount of foreign 
capital in excess of ex-ante savings gap. 
Chenery and Eckstein tested the relationship between savings 
income, exports, and foreign capital inflow by fitting a regression 
equation in which gross domestic savings (S) was assumed to be a 
function of GNP (Y), the inflow of foreign capital (F) and the 
share of exports in GNP 
E/Y. 
S=a+ b1Y + b2E/Y + b3F 
1 Hazari, B. R. 'Foreign Aid, Ccnspicuous Consun tiara and Dcamestic Savings: Score 
Theoretical Observations. Journal of Develognent Studies, Vol. 12,1975-76. P. Loo 
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The results showed that in 12 out of 16 countries the 
impact of (F) on (S) was negative. But, according to Chenery 
and Eckstein, the reduction in the level of savings in relation 
to income over the period covered by their study (1950-1965; 15 
years), has not been due to the observed increase in foreign 
capital inflow alone, but also due to the observed decrease in 
the export share over the years. They were also careful to foot- 
note that their interpretation does not imply that the total 
impact of foreign capital inflow reduces domestic saving. The 
relationship 
A S/ 
pF is partial and assumes that income is' 
held constant. But, external capital increases income and domestic 
saving increases with income; hence, if 
A S/ 
AF were negative 
in the short run, in the long run the total impact on saving would 
be positive, especially when the cumulative effects on income 
are taken into considerationl. 
The studies reviewed above which gave empirical evidence 
of the possibility of the existence of a negative association 
between domestic savings and foreign capital inflow suggest the 
modification of the saving function is needed to allow for this 
possibility. But, the statistical findings of this negative 
relationship have been questioned on the grounds that they may 
represent an ex-post accounting convention rather than a behaviour- 
istic relationship, and it may also be due to exogenous shocks 
causing a simultaneous increase in foreign capital inflow and a 
decrease in domestic savings2. 
1 Chenery, H. B. and Eckstein, P. 'Develogmnt Alternatives for Latin America'. 
Journal of Political Eccncmy, 1970, p. 975. 
2 
Papanek, G. 'The Effect of Aid and Other Resource Transfers on Savings and 
Growth in Less Developed Countries'. Economic Journal, September 1972. 
In Chapter 7 an evaluation of the hypothesis of negative relationship between 
foreign capital inflow and darestic savings is provided in the light of the 
Sudan's experience during the past two decades, as well as in the light of the 
saving experience of 50 developing countries in a more recent period 1977-1979. 
1ý 
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Nevertheless, Chenery (1979) in a postscript to his 
earlier paper with Strout (Chenery and Strout 1966) introduced 
a modification to the saving function used in the original study 
to allow for the belief that inflows of external resources have 
several origins and will normally lead to increases in both 
investment and consumption? The following saving function 
is introduced: 
St =S=S0+ a(' (Vt - V0) Q(', Ft 
where a is the proportion of capital inflow that is used for 
consumption. Hence, the saving function in the original form 
(that is in Chenery and Strout's paper 1966) becomes the extreme 
case in which all external capital is invested, that is 0. 
it 
However in Chenery's view q' should be treated as a policy 
variable in analysing the role of capital in development policy 
from the point of view of either the borrower or the lender. 
"An effective development policy will be that which channels a 
high proportion of external resources into investment when 
savings constitute the binding constraint" (1979, p. 446). 
Domestic savings have also been thought of as a function 
of exports. Several studies have shown a positive relationship 
between exports and savings2. The positive association between 
exports and savings seems to be plausible because conventional 
savings theory could lead one to expect a high propensity to 
save out of the highly concentrated incomes produced by primary 
exports. Such incomes are also administratively and politically 
1Chenery, H. B. 'Strmtural Change & Development Policy'. Oxford University Press, 
2See9Maiizels, A. 'Exports & Econcmic Growth of Developing Countries' Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1968; leery, T3.13-& EcKstein ve oilmen rnataves for Latin f 
American Countries', Journal of Political Eccn an 1970, p. 976; Lee, J. 'Exports '"'h 
& the Propensity to ave con nic ourn , June 1971; and Papanek, G. 'Aid Foreign Private Investment, savings & Growth in Less Developed Countries' 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 81,1973, p. 126. 
I 
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easier to tax and therefore facilitate higher rates of government 
savings. Moreover, countries with higher rates of exports tend 
to face less of a foreign exchange constraint on investment and 
therefore tend to provide more of an incentive to saving. 
However, the positive association between exports and 
savings gives rise to two possible shortcomings of the two gap 
analysis. First, the association between exports and savings 
indicates that the balance of payments of an economy cannot be 
treated in isolation from its investment-saving problem, that is, 
the ex-ante export-import gap is not - as the two gap approach 
assumes - independent from the ex-ante saving-investment gap. 
Improved export growth would reduce both ex-ante gaps. Secondly, 
gap analysis is liable to overstate the ex-ante saving gap for 
countries having a significant saving response to export changes. 
Institutional factors such as the business structure, 
saving institutions, capital markets as well as the environmental 
factors favouring savings were also emphasized as important 
determinants of savings ratios in LDCs. Support for this view 
has come from a study by U Tun Wai (1972) 
1 that has shown savings 
to be responsive to the number, availability and efficiency of 
financial markets. However, empirical studies of the saving 
ratios related to such institutional and environmental factors 
are difficult for statistical investigation. 
3.2 THE ICOR 
As we noted in the previous chapter the ICOR is used to 
predict the level of investment required to achieve a given growth 
Tun Wai 'Financial Intennediaries and National Savings in Developing 
Countries'. Praeger, New York, 1972. See also Hitiris, T. & Wiseman, J. 
'Aspects of the Mobilization of Savings in LDCs'. Institute of Social and 
Econamic Research, University of York, Discussion Paper 54,1981. 
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rate in income. The correct prediction of variation in the 
ICOR is of particular importance for the reliability of the 
calculation of aid requirements1. In aid-growth models this 
ratio is regarded as constant. However, it is argued by some 
economists that the ICOR is not a stable parameter, and it 
may itself be the result of the operations of other factors 
in the economy such as the rate of growth, availability of 
human skills, natural resources endowments. A study by 
Leibenstein (1966) revealed that the capital output ratio is 
always lower at higher rates of growthi This inverse relation= 
ship held true in 129 out of the 134 countries considered by 
him , which indicates that the ICOR is determined by the rate 
of growth and not independent from it. 
In a revised formulation of the Chenery-Strout model, 
Chenery and Eckstein (1970) admitted that the capital output 
ratio may not remain constant and it should be expected to 
be lower at higher rates of growth, because first, during periods 
of rapid growth improvements in capacity utilization are likely 
to occur. Secondly, the increases in factors other than capital, 
such as skilled labour, technology, and available resources, 
play a large part in determining the growth of output. Thirdly, 
when higher growth rates are based on greater investment, the 
part of gross investment used to replace old equipment and to 
construct social overhead facilities, usually represent a smaller 
share of the total. 
Surely, the determination of the correct behaviour of the 
ICOR is problematic, because it is determined - as we noted - by 
'See 
Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1. 
2Leibenstein, H. 'Incremental Capital Output Ratios and Growth Rates in the 
Short Run'. The Review of Econnnics and Statistics, February 1966, p. 24. 
31n their mode Chenery & Eckstein used an investment function dependent on the 
rate of growth in order to reflect the inter-dependence between Cox and the 
rate of growth. 
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a number of factors which may not be objectively quantified. 
Moreover, estimating the ICOR from historical time series may 
not produce a reliable estimate in case of wide fluctuations in 
the ICOR over time, which may not follow any uniform trend. 
Turning to the foreign exchange gap models used in 
calculating foreign aid requirements, we find that doubt is also 
case on the stability and correct estimation of the two trade 
behaviouristic parameters, namely the propensity to import and 
export. 
3.3 THE IMPORT FUNCTION AND EXPORT GROWTH 
Most aid requirement models consider imports to be. a 
stable function of the rate of growth of income. This is con- 
sidered by some economists as too simple, for it neither takes 
into consideration the variation in the capital output ratio 
nor the other factors affecting the volume and composition of 
imports, such as changes in the prices of domestically produced 
substitutes, changes in taste, terms of trade, changes in the 
level of reserves, and government policies concerning foreign 
trade, i. e. quotas, duties, foreign exchange control1. 
In order to obtain a more reliable import junction Maizels 
(1968), for example, introduced a disaggregated import function. 
Different functions have been suggested for imports of capital 
goods, intermediate products and consumer goods. According to 
him imports fall into two sub-groups: capital goods, including 
intermediate products for the capital goods industries, and 
consumer goods, including intermediate products for the consumer 
1 in In LrCs where mist of the imports are capital goods, ýroverents 
the COR inply less capital investment and hence less inports. 
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goods industries. While the former is assumed to depend 
essentially on the capacity to import which is influenced by the 
free foreign exchange availability provided by exports, and by 
net foreign capital inflow, the latter is determined as a 
residual. Hence the capital goods import function suggested by 
Maizels takes the following form: 
Mt =a+ b1Zt + b2Zt_1 + cRt_i 
where Mt is imports of capital goods, including raw materials 
for capital goods; Z is the capacity to import, and R is the 
level of monetary reserves reflecting the influence of short- 
term capital and monetary movements on import changes. 
Chenery and Eckstein (1970) realizing - though not 
explicitly - the shortcomings of the Chenery-Strout's model 
which treats imports as a linear function of income, have intro- 
duced two additional variables which considerably improve the 
estimation of the import function. First, because of the greater 
dependence of Latin American countries on imported capital 
goods than imported consumer goods, income is disaggregated 
into investment and consumption in order to measure separate 
import propensities for increases in investment and consumption. 
Secondly, usually government policies tend to make foreign 
exchange more expensive and less plentiful to potential importers 
when foreign exchange is scarce. In order to reflect these price 
and availability effects on imports, Chenery and Eckstein used 
two direct measures of the availability of foreign exchange to 
the economy, reserves of gold and foreign exchange at the beginn- 
ing of the year (R) and export earnings from goods and services 
(X). The equation used was: 
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rat= (M)t1+uAY+X4 C+o"4z+W (E/Y) +7fl (R/Y) 
where A refers to changes between the previous period and the 
current one; M= imports, Y= income; C= consumption; I= 
investment; ELY and 
R/Y 
represent current exports and reserves 
expressed as shares of current GNP to reduce problems of multi- 
collinearity. 
For all but one of the sixteen countries studied imports 
over the period 1950-65 responded positively with both E and R 
(slightly more to R). 
The possibility that the propensity to import fluctuates 
with changes in the terms of trade has also been suggested. It 
is asserted that the terms of trade of primary producing LDCs 
have generally worsened over the past decades, and to this extent 
their capacity to import has been depressed. But it is difficult 
to measure the net effect of a deterioration in a country's 
terms of trade on its overall balance of payments position because 
- as it is claimed - LDCs usually offset this deterioration in 
terms of trade by increased borrowing from industrial countries 
and from international financial agencies. However, an attempt 
has been made by Maizels (1968) to calculate the effect of 
changes in terms of trade on the capacity to import and on the 
rate of growth of GDP on the basis of a hypothetical assumption 
that the terms of trade remained unchanged over the period con- 
sidered, while net capital inflow has increased. The approximate 
effect of assuming no change in the terms of trade is found to be 
an increase in rate of growth in the capacity to import from 4.5% 
to 5.2% per annum for the countries studied over the period from 
1952/4 to 1962/3. 
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Import substitution policies have also been acknowledged 
as having an influence on imports function. It is generally 
accepted that developing import saving industries leads to a 
reduction in the demand for imports. But in the short run import 
substitution is likely to increase imports since the establish- 
ment of new imports saving sector requires investment with a high 
import content. Chenery and Eckstein (1970) thought that the 
inclusion of a measure of a long run import substitution through 
changes in the structure of production enhances the descriptive 
power of the import function. In their view the best single index 
of the ability to replace imports with domestic production in the 
Latin American countries considered in their study is the rising 
share of GNP devoted to manufacturing. But at the time of the 
study they were unable to incorporate this measure. However they 
reported in a footnote that "... when such a variable is included 
in the disaggregated estimating equation, it assumes the 
hypothesized negative sign for all the countries but Argentina, 
Peru, and Ecuador" (p. 978). 
As far as export growth is concerned, aid growth models 
- as we noted in Chapter 2- take export growth rate as 
exogenously determined. However, this exogenous postulation of 
export growth seems to be appropriate in view of the fact that 
the exports of many LDCs depend heavily on exogenous factors such 
as the international demand for primary products, the develop- 
ment of synthetic substitutes, fluctuations in prices, trade 
barriers imposed by developed countries and weather conditions. 
3.4 THE SUPPLY LIMITS 
Most of the aid-growth models ignore the supply side by 
assuming - implicitly - that the donors are sufficiently generous 
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to fill the maximum gap. In practice, however, donors may be 
willing to give less than the maximum gap, thereby forcing the 
recipient to make adjustments by lower imports and higher exports 
and savings. Hence, the weakness in the models which do not 
incorporate supply limits of foreign resources is that they do 
not consider this more realistic type of adjustment to dis- 
equilibrium. Surely, the supply of foreign resources has always 
been less than the demand. The recommendation of the latest 
report on international cooperation (Brandt, 1980) calling for 
a substantial increase in the magnitudes of aid resources is a 
clear indication of supply shortages. It is important that aid 
growth models which aim at providing a framework for macro- 
economic planning with foreign resources should take into 
consideration such limits which will affect the adjustment 
policies needed during the process of growth with foreign aid. 
However, a study by Chenery and MacEwan (1966) exploring 
the optimal patterns of growth and, aid for Pakistan, have in- 
corporated variations in the supply and the cost of borrowing to 
aid requirements modelt. Their model relates the features of 
optimal growth patterns to the objectives and development policies 
of the recipient country as well as the assistance policies of 
the donors (that is the supply limits). Clearly, any attempt 
to consider the supply limits in forecasting the demand for 
foreign aid (or aid requirements) will be complicated by the 
fact that there is now a large number of donors whose objectives 
range through a spectrum of humanitarium (moral), economic, 
randt, W. 'North-South: A Proaranme for Survival'. Report of the InceFend- 
ent Carrnission on International Develooarent Issues. Pan Books Ltd. 1960, 
pp. 237-256. 
2Chenery, H. B. and MacEwan, A. 'Optimal Patterns of Growth and Aid: The Case 
of Pakistan'. The Pakistan Development Review, 1966 6(2), pp. 227-231. 
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strategic and historical (colonial) grounds and their 
policies regarding the forms and allocation of aid resources 
vary considerably. 
3.5 SUMMARY 
In Chapters 2 and 3 we examined the basic models used in 
explaining the role of aid in the growth process in LDCs, and in 
estimating foreign aid requirements, and the major criticisms 
with regard to the validity and the operational usefulness of 
their assumptions. 
The general thrust of aid growth models is clear, foreign 
aid flows can be used by LDCs as a basis for significant acceler- 
ation of investment and growth as it performs a critical role 
in both resource mobilization and structural transformation. 
Once these structural changes are under way the demand for aid 
declines leading to eventual independence from foreign aid. The 
examples of Greece, Taiwan, Israel and the Philippines have 
been frequently cited as countries in which substantial amounts 
of foreign aid resources led to accelerated growth of national 
income and steadily reduced their dependence on external assist- 
ance for continued growth. 
The contribution of two gap analysis to development theory 
is that if foreign exchange is the dominant constraint it suggests 
the additional role of foreign aid in supplementing foreign 
exchange, without which a fraction of domestic savings might go 
Unutilised because actual growth would be constrained by the 
inability to import necessary inputs. 
However, the relevance of the framework of two gap approach 
I 
e 
to LDCs has been questioned. On the one hand, there is a 
neoclassical critique which asserts that the distinction between 
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the two gaps is based on very extreme assumptions and that the 
structural rigidities assumed in LDCs are rarely so great as to 
prevent a timely adjustment of the imbalance between the two gaps. 
Moreover, when the two gaps are not equal and foreign aid is 
used to fill the larger of the two, a less than full potential 
performance of the smaller gap will occur due to resource waste. 
On the other hand there is scepticism about the assumption that 
foreign resources are exactly additive to domestic savings. 
Nevertheless, in theory the two gaps can exist given the 
assumptions about the transformation possibilities emphasized by 
Lal (1972). As long as the substitution between foreign and 
domestic resources is slow and a long drawn process in LDCs, 
the possibility for the existence of the two gaps at a particular 
point in time or over time cannot be ruled out. To prevent 
resource 'waste' implied by the two gap analysis a coordinated 
development policy must attempt to speed up the process of 
substitution to equate the two gaps ex ante. When foreign exchange 
is the dominant constraint 'excess' savings could be used either 
for promoting exports or import competing activities, or - as 
Bruton (1969) suggests - to be used for types of productive in- 
vestment which do not require imported capital goods such as 
investment in human resources. 
There are also objections to the methods used in calcul- 
ating foreign aid requirements and in analysing the growth process 
with foreign aid. The limitation of these models is precisely 
that they operate at a highly aggregative level. The nature of 
the econometric approach in aid growth models raises methodolog- 
ical questions particularly with regard to the constancy of the 
structural relationships in the process of structural change. 
The postulation of constant parameters such as the ICOR, the MSR 
54. 
and the export and import propensities holds only when the past 
circumstances - economic, social as well as political - remain 
unchanged; ä situation which is inconceivable in view of the 
political instability in LDCs and the rapid economic and social 
change accompanying the development process. However, the 
enhancement of the descriptive power of the parameter values 
in terms of the factors determining them and in terms of 
their variation over time is not an impossible exercise if the 
necessary and reliable data are available. Needless to say 
considerable degrees of disaggregation have been introduced in 
the studies by Chenery and Bruno for Israel (1962), Adelman and 
Chenery for Greece (1966), and Chenery and Eckstein for Latin 
America (1970) which improved the estimation of the parameter 
values in question. 
Finally, on the basis of some observed negative relation- 
ships between foreign capital inflow and domestic savings, it 
is claimed that foreign aid supplants rather than supplements 
domestic savings and the effect of aid on growth is often offset 
by increased consumption. Moreover, it is claimed that foreign 
aid resources permit countries to defer difficult policy measures 
that would otherwise have been taken, that aid resources are 
often wasted and misused, and that the donors' objectives are 
mainly political. Taking all these factors together it is 
claimed that foreign aid, rather than accelerate growth, is 
likely to retard it. Subsequent chapters deal primarily with 
this controversy in view of Sudan's experience of growth and 
development with foreign aid resources during the past two 
decades (1960-1980). 
ý. i,, 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE SUDANESE ECONOMY FEATURES, DEVELOPMENT 
PERFORMANCE, AND CONSTRAINTS 
4.1 GENERAL 
What distinguishes the Sudan from many of the other LDCs 
is its vastness and freedom from population pressures. Other- 
wise it shares with such countries most of their characteristics, 
namely, low income per capita, low growth rates, dualism in the 
structure of the economy, the majority of the people are poor 
and have little access to the basic amenities, including 
nutrition, health care, education and safe drinking water 
l. 
In terms of area, the Sudan with 2.5 million square kilo- 
meters is the largest country in Africa and the Arab World. Its 
area is 64% larger than the combined area of the EEC member 
countries (excluding Greece). The problems of over-population, 
feudal systems and shortages of land that plague many of the LDCs 
do not exist in the Sudan. The vastness of the country offers an 
enormous potential for development. The range of climate from 
tropical forests in the south, an extensive savannah in the west, to 
semi-desert and desert in the north, is favourable for the 
expansion of agricultural activities of various forms. The Nile 
River and its tributaries provide a resource of the greatest 
importance for irrigation, transportation, and hydro-electricity 
generation. 
For a comprehensive list of characteristics of LDCs see P. Streete: 
I;: 
"How Poor are the Poor Countries" in Development in A Divided 
World (ed) D. Seers & L. Joy, Penguin Books 1970. 
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It is estimated that about 200 million feddans (1 feddan = 
1.038 acre) are suitable for cultivation, out of which only 
17 million feddans are currently under cultivation. In addition 
there are 218 million feddans suitable for forestry, and 57 million 
feddans as pastures. The country is also rich in livestock with 
some 40 million headl. Other natural resources are the 
potential fishing grounds in the Nile and the Red Sea. Mineral 
resources are gradually emerging as an important sector, but 
historically they were not important and their contribution to 
the GNP remained negligible. Oil deposits have been discovered 
in the south-western part of the country in 1979. Enough oil has 
been found so far to warrant the building of a pipeline from the 
oil fields to the port for exporting oil?. 
Unlike many of the LDCs the Sudan does not suffer from 
demographic pressures. With a population currently about 18 
million and increasing at a rate of 2.5% per annum, it has about 
7 people per square kilometer; in comparison, Tanzania has over 
16, Etheopia more than 24, and Bangaladesh 586 people per square 
kilometer. However, the population is not evenly distributed 
throughout the country with over 50% of the people concentrated 
in 15% of the total area. The main concentrations of the 
population are along the Nile and its tributaries, and in a few 
dense patches in the west, the south and the south east, with 
almost totally deserted regions in the north west and the north 
east. 
1 Information Memorandum: December 1980, Ministry of Finance and 
National Economy, Bank of Sudan. 
2 Plans to build a refinery for using oil for domestic consumption 
were abandoned recently. 
r 
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Although the vastness of the country offers tremendous 
potential for rapid economic development it has also been a 
constraint in realizing that potential. Given the size of the 
country and its low and dispersed population, transport and 
communication have been a major problem in the development process. 
Another important general feature of the Sudanese economy 
is the predominant role of the government in the control and 
management of the economy. Historically, the government owns 
and operates all the public utilities including railways, river 
steamers, electricity and water supply. It owns and manages all 
the modern agricultural schemes in the irrigated areas, owns the 
bulk of industrial enterprise, and monopolizes internal and 
external trade in certain basic commodities such as sugar, wheat, 
cotton, oil seeds and petrolium products. The public sector has 
grown substantially after the military takeover in May 1969, 
which was followed by nationalization and confiscation of a 
large number of private sector enterprisesl. Now, most of the 
non-traditional activities are dominated by the public sector. 
4.2 ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, DEVELOPMENT PERFORMANCE, AND CONSTRAINTS 
4.2.1. General 
The Sudanese economic structure is essentially agricultural 
both in terms of value added and in terms of employment. Offic- 
ially agricultural share in GDP is about 40%, but this is a clear 
underestimation, since economic activities of the other sectors 
of the economy especially industry, transport and trade, depend 
primarily on the activities of the agricultural sector. The 
After 1972 most of these enterprises - with the exception of 
commercial banks - were denationalized and returned to their 
owners. 
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agricultural sector produces raw materials for industry which is 
comprised mostly of agricultural processing activities. It also 
provides food for local population and surplus food and industrial 
crops for export. Nearly 95% of export earning comes from 
agricultural crops. Hence agricultural production and output is 
the single most important determinant of the overall economic 
growth, exports and the balance of payments position. In terms 
of employment, agriculture provides employment for 80% of the 
population. The industrial sector's contribution to the economy 
is still modest. During the 1970s, industry and mining has 
contributed a nearly constant 8-9% share of GDP. 
4.2.2 Overall GDP Growth Performance 
Data regarding Sudan's national income, like most other 
African countries, should be treated with prudence. Because 
continuous series for production and income exist only for some 
few economic activities, the gaps have to be filled by surveys 
which suffer from considerable margins of error. Changes in 
methods of estimating national income also make the estimated 
figures uncomparable. As a World Bank report1 reveals, for 
example, the following average increases in nominal GDP were 
estimated for the Sudan for the period 1976-78: 
IMF (April 1979) 27% 
IBRD (October 1979) 22% 
IMF (Tax Survey 1980) 15% 
Bank of Sudan 13% 
1 Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. The World 
Bank 1981 (p. 187). 
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However, the published data on National Income Accounts1 
show that GDP growth rates, in nominal terms, averaged during the 
decade of the 1960s, 5.1% per annum, and 21.8% during the period 
1970-19782. Clearly the high average GDP growth rates during the 
1970s reflect to a large extent price increases rather than real 
growth rates. Estimating growth rates in real terms is problem- 
atic because official estimates of Sudan's GDP and National Income 
are produced at current rather than at constant prices and there is 
no official GDP deflator. 
This deficiency, however, did not prevent us from using 
the available price data for deflating the official National Income 
data. In Chapter 8 we use. consumer's price index and imports 
price index to estimate real GDP growth rates for the purpose of 
examining the association between foreign capital inflow and real 
GDP growth rates. In this chapter we shall use data regarding 
the physical growth performance in the major sectors of the economy, 
which are likely to give a more meaningful indication about the 
growth trends and the development performance of the economy over 
the past two decades. Trends in sectoral growth performance would 
also enable us to detect in subsequent chapters the impact of 
external development assistance on this performance. 
4.2.3 Agricultural Sector Performance and Constraints 
The structure of the agricultural sector in the Sudan is 
represented on the one hand by the irrigated areas, mostly in 
publicly owned and administered schemes along the banks of the 
National Income Account Series, Department of Statistics, Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Planning. 
2 The latest published data on National Income are for the year 
1 1977/78.11 
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River Nile and its tributaries and the mechanized rainfed 
farms, and on the other hand by traditional rainfed farming and 
livestock activities. The irrigated agricultural schemes comprise 
large consolidated areas such as the Gezera Scheme, which alone 
covers two million feddans, the Rahad'project, New Halfa project 
and a number of smaller schemes along the Blue and the White Nile 
relying on gravity, flood and pump irrigation. 
The economic growth of the Sudan is influenced by the 
increases in the agricultural output of these schemes. Cotton 
which is the principal crop has been the mainstay of the economy 
for many years. On the average 52% of the country's export 
earnings still depend on cottonl. But, since 1974, realizing all 
the hazards of developing a one crop economy, such as vulner- 
ability to price fluctuations, adverse demand conditions and 
weather changes, emphasis has been gradually placed on the 
production of oil seeds, wheat and sugar cane. Large scale rain- 
fed mechanized farming supported mainly by external development 
loans - as we shall see in Chapter 6- gave important contributions 
to the growth of the agricultural sector and the national economy. 
As a result of the government policy to diversify the pro- 
ductive structure of the economy, the composition of agricultural 
production has changed in favour of groundnuts, wheat and millet. 
The share of cotton in total value of crops produced was reduced 
from 30.2% in the year 1972/73 to 20.4% in 1977/782. This policy, 
however, adversely affected the export performance of the economy - 
as we shall see in the next chapter when we analyse the export 
performance of the economy. This is mainly because the increase 
1Calculated for the period 1960-1979 (Bank of Sudan data on Balance 
of Payments). 
2Ministry 
of National Planning: Recent Performance of the Agricultural 
Sector (unpublished report). 
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in the production of other crops in the irrigated areas was 
achieved at the expense of a decline in cotton production aris- 
ing from the reduction in the cotton acreage as well as from 
declining yields caused by the relative neglect and the incentive 
framework which favoured the production of other crops. For 
example, over the decade 1969-1979, cotton acreage dropped from 
1.26 to 1.03 million feddans (about 18%). Average yields of 
cotton dropped from 537 to 392 kilograms per feddan (about 27%) 
also Table 4.1 and (see/Figure 4.5). As a result seed cotton production fell from 
675 to 407 thousand tons (about 39.7%), consequently, the volume 
of cotton exported fell from 1.47 million bales in 1971 to 0.78 
million bales in 1978 (about 47%)1'. The government, however, has 
been forced towards the end of the 1970s to concentrate its 
attention on cotton again, as the expansion in the production of 
other crops did not compensate for the lost cotton export 
earnings. In a way this situation is a manifestation of some 
sort of short-run structural rigidity stressed by Professor 
Chenery and Strout (1966). A situation which requires not only 
a policy change, but also external development assistance to 
enable horizontal expansion in cotton acreage as well as other 
crops; and a vertical expansion to improve the yields per feddan 
in the existing schemes. 
Figures 4.1,4.2,4.3,4.4,4.5 and Appendix Table 4.1 
reflect the trends which evolved over the two decades 1960-1980 
with regard to the production of the major agricultural export 
and food crops. The salient features of the trends in agricul- 
tural production are as follows: 
1. Total agricultural production for the major food and export 
crops - cotton, oil seeds, wheat, dura, duk-hun and gum arabic - 
lMinistry of National Planning. Recent Performance of the Agricultural Sector 
Unpublished Report. 
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Table 4.1 Cotton Yield per Feddan in the Gezera Scheme 
(in Kantars of 315 lb) 
Year Cropped Area Output in Yield per 
in 000s Feddan Kantars Feddan 
1960/61 429 1158.3 2.7 
61/62 468 2808.0 6.0 
62/63 485 1891.5 3.9 
63/64 509 1170.7 2.3 
64/65 508 1778.0 3.5 
65/66 510 1887.0 3.7 
66/67 542 2493.2 4.6 
67/68 553 2322.6 4.2 
68/69 574 2984.8 5.2 
69/70 578 2890.0 5.0 
70/71 588 3175.2 5.4 
71/72 589 2709.4 4.6 
72/73 589 2414.9 4.1 
73/74 589 2945.0 5.0 
74/75 588 2646.0 4.5 
75/76 380 1026.0 2.7 
76/77 485 1746.0 3.6 
77/78 474 1896.0 4.0 
78/79 409 1186.1 2.9 
79/80 446 1115.0 2.5 
Source: Bank- of- Sudan, Annual Reports (various issues) .:. 
Id 
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more than doubled over the two decades 1960-1980. The volume 
of output increased from about 2 million tons in 1960/61 to 
about 4 million tons in 1979/80, with an annual average rate 
of growth of 5.1%. However, as shown in Fig. 4.1 total 
agricultural output". -had been more or less stagnant during the 
1960s whereas the decade of the 1970s witnessed an increasing - 
though fluctuating - trend. But, it is interesting to note 
that the increasing trend in agricultural output has been mainly 
due to increases in food crops rather than in export crops. (See 
Figs. 4.2,4.3,4.4). Figures 4.2 and 4.5 show clearly the 
deteriorating trends in production and productivity for cotton, 
the major export crop over the decade 1970/71 - 1979/80 with an 
average decline of 3.3% per annum. 
2. The production of groundnuts and sesame, the second and third 
largest export items - which are partially used to produce cooking 
oil domestically - have shown a rising but fluctuating trend over 
the two decades, particularly in the case of sesame. In terms of 
area groundnuts acreage rose from 470 thousand feddans in 1960/61 
to 2.35 million feddans in 1979/80, an increase of fourfold. 
Sesame acreage rose from . 694 to 2.0 million feddans during the 
same period - an increase of 186% (see appendix Table 4.1). in 
terms of production, groundnuts output increased significantly 
over the period particularly after the adoption of the government 
diversification policy in 1974. During the 1960s and the 1970s 
groundnut output grew at an average rate of 13.4% and 10.9% per 
annum respectively, whereas for sesame production there has been 
a marked decline in the average output growth rate from 11.5% 
during the 1960s to 2.2% during the 1970s. 
3. The fourth major export crop, gum-arabic, for which Sudan is 
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the major world producer (Sudan's share ranges from 70-85% 
of total world trade) has shown an almost stagnant trend over 
the two decades. The production of gum-arabic has suffered from 
drought and locust as well as from replacement of gum trees by 
groundnut and sesame cultivation under intensified agricultural 
schemes. 
4. Food grain production (sorghum-dura-wheat and millet-dukhun) 
have increased remarkably over the two decades 1960-1980, with 
an average output growth rate of 9.2% per annum. This high 
growth rate is mainly due to the development of large scale 
rainfed mechanized farming production of sorghum (dura), which 
was supported mainly by external development loans from the 
World Bank and the Kuwait Fund for Economic Development1; 
and to the introduction of wheat production in the Gezera Scheme 
as part of the policy of diversification of agricultural output. 
A comparison between the annual average output growth rates 
for the major export and food crops during the 1960s and the 1970s 
- shown in Table 4.2 below - reveals that agricultural production 
growth rates have declined during the 1970s. Cotton production - 
the major export crop - declined by an annual average rate of 
3.3% during the 1970s, whereas during the 1960s cotton output 
growth rates showed a marked average increase of 12.6% per annum. 
The causes and the major constraints that limited the 
growth performance in the agricultural sector during the 1970s in 
general, and in the major export crop (cotton) in particular, can 
be summarized in the following: - 
1. Structural rigidity. As we mentioned earlier, the government'--; 
1 
See Chapters 6 and 8 
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Table 4.2 Annual Average Output Growth Rates of 
Major Export & Food Crops 196O/61-1979/80 
Period 
Crop 1960/61-1969/70 1970/71-1979/80 
Cotton 12.6% -3.3% 
Groundnuts 13.4 10.9 
Sesame 11.5 2.2 
Itura 8.1 4.9 
Wheat 20.0 11.0 
Dukhun 9.0 2.1 
Gum-arabic -2.6 0.8 
Constructed from Appendix Table 4.1 
decision to diversify the productive structure of the economy 
in 1974 has been made possible only at the expense of reduced 
cotton acreage, a factor which is partially responsible for the 
decline in cotton production and exports. This phenomenon 
manifests a kind of structural rigidity in the irrigated sub- 
sector of agriculture. As the development of new irrigated land 
is not possible in the short run the expansion in the production 
of groundnuts, wheat and sorghum (dura) adversely affected the 
cotton acreage. 
2. The decline in cotton production cannot only be explained by 
reduced acreage but can also be explained by the declining yields 
in the irrigated schemes. For example, in the Gezira Scheme cotton 
yield per feddan dropped from 5.4 kantars per feddan in 1970/71 
to 2.5 kantars per feddan in 1979/80 (see 'Fig. 4.5). Declining 
yields have been mainly due to the failure to increase the 
71. 
existing productive capacity in the irrigated schemes caused 
by logistical problems such as the provision of infra- 
structure and communications, shortages of foreign exchange to 
buy spare parts and essential inputs and the consequent neglect 
of maintenance, replacement needs, and inadequate farm 
machinery availability. 
3. Following the global inflation in the early 1970s there 
have been sharp increases in the prices of vital imported inputs 
such as fuel, fertilizers and pesticides which affected seriously 
the productivity in the agricultural sector in general and in 
particular the import intensive crops like cotton. For example 
it is estimated that about 20% of gross earnings from cotton 
exports goes to meet spraying costs alone which is necessary to 
l 
control pests to which cotton is vulnerable. 
4. Another constraint has been the shortage of both skilled and 
unskilled manpower for agricultural operations. The skilled man- 
power has been attracted by better earning opportunities in 
neighbouring oil-producing countries (Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 
Emirates). The unskilled labour on the other hand, did not find 
earning opportunities in cotton picking and in agricultural jobs 
sufficiently attractive. 
5. The Government policies have also contributed to the decreas- 
ing trends in cotton production and agricultural productivity in 
two ways: First, the adoption of an incentive policy that dis- 
couraged cotton production, such as heavy taxation on cotton 
1Ministry 
of National Planning, February 1981. Unpublished report, 
"Memorandum on the Sudanese Economy". 
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production through export levies and unfavourable exchange 
ratest. Secondly, the adoption of plans and policies that 
concentrates on the creation of new capacities rather than 
the rehabilitation of existing schemes. This is clearly reflect- 
ed through the allocation of external development loans - as we 
shall see later - to new projects. However, this policy has been 
changed towards the end of the 1970s, when the government 
introduced in 1978 a programme for economic stabilization with 
the main objective of raising capacity utilization in the 
existing schemes and providing the necessary facilities to 
ensure export expansion. It is only after this policy change 
that the government started to pay attention to the existing 
agricultural schemes in the irrigated areas. In 1980 a programme 
loan - rather than a project loan - has been secured for the 
first time from the World Bank and other foreign aid agencies 
for the rehabilitation of the existing agricultural schemes. 
4.2.4 Industrial Sector Performance and Constraints 
The industrial sector's contribution to Sudan's economy 
has been modest during the two decades 1960-1980.. Industry and 
mining have represented a nearly constant 8 to 9% share of the 
GDP. The sector is dominated by two subsectors which are typical 
for most of the LDCs in their early stages of industrialization, 
these are, food, beverages and tobacco industries, and textiles, 
clothing and leather industries. Heavy industry is confined to 
two cement plants and petrolium processing in the single 
refinery in the country in which imported oil is processed and 
For details see: K. Nashashibi, A Supply Framework for Exchange 
Reform in Developing Countries: The Experience of Sudan. IMF Lg. N 
Staff Papers, March 1980. 
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partially re-exported. Also, like many LDCs industrialization 
in the Sudan has been promoted either with the processing of 
agricultural commodities which are otherwise exported in their 
crude form, or with manufacturing of import substitution goods 
for the expanding home market. 
Industrialization in the Sudan started with the ginning 
of cotton early this century. But the processing of cotton had 
not gone beyond ginning until the early 1960s when two cotton 
textile firms in Khartoum North were established by foreign 
enterprises. The 1970s, however, witnessed a growing textile 
industry supported mainly by official as well as private foreign 
capital. Other import substitution industries which expanded 
rapidly during the 1970s were sugar, cooking oil, flour mills 
and footwear. The sugar industry has received special attention 
during the 1970s whena major investment programme to build four 
sugar factories has been completed in order to transform the 
country from an importer to a net exporter of sugar. But, this 
investment programme has suffered serious setbacks in its 
implementation on account of managerial, financial, technical 
and infrastructural problems. 
Appendix Table 4.2 and Figures 4.6,4.7,4.8 and 4.9 
show trends in industrial production of selected public sector 
industries, namely sugar, cement and food processing (fruits, 
dates and onion dehydration). With the exception of cement product- 
ion, all other industries have been established with the support 
of external development loans. 
Cement production showed a declining trend during the 1970s 
causing severe shortages in this vital input for building and 
(See Fig. 4.7). 
construction/ The severe shortages in cement have been aggravated -;; 
by the implementation of an over-extended public sector building fl 
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and construction programme during the 1970s, leading to pro- 
longed delays in projects' implementation in both the public 
and the private sector. 
Sugar production, which is mainly supported by external 
development loans, has been growing over the two decades 1960-1980 
as shown in 4.6. But the increased sugar production has 
not been due to increasing capacity utilization but rather due 
to the creation of'new capacities in the newly built sugar factories. 
As for other food processing activities there has been a fluct- 
uating but declining trend in date and fruit processing, and in 
(See Figs 4.8 & 4.9). 
onion dehydration particularly during the 1970s1 The deterior- 
ation in food processing activities is mainly explained by 
underutilization of capacity caused by the unstable supply of 
agricultural raw materials on the one hand, and due to lack of 
spare parts and maintenance equipment on the other.. 
Textile production has been confined until 1976/77 to two 
private sector plants in Khartoum North for which data are not 
available. The public sector textile production started in 1976/77 
with the operation of the Friendship Textile Factory at Al Hassahisa 
funded by a foreign loan from the Peoples Republic of China. 
During the subsequent four years, six other weaving factories 
started production. The combined output of the public sector 
textile industry has increased from 5.8 million meters in 1976/77 
to 17.0 million metres in 1979/80, with an average annual increase 
of 43% over the four years. However, these factories still 
operate below capacity mainly due to shortages of yarn caused by 
the fact that the government has implemented six regionally 
dispersed weaving factories before the central spinning plant to 
supply them with their yarn, a situation which manifests an apparent'" 
weakness in planning and coordination in the industrial sector. 
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The most striking feature in the industrial sector has been 
the high degree of underutilization of existing capacity and the 
prolonged delays in the implementation of new industrial projects. 
A study of the capacity utilization in 27 plants in the public 
sector in 1977 had shown that 22 plants were operating below 65% 
of their capacity and 10 plants below 35%1. From the various 
issues of the Economic Survey of the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning, several factors that caused the underutilization 
of capacity, thereby affecting the overall performance of the 
industrial sector, can be highlighted: 
1. Transportation bottlenecks of industrial raw materials and 
spare parts. Delays in deliveries by the railway system can 
be realized by the fact that during the period 1969/70 to 
1973/74 freight train delays as a percentage of total trains 
run were as much as 99.3% on average. 
2 
2. Foreign exchange scarcity has been a key factor accounting for 
the low capacity utilization and plant operating efficiency. 
Shortages in foreign exchange caused irregular and insufficient 
supply of imported raw materials and spare parts. In 1976/77, 
for example, private industry requested LS 120 million for 
industrial import needs. The government foreign exchange 
budget contained LS 86 million for this purpose, and in fact 
only LS 42 million was obtained of which half went to service 
import credit facilities obtained in previous years. 
3 
3. Shortages of skilled labour, management, and highly trained 
personnel have led to poor maintenance and equipment breakdown. 
This problem had been aggravated further by emigration to oil- 
rich countries in the Gulf region. 
1 
inistry of National Planning - Unpublished reports 1979 and 1977. 
2' 
Transport Statistical Bulletin 1974, Ministry of National Planning.; 
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4. Frequent power cuts during peak demand periods have always 
caused major disruptions in production. For example, in 
June 1977 unannounced interruptions in electricity supply to 
Khartoum North industrial area (the largest industrial area 
in the country) numbered 20 and totalled 115 hours causing a 
major disruption of production in the factories there. 
l 
4.2.5 Transport and Power Sector Performance and Constraints 
Transport and communication in the Sudan has always been a 
serious impediment to economic development. The country's physical 
size, the wide geographical dispersion of both population and 
economic activities as well as the importance of its export crops 
create special transport needs and problems. Although it is not 
a landlocked country, many places are more than 1,000 kilometers 
from the single port of the country by the shortest route. 
Historically the railways have occupied a predominant 
place in Sudan's transport system. The railway system includes 
5,493 kilometers of single track route. Estimates show that about 
two-thirds of long distance freight transport is carried by railways.; 
It handles about 75% of freight traffic and 70% of passenger 
traffic on the vital Port Sudan - Khartoum route. This route is 
of vital importance to the national economy because the economy 
depends on substantial imports of fuel, food, fertilizers and other 
consumer and capital goods as well as exports (cotton, oil seeds 
and gum-arabic), all of which pass through Port Sudan. 
The operational performance of the railways has generally 
been poor, creating the most severe constraint to the expansion of 
the national economy. Table 4.3 and Fig. 4.10 show that the 
railway traffic does not exhibit any regular pattern of traffic 
growth. It shows a considerable increase up to the year 1969/70, 
and a declining performance thereafter. 
1 Public Corporations in Sudan. Study by a government task force 
assisted by World Bank staff members and consultants - February 1978. 
Table 4.3 Rail and River Freight and Passenger 
Traffic Volumes 1960/61-1979/80 
Year Railways 
Freight (in Passengers 
millicri tcns) (in millicn) 
River 
Freight (in Passengers 
thousand tans) (in thousand) 
1960/61 2.1 2.9 - - 
61/62 2.5 3.1 - - 
62/63 2.8 3.2 - - 
63/64 3.1 3.1 150 186 
64/65 2.6 3.1 127 208 
65/66 2.6 3.4 127 187 
66/67 2.6 3.5 122 219 
67/68 2.5 3.4 124 237 
68/69 2.9 3.2 145 256 
69/70 3.0 3.9 122 302 
70/71 3.0 3.4 129 262 
71/72 2.9 3.2 134 267 
72/73 2.8 3.4 111 296 
73/74 2.6 2.8 91 182 
74/75 2.5 3.0 108 232 
75/76 2.8 3.1 98 307 
76/77 2.6 3.9 100 233 
77/78 2.2 3.0 102 255 
78/79 2.0 2.4 106 279 
79/80 2.1 2.6 91 66 
Source: (1) The Economic Survey - Ministry of Finance 
and National Economy 
(2) Transport Statistical Bulletin 1974 
Ministry of National Planning 
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This declining trend is explained on the one hand by the 
partial traffic diversion to road transport and on the other hand 
by the inability of the railways to handle the freight available 
sufficiently quickly because of 
1: 
1. Insufficient locomotives and rolling stock 
2. Lack of spare parts 
3. Physical damage to the track caused by washouts, sand dunes 
and excessive heat. 
These factors, combined with administrative problems, have 
caused delays, low operating speed and locomotive breakdown. 
Road transport in the Sudan received very little attention 
during the 1960s. By 1970 the total inter-city asphalt road length 
was only 375 kilometers (see Table 4.4). In view of the poor 
performance of the railways, it became increasingly apparent that 
transportation facilities were inadequate to cope with the increasi 
economic activity, -and that transport bottlenecks hampered the 
expansion of agriculture, industry and commerce in the urban sector 
as well as the implementation of the development projects. In 
1973 the government introduced the Phased Action Programmet which 
laid heavy emphasis on the provision of a primary road network 
connecting key markets and towns. By 1979/80 the cumulative 
asphalted road length in the Sudan reached a level of 1592 kilometer 
(an increase of 325% over the pre-1970 length). A further 762 
kilometers of asphalt roads are currently under construction. 
The fast growth in road construction during the 1970s, 
which as we shall explain is associated directly with foreign aid 
(see Ch. 8) 
resources have caused a remarkable shift in the share of road 
1 It has been reported earlier that during the period 1969-74, on the average tra delays - as a percentage of total trains run - are 999,5. 2A modified extended version. of the Five Year Plan (1970/71-1974/75) introduced 
the Government to revise same of the policies, priorities and investment 
allocations included in the Five Years Plan. 
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Table 4.4 Asphalt Road Length Completed Before and After 1970/71 
(1) Before 1970/71 
Road Section Length 
1 
Khartoum-Waden ani Road 187 km 
Khartoum North - Geil i Rd. 42 
Khartcxun Jebel Aulia Pd. 35 
Cmduunan-Wadi Sedina Rd. 22 
Sutmit Rrkoint Rd. 34 
Other 2 55 
Total 375 
(2) During 1970/71 - 1979/80 
(a) Completed: 
(1) Wadnedani - El Gedarif Pd. 228 km 
(2) El Gedarif - Kassala Rd. 220 
(3) Kassala - Haya Rd. 348 
(4) Haya - Suakin - Port Sudan Pd. 204 
(5) Wadrredani - Setmar - Kosti pd. 217 
Total 1217, 
(b) Under construction: 
(1) Sennar - Damazin Rd. 
(2) Nayala - Kas-Zalingi Rd. 
(3) Jebel Aulia - Dueim Rd. 
(4) Dueim Rabak Rd. 
285 km 
210 
158 
109 
Total 762 
Source: Ministry of National Planning. 
1. Work was initiated in 1963 under LS aid but in 1967 work on the project 
was stopped due to political differences between the US and Sudan government 
following the Middle East War in 1976. 
2. Includes Zookar/Sallalet Rd. 17 km, Gedarfe-Hillalat Rd. 17 km, Kalakola- 
White Nile 6 km, and Wacmedani-Barzitat Rd. 15 km. 
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transport via-a-vis other transport modes. In terms of ton-kilometer 
the share of road transport has increased from 25% in 1970/71 to 
60% in 1979/80. This is shown in Table 4.5 below. 
Table 4.5 Share of Road Transport in Ton/Km Carried by 
All Modes of Transport 
Ton-km in billion 
Period Total ton }an (all modes) ton-km carried by road 
Total % Total % 
1970-71 3.70 100 0.92 25 
1976-77 5.50 100 2.97 54 
1979-80 6.00 100 3.57 59 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Eccncxnic Planning - Planning 
One of the major constraints experienced in carrying out 
the roads construction programme during the 1970s has been cost 
overruns caused by price increases of labour, fuel and materials. 
The following examples given in Table 4.6 indicate the extent of 
cost escalation in some of the road projects. 
Table 4.6 Extent of Cost Overruns in Some Road Projects 
In Ls million 
Project Original cost Cost at the Size of % of cost over- 
estimate oanpletion cost nm to original 
of project overrun cost 
Haya-Suakin-port Sudan Rd. 28.1 34.7 6.6 24% 
El Gadarif Kassala Rd. 22.7 29.2 6.5 29 
Kassala-Haya Rä 35.7 61.5 25.8 72 
Kosti Bridge 11.8 19.5 7.7 65 
Total 98.3 144.9 46.6 47.4 
Source: Ministry of Finance & ECCnCniC Planning - Planning 
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This relatively high rate of cost overruns reflects on 
the one hand the adverse effects of the external factors regarding 
price rises in fuel and imported materials, and on the other hand, 
it points to other internal factors such as the inadequate project 
appraisal and the lack of proper evaluation of terms of contract 
with contracting agencies. Cost escalations have also been due to 
delays in project implementation caused mainly by delays in 
supplying materials to the contracting agencies by the government 
such as cement whose distribution is controlled by the Ministry 
of Commerce and Supply, and petrol whose distribution is controll- 
ed by the Ministry of Industry. Delays have also been caused by 
the non-availability of adequate local funds which are supposed 
to be supplied by the government. A problem known .. as. 
'the 
liquidity problem'. 
Besides the fast growth of road building, the government 
has also planned and implemented the petroleum products pipeline 
between Khartoum and Port Sudan. during the 1970s. It is a major 
transport project with the aim of relieving congestion on railway 
traffic between the single port of the country, Port Sudan, and 
Khartoum, the capital. 
River transport, in general, plays a minor role in the 
movement of freight and passenger traffic. But it provides an 
important means of communication between the southern and 
central regions of the country as alternative modes of transport 
are completely absent (namely railways and roads). The river 
transport system consists of Kosti-Juba (the capital city of the 
Southern region) 1,436 kilometers and Karima-Dongola reach in the 
Northern province 28 kilometers. The river services, however, have ii 
suffered from deteriorating operational efficiency particularly 
over the decade of the 1970s on account of lack of spare parts, 
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maintenance equipment, the number and age of the fleet, and the 
poor management of the service. Table 4.3 and Fig. 4.11 show 
the deteriorating performance of the river transport. 
Table 4.7 Electricity Generation 
in GWH (generated 
watt/hour) 
Year GWH Annual Growth 
(in million) Rate % 
1966/67 269 - 
67/68 288 7 
68/69 332 15 
69/70 372 12 
70/71 N. A. - 
71/72 452 
72/73 515 14 
73/74 544 6 
74/75 588 8 
75/76 628 6 
76/77 683 9 
77/78 738 8 
78/79 863 17 
79/80 935 8 
Source: The Economic Survey' - various issues 
Ministry of Finance, and Economic Planning 
Note: N. A. = not available 
Electric power generation, like transport activities, is an 
essential infrastructure for the growth and development of 
agriculture and industry. In the Sudan the total generating 
capacity at present is about 230 megawatts (Pfiff), 70% of which is 
hydro generated (the hydro potential capacity is estimated about 
1600 MW) . 
Electric power generation has been steadily growing since 
88. 
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the year 1966/67 (see Fig. 4.12). The average annual increase in 
electric power generation has been about 10% over the period 1966/67 
-1979/80. But, despite this steady growth in electricity supply 
the years of the past decade have witnessed frequent periods of 
uncertain and inadequate supply of electricity which have impeded 
the execution of development projects in many regions and, as we 
mentioned earlier, caused a major bottleneck in the production of 
industries relying on electric energy. The inadequate and 
uncertain electricity supply has been mainly due to the increased 
needs of irrigation schemes and many manufacturing industries 
established during the 1970s; as well as the increasing needs of 
domestic and commercial sectors in the urban areas which have 
grown considerably over the past two decades. For example, the 
share of urban population in the total population of Khartoum 
Province has gone up from 50.2% in 1956 to 71.9% in 1973/741. 
Electricity supply deficiency can be seen by the fact that while 
the demand for electricity in Greater Khartoum has been fluctuat- 
ing between 140 MW and 210 MW during the cold and the hot seasons 
respectively, actual supply has never exceeded 160 MW2. However 
the shortages in electricity supply have not only been due to E 
increased demand but-also due to reductions in the effective 
capacity of El Roseries Dam hydro turbines during the rainy ö 
M 
seasons- (especially in August) as the silt and debris borne by 
the Blue Nile from the Etheopian highlands blocks the turbines. 
4.2.6 Human Resources Constraint 
As we mentioned earlier, the majority of the people of the 
Sudan are poor and have little access to the basic amenities. 
1ILO 'Growth, Employment and Equity': a comprehensive strategy for 
the Sudan, p. 351. 
2Sudanow. A monthly magazine published by the Sudan Government, 
p. 25, March 1982. 
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Life expectancy at birth still remains at 47 yearsl. Nearly 80% 
of the adult population is illiterate, and about one-half of 
school age children do not enter primary school. Unlike most of 
the LDCs population growth in the Sudan - at about 2.5% per annum - 
is not a problem. Unemployment is negligible; in 1975 the 
percentage of the labour force which is unemployed is estimated 
to be 1.7% or 1.2% of the total population2. As a 
matter of fact the problem has always been one of shortage of 
labour in agriculture - particularly in the cultivation of cotton 
which is most labour intensive - and in industrial and services 
sectors activities. Added to this problem of shortage in 
unskilled labour is the more usual problem of shortages of 
skilled manpower, which has been a major bottleneck in the country's 
development effort. 
In the Sudan manpower problems have been aggravated further 
during the 1970s by a sudden and a severe drain of manpower at 
all skill levels to the nearby Arabic-speaking countries - Saudi 
Arabia, Libya, and the Gulf States - whose oil income has permitted 
them to undertake vast development projects and allowed them to 
pay salaries which by far exceed what can be earned in the Sudan. 
This so called 'brain drain' has left major staffing gaps in 
virtually every government ministry and department. Hence, many 
parts of key ministries and productive organizations are left to 
rely on relatively inexperienced personnel. Detailed data on 
the number and type of migrant: workers are not available as many 
migrants go to the neighbouring Arab oil producing countries as 
tourists or for pilgrimage in the case of Saudi Arabia, but they 
1 World Development Report 1981, p. 134. 
2 Growth, Employment and Equity: A Comprehensive Strategy for the 
Sudan. ILO Report 1975. 
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never come back to their jobs. However, the number of migrant 
workers registered by the Department of Labour is for those who 
complete their job contracts through that department. During the 
period April 1978 to March 1980, according to the Department of 
Labour records, 13,000 workers migrated through their offices'. 
This figure represents about 55% of the jobs secured by the 
department itself during the same period for skilled, unskilled, 
semi-skilled and university graduates inside the Sudan. 
4.3 SUMMARY 
The analysis of the physical growth performance in the 
major sectors of the economy during the period 1960-1980 clearly 
indicates that the external constraint - emphasized by the two- 
gap models reviewed in Chapter 2- has been a major factor limit- 
ing the production process in agriculture, industry and transport 
(railways). It is manifested on the one hand by the heavy 
reliance on imported capital goods such as agricultural machinery 
and implements and transport equipment, spare parts, maintenance 
equipment, as well as other vital inputs such as fuel, fertilizers, 
insecticides, and industrial raw materials. And on the other hand 
by the heavy dependence on a single export crop (cotton) whose 
production has been deteriorating particularly after the year 1974 
when structural rigidities in the irrigated sub-sector have not 
allowed for increases in the production of other export crops 
(such as groundnuts) and import substitution crops (such as wheat) 
without marked reductions in cotton production. Further analysis 
of this external constraint shall be presented in Chapter 5 
(section 5.3) when we examine the structure, features and develop- 
ments in the external sector of the economy. 
1 The Economic Survey - Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning - 1978/79-1979/80. 
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It is important to note, however, that sectoral physical 
growth performance over the period 1960-1980 indicates that there 
has been a large increase in the acreage of rainfed and irrigated 
agricultural lands as well as an increasing trend in the production 
of some agricultural crops such as sorghum (dura), wheat and 
groundnuts. There has also been a remarkable growth in road 
construction during the 1970s. In the industrial sector sugar 
and textile industries as well as electric power generation 
have shown an increasing trend. These achievements in agriculture, 
road building and industry are mainly due - as we shall see in, 
Chapters 6 and 8- to the availability of foreign development 
loans and grants which financed the foreign exchange costs of. 
these activities. 
However, self-sufficiency in sugar, wheat and textiles 
had not been achieved as planned by 1978/79 as the country still 
imports these basic food and clothing items. Failure to achieve 
this goal is largely explained by the prolonged delays in the 
implementation of the new projects, on the one hand, due to 
shortages in the supply of basic imported materials such as 
cement (partially imported) and fuel; transport bottlenecks, 
lack of sufficient domestic funds, cost overruns, and - as we 
shall see in Chapter 9- the lengthy procedures involved in the 
acquisition of foreign development loans. And, on the other hand, 
by capacity underutilization in the existing productive schemes 
caused mainly by the widespread shortage of foreign exchange 
needed to purchase spare parts, maintenance equipment and basic 
imported inputs, as well as the shortages in skills which have 
been aggrevated by the sudden widespread migration to the nearby 
Arabic speaking oil rich countries during the 1970s. 
In the forthcoming chapter particular emphasis will be 
94... 
given to the main causes that underly the lack of funds, 
domestic as well as foreign, which have been a major impedi- 
ment to the growth performance of the economy, namely the 
public sector's savings performance and the external sector's 
performance. 
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CHAPTER 5 
PUBLIC SECTOR SAVINGS AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONSTRAINTS 
In the previous chapter we have shown that the availability 
of foreign exchange and insufficient local funds have constituted 
major obstacles to the growth performance in the productive sectors 
of the economy, as well as to the implementation of the planned 
investment programmes. The aim of this chapter is to analyse 
the major features of the public sector's financial performance. 
as well as the external sector's performance, that is exports and 
imports, and the overall balance of payments developments. This 
analysis would enable us in the subsequent chapters to'clarify the 
effects - positive or otherwise - of foreign aid loans received 
by the Sudan in relieving these constraints. The impact of 
foreign aid loans on foreign exchange availability, domestic savings 
effort and the overall as well as the sectoral growth performance 
of the economy shall be examined in Chapters 6,7 and 8 respectively. 
5.1 PUBLIC SECTOR'S DOMESTIC FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: AN OVERVIEW 
At the outset of this section it is important to define 
the public sector savings and investment in the Sudan in view of 
the budgetary procedures. The public sector savings consists of 
the central government savings - that is, central government 
revenue minus central government current (non-development) 
expenditure - plus the savings of public enterprises in the various 
sectors of the economy. Public sectors savings are used together 
with external and internal borrowing to finance the public sector 
investment programmes (that is development expenditure)1. my, p 
1 Because of the difficulty in defining the concept of development 
expenditure different countries have different procedures for 
budgeting development expenditure. In the Sudan development 
expenditure is defined to includ all ex enditure a development 
project till its completion (such as capital expendrýiture on 
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three sources of finance in the public sector are clearly shown 
in the first Ten Year Plan, the Five Year Plan, and the current 
Six Year Plan. Table 5.1 shows the share assumed by the planners 
of each source of finance in supporting investment in the three 
development plans. It shows the increasing planned reliance on 
foreign aid and the decreasing planned reliance on domestic 
savings in financing planned investment. 
Table 5.1 Sources of Finance for Development Plans 
The Ten Year Plan .e Five Year Plan The Six Year plan 1961/62 - 1970/71 - 1977/78 - 
1970/71 1974/75 1982/83 
Total Investment: 337.0 100% 215.0 100% 1570 100% 
Sources of Finance: 
Danestic Savings 219.7 65.2 105.0 48.8 450 28.7 
Foreign Aid 117.3 34.8 110.0 51.2 835 53.2 
Internal Borrowing - -- -- 285 18.1 
Source: The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (Planning) 
Turning to what has actually happened in practice we should 
note that all the three plans have either been suspended or changed 
drastically over the years of the implementation mainly because of 
political instability and some external economic shocks following 
.... buildings and construction, equipment, vehicles, salaries and 
wages for those implementing the project, fuel and custom duties. 
Once the project is completed, all the current expenditure for 
operation and maintenance will be included in the Central Govern- 
ment's ordinary budget (current expenditure) or in the operating 
budgets in the case of public enterprises. Any expansion or 
modernization or consolidation of these projects is treated as 
development expenditure (see Azhar, B. A. Development Budgeting 
in the Sudan (1977). 
!I 
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the mid 1970's sharp rises in oil prices and the consequent global 
inflation. The Ten Year Plan 1961/62 - 1970/71, which was the 
first comprehensive development plan, was suspended in 1964 follow- 
ing a civilian popular revolution which ended the military rule 
of General Aboud. The Five Year Plan 1970/71-1974/75, which was 
formulated by a team of Russian experts, has also been suspended 
after two years of operation - following the failure of a communist 
coup in 1971. Instead an interim Action Programme has been 
launched. The magnitude of investment was increased, new projects 
were introduced, and the period of the Plan was extended for a 
further two years. The current Six Year Plan has also not been 
free from amendments caused mainly by the severe financial 
constraints just at the time when the government was about to 
embark on its implementation. As a result the investment pro- 
gramme had to be cut down in size to bring it in line with the 
expected domestic and external financial resources. This has been 
done through the first Three Year Investment Programme 1977/78- 
1979/80 and the current Second Three Year Investment Programme 
1980/81-1982/83. Both programmes were supported by strict 
economic stabilization and financial reform policies of the 
IMF/IBRD type 1. Because of the suspension, changes and amend- 
ments of the successive development plans, our analysis of public 
sector's financial performance is undertaken in view of time trends 
and annual budgetary appropriations rather than to compare perform- 
ance with initial plans targets. 
In general, the financial performance of the public sector 
over the two decades 1960-1980, as shown in Table 5.2 and Fig. 5.1, 
could be summarized in the following: 
I. To satisfy the 12-IF "ccinditicnality" for securing loans for balance of payments " support fran the I as well as fran other creditors like the t, TOrld Bank & the 
other developnent aid institutions it is necessary to undertake sane policies 
which are thought to be effective in bringing about the external & internal bal- 
ance of the eccnany. Cam-on exaq les of such policies are gov `t expenditure cuts, ''. 
exchange rate changes, revenue raising, abolition of subsidies, export pramtion, 
etc. h 
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Table 5.2 Public Sector Financial Performance 
(in Ls million) 
Year Central 
Gov' t 
Revenue 
Central 
Gov' t 
Expenditure 
Gov't 
Surplus/ 
Deficit 
Public 
Enterprises 
Surplus/Deficit 
Overall Public 
Sector Surplus/ 
Deficit 
1960/61 64.1 48.2 15.9 (3.6) 12.3 
61/62 60.3 51.6 8.7 4.5 13.2 
62/63 74.4 58.5 15.9 10.4 26.3 
63/64 78.6 60.8 17.8 (2.8) 15.0 
64/65: 73.9 62.9 11.0 (6.9) 4.1 
65/66 75.2 74.3 0.9 (10.3) (9.4) 
66/67 85.8 83.2 2.6 (2.0) 0.6 
67/68 99.0 86.4 12.6 3.1 15.7 
68/69 114.6 107.0 7.6 (13.2) (5.6) 
69/70 149.4 144.0 5.4 (13.9) (8.5) 
70/71 164.5 146.4 18.1 2.6 20.7 
71/72 163.7 153.3 10.4 (2.1) 8.3, 
72/73 176.2 171.9 4.3 (1.0) 3.3 
73/74 209.5 189.6 19.9 (50.3) (30.4) 
74/75 287.8 264.0 23.8 (84.0) (60.2) 
75/76 332.0 '303.2 28.8 (46.0) (17.3) 
76/77 388.4 351.2 37.2 (84.1) (46.9) 
77/78 465.3 451.2 14.1 22.4 37.0 
78/79 580.7 585.6 (5.1) (67.8) (72.9) 
79/80 717.1 720.4 (3.3) (34.1) (37.5) 
Source: 1. The Economic Survey - various issues - Ministry of 
Finance & Economic Planning. 
2. Bank of Sudan Annual Reports. 
Note: Brackets indicate a minus sign. 
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1. There has been a steady growth - in nominal terms - with 
respect to revenue raising (see Table 5.3). During the 
1960s government revenue grew at an annual average rate of 
growth of 9.4%, compared to an almost double rate of 17.4% 
during the 1970s. The high growth rate of revenue during 
the 1970s is inflationary rather than real, when central 
government revenue is deflated by the consumer price index, 
it showed a real average growth rate of 6.5% per annum during 
the 1960s and a much lower average real räte of growth of 
2.3% per annum during the 1970s. Current expenditures - in 
both nominal and real terms - were allowed to increase at a 
faster rate than the growth rates of revenue. During-the 
1960s average annual rate of growth of expenditure was 12% 
and 9.1% in nominal and real terms respectively, whereas 
during the 1970s the rate was 18% and 2.5% in nominal and real 
terms respectively. The result was that there was very little 
or no government savings to help finance development 
expenditure. 
2. The second major feature of the public sector financial 
performance is that the budgetary problems of the central 
government have been compounded by the deteriorating 
performance of public enterprises. Their financial losses 
led to excessive borrowing from the domestic banks which in 
turn inflicted inflationary pressures on the economy. ' 
l 
3. A third important feature is that despite the mounting diff- 
iculties experienced by the public sector during the 1970s, 
there has been an exceptionally fast rise in public sectors 
investment expenditure. As domestic resources were not 
sufficient to cover the increase in investment, the overall 
public sector deficit has increased. External development 
loans from multilateral, bilateral, suppliers' credits and 
1 For a detailed study of the Parastatal Sector See Public Corpor- 
ations in the Sudan -a study by a government task force assist- 
ed by World Bank staff members and consultants, Feb. 1978. 
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Table 5.3 Central Government Revenue and Expenditure 
Nominal and Real Growth Rates 1960/61-1979/80 
1975 = 100 
Revenge E xpendit ure 
Year Reue Rate Revenue Rate Expendit- Rate Expesidittme Rate 
at of at Con- of ure at of at of 
Current Growth stant Gmwth Current Grc th Current Grcwth 
Prim 1975 Prices Prices Prices 
1960/61 64.1. - 185.3 - 48.2 - 139.3 - 
61/62 60.3 (6) 160.4 (13) 51.6 7 137.2 (2) 
62/63 74.4 23 194.8 21 58.5 13 153.0 12 
63/64 78.6 6 196.5 1 60.8 4 152.0 (1) 
64/65 73.9 (6) 177.6 (10) 62.9 3 151.2 (1) 
65/66 75.2 2 185.7 15 74.3 18 183.5 21 
66/67 85.8 14 211.9 14 83.2 12 201.9 10 
67/68 99.0 15 216.2 2 86.4 4 188.6 (7) 
68/69 114.6 16 278.2 29 107.0 24 259.7 38 
69/70 149.4 30 322.0 16 144.0 35 310.5 20 
70/71 164.5 10 341.3 6 146.4 2 303.7 (2) 
71/72 163.7 0.0 334.7 (2) 153.3 5 313.5 3 
72/73 176.2 8 317.4 (5) 171.9 12 309.7 (1) 
73/74 209.5 19 327.3 3 189.6 10 296.3 (4) 
74/75 287.8 37 356.6 9 264.0 39 327.1 10 
75/76 332.0 15 332.0 (7) 303.2 15 303.2 (7) 
76/77 388.4 17 381.9 15 351.2 16 345.3 14 
77/78 465.3 20 392.0 3 451.2 28 380.1 10 
78/79 580.7 25 408.1 4 585.6 30 411.5 8 
79/80 717.1 23 385.3 (6) 720.4 23 387.1 (6) 
Source: The Economic Survey - various issues - Ministry of Finance and 
Eccnanic Planning. 
Note: Brackets indicate a negative growth rate. 
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commercial sources, as well as internal loans were used to 
cover the overall public sector deficits. Highlights of the 
public sector's domestic financial performance is given below. 
5.1.1 Government's Fiscal Effort 
Sudan's fiscal effort as measured by revenue/GDP ratio1 
has steadily increased during the 1960s. But showed a declining 
trend during the 1970s (see Table 5.4). Tax ratios - tax 
revenue/GDP ratio - has followed more or less the same pattern 
over the past two decades. This is mainly because taxation - 
direct and indirect - represents the major source of revenue (on 
the average over 70% of total revenue comes from taxation). 
A comparison of tax ratios with four African countries - 
which are at the same stage of development - showed that Sudan's 
tax ratios compare favourably with those countries during the 
periods 1966-68 and 1969-71 ranking second and first respectively. 
However during the period 1972-76 Sudan's taxation effort has been 
less vigorous, ranking third (Table 5.5). 
5.1.2 Government Expenditure 
As we noted earlier, central government expenditure was allow- 
ed to grow - in nominal and real terms - at a faster rate than 
revenue leaving very little or no savings for financing develop- 
ment expenditure. The rising trends in government expenditure 
could be explained by the following factors: - 
1 Revenue/GDP ratio is only a crude measure of fiscal effort made by a country. 
Relating revenue to the taxable capacity of the country may give a better 
zrreasure of the fiscal effort. The difficulty in applying this measure is 
that taxable capacity cannot be measured easily as it depends aIr 1g other 
factors on the psychology of the tax payers, inccane and wealth distribution, 
etc. 
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Table 5.4 Trends in Fiscal and Taxation Efforts 1960/61-1979/80 
(In Ls million - current prices) 
Year GDP 
Tax 
Revenue 
Total 
Revenue 
Taxation 
Effort % 
Fiscal 
Effort % 
1960/61 386.8 40.0 64.1 10.3 16.6 
61/62 420.0 44.8 60.3 10.7 14.4 
62/63 456.2 44.1 74.4 9.7 16.3 
63/64 463.8 50.4 78.6 10.9 16.9 
64/65 476.8 51.1. 73.9 10.7 15.4 
65/66 492.0 58.2 75.2 11.8 15.2 
66/67 497.6 63.6 85.8 12.8 17.2 
67/68 536.3 73.9 99.0 13.8 18.5 
68/69 583.3 84.9 114.6 14.6 19.6 
69/70 602.6 100.6 149.4 16.7 24.8 
70/71 637.6 120.8 164.5 18.9 25.8 
71/72 752.1 127.1 163.7 16.9 21.8 
72/73 896.8 133.2 176.2 14.9 19.6 
73/74 1246.2 157.1 209.5 12.6 16.8 
74/75 1510.8 216.5 287.8 14.3 19.0 
75/76 1848.0 270.3 332.0 14.6 18.0 
76/77 2339.7 303.8 388.4 13.0 16.6 
77/78 2878.4 345.7 465.6 12.0 16.2 
78/79 3462.0 397.1 580.7 11.4 16.8 
79/80 4072.1 424.3 717.1 10.4 17.6 
Source: (1) The Economic Survey - Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning. 
(2) Department of Statistics. 
Note: GDP figures for the years 1978/79,1979/80 are 
provisional estimates. 
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Table 5.5 Tax Ratios: Sudan and Other Four African Countries 
(Taxes as a percentage of GNP) 
Country 1966-1968 1969-1971 1972-1976 
Sudan 13.2 17.5 14.4 
Kenya 12.2 14.4 19.2 
Ghana 13.4 15.8 14.2 
Tanzania 11.1 13.9 18.9 
Ethiopia 8.6 8.6 10.1 
Source: 1. R. Chelliah, H. Baas, and M. Kelley "Tax Patios and Fiscal 
Effort in Developing Countries 1969-1971° IMF Staff Papers 
March, 1975. 
2. A Tait, W. Gratz and B. Eichengreen "Internaticnal Canparison 
of Taxation for Developing Countries 1972-1976" IMF Staff 
Papers, March 1979. 
3. Sudan's tax ratios are estimated from Table 5.4. 
1. Following independence in 1956, the early 1960s witnessed 
considerable increases in expenditure in social services, 
and expenditure to meet the expansion on the public estab- 
lishment both civil and military. 
2. The Southern Sudan civil war which lasted for 17 years 
(1955-1972) caused heavy expenditure on defence and security. 
The settlement of the problem in 1972 according to the Addis 
Ababa Accord has also caused heavy expenditure on the 
southern region to meet the costs of establishing the new 
regional government and rehabilitation of the refugees who 
fled to neighbouring countries during the conflict. 
3. The continuous expansion of the public sector employment 
led to an increasing wage bill. The wage bill has increased 
fast because successive governments have followed liberal 
employment policies on political grounds rather than on 
need criteria. For example, the 'Unemployment Fund' establish 
-ed in 1967/68 to absorb university graduates irrespective 
of the need for their services. The implementation of a 
Job Reclassification Scheme in 1977/78 for the civil servants, 
1oß. 
the army and the parastatals with the aim of applying 
the principle of'egual pay for equal work' has brought 
about substantial increases in the wage bill. 
4. Expenditure on local governments rose sharply since the 
implementation of the Local Government Act in 1971 which 
gave greater autonomy for local governments. As local 
authorities have a highly regressive system of revenue rais- 
ing and are not allowed to borrow, most of their expenditures 
were financed from the central government. 
5. There has been a fast growth in expenditure on defence and 
security during the 1970s. The present regime which took 
power in 1969 by a military take-over, believed that previous 
governments neglected the expansion and modernization of the 
armed forces. Moreover, the regional political problems in 
neighbouring Ethiopia, Chad, Zaire, Uganda and the Central 
African Republic have necessitated the maintenance of a high 
level expenditure on security. 
5.1.3 Public Enterprises' Financial Performance 
Public enterprises dominate all non-traditional activities 
in the Sudan, and contribute more than half of GDP1. The govern- 
ment is engaged in the provision of physical infrastructure such 
as irrigation works, land development, transport and communicat- 
ions and power, as well as in direct production and trading of 
basic commodities such as cotton, sugar, groundnuts, wheat, dura, 
textiles and petrolium products. Public enterprises have an 
obligation to pay to the Ministry of Finance and National Economy 
a share of their profits as well as business profit tax. 
The financial performance of public enterprises has been 
poor particularly from 1971 onwards. Instead of yielding surpluses 
they have relied on the central government and domestic bank 
borrowing to cover their deficits. Up to date data on the 
1 Public Corporation the Sudan 1978. A study by a Government task force 
assisted by World Bank staff members and consultants. , 
`! 
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financial performance for public enterprises are not available due 
to the poor state of accounts of many of the public corporations. 
However Table 5.6 gives an indication of the extent of the 
financial losses of the public corporations in the agricultural, 
industrial and transport sectors. 
Table 5.6 Net Profits (Losses) Before Tax 
For Sane Public Corporations 
in Ls million 
Sector 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 
Agriculture (4.1) (2.1) (5.9) (8.1) 
Industry 1.3 (2.2) 0.5 (0.2) 
Transport 0.4 (2.1) (0.5) 4.1 
Total (2.4) (6.4) (5.9) (4.2) 
Source: Public Corporations in the Sudan Feb. 1978, Ministry of 
Finance and National Economy. (Figures in brackets 
indicate losses). 
The main reasons for the poor financial performance of the 
public enterprises - as we noted in our analysis of the physical 
performance in the various sectors of the economy in the previous 
chapter - have been the very low capacity utilization caused, on 
the one hand, by shortages in foreign exchange and necessary funds 
needed for spare parts, maintenance equipment, basic inputs as 
well as expansion and modernization; and on the other hand, by 
poor management, inadequate organization and control, contradicting 
and unclear objectives and changing relations with Ministeries and 
departments. However, it is worth noting that measures to 
1 
Public Corporations in the Sudan 1978. 
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rationalize the operations of public enterprises came too late, 
when in 1979 the scope of the public sector was narrowed. For 
example, enterprises like perfumeries, sweets, plastic sacks and 
paper packs have been divested. Organizational measures were 
adopted to enable quicker and more efficient operations - for 
example, redundant supervisory levels of sectoral and branch 
corporations like the Public Agricultural Corporation and the 
Public Industrial Corporation were eliminated. 
5.2 PUBLIC SECTOR SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT 
The central government's financial operations with the 
resulting small surpluses together 
of the public enterprises has not 
to finance the planned investment 
a continuous reliance on domestic 
inflow to finance the gap between 
investment. 
r with the poor performance 
allowed for sufficient savings 
programmes, thereby leading to 
bank borrowing and foreign aid 
public savings and public 
As shown in Table 5.7 and Fig. 5.4, the proportion of 
government development expenditure financed from the government's 
savings has been declining over time. The average annual share 
of government savings in financing development expenditure 
declined from 34% during the 1960s to about 25% during the 1970s. 
However during the last half of the past decade, that is 1974/75- 
1979/80, this proportion has declined further to only 13.4%. 
The public sector's reliance on domestic bank borrowing 
since 1965/66 is shown by Table 5.8. It is worth noting that 
only after the year 1965 did temporary advances to the government 
under Section 57 of the Bank of Sudan Act become a regular phen- 
omenon. Over the period 1965/66-1979/80 net ban}cznc claims on the 
public sector grew at a fast average annual rate of growth of 29%. 
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Table 5.7 Government Savings as a Percentage of Government 
Investment Expenditure (in Ls million) 
Government Central Percentage 
Year Investment Goverrnnent Share of Sav- 
Expenditure Savings ings in Investment 
1960/61 22.9 15.9 69.4% 
61/62 23.8 8.7 36.6 
62/63 33.8 15.9 47.0 
63/64 47.4 17.8 37.6 
64/65 29.8 11.0 36.9 
65/66 26.0 0.9 3.5 
66/67 21.8 2.6 11.4 
67/68 24.1 12.6 52.3 
68/69 28.2 7.6 26.4 
69/70 29.4 5.4 18.4 
70/71 23.4 18.1 75.7 
71/72 24.9 10.4 41.8 
72/73 29.9 4.3 14.5 
73/74 44.4 19.9 44.8 
74/75 102.4 23.8 23.2 
75/76 113.1 28.8 25.5 
76/77 155.0 37.2 24.0 
77/78 185.9 14.8 8.0 
78/79 164.3 0.0 0.0 
79/80 175.7 0.0 0.0 
Source: Constructed from the Economic Survey - Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning, and data collected from 
the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (Planning) 
1981. 
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Table 5.8 Net Banking Claims on the Public Sector 
1965/66_- 1979/80 
(Ls million 
current prices) 
Year Net Banking Annual Rate of 
Claims Growth 
1965/66 
. 26 - 
66/67 37 42% 
67/68 40 8 
68/69 61 52 
69/70 79 30 
70/71 59 20 
71/72 126 33 
72/73 419 18 
73/74 191 28 
74/75 250 31 
75/76 358 43 
76/77 518 45 
77/78 658 27 
78/79 849 29 
79/80 962 13 
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Reports, various issues. 
The extent of the reliance on foreign aid loans will be considered 
in detail in the next chapter. 
However, despite the domestic financial difficulties - 
explained above - particularly during the past decade, there has 
been an exceptionally fast rise in the overall public sector 
investment expenditure (see Table 5.9). Public sector investment 
expenditure increased - in nominal terms - over the decade 
1970/71 - 1979/80 at an average annual rate of growth of 23.6%. 
The lack of an appropriate price deflator makes it difficult to 
give an accurate estimate of the growth rate in real terms, but a 
113. 
Table 5.9 Actual Public Sector Development Expenditure Growth 
Rates and Funds Absorption Ratio 1960/61 -1979/80 
in Ls million) 
Year Budget Actual Rate of Funds ALzsorpt Allocation Expenditure Growth of Dev- icn Ratio 
elcgnent Expend. 21x 100 
(1) (2) (3) 
1960/61 24.3 22.9 - 94.2% 
61/62 39.8 27.5 20.0% 69.1 
62/63 74.3 37.5 36.0 50.5 
63/64 53.5 48.2 28.5 90.0 
64/65 32.4 32.2 (33.2) 99.4 
65/66 41.4 28.9 (10.2) 69.8 
66/67 36.6 28.0 (3.1) 76.5 
67/68 46.7 25.2 (10.0) 53.9 
68/69 49.7 29.6 17.5 59.6 
69/70 35.0 30.8 4.1 88.0 
70/71 37.4 26.6 (13.6) 71.1 
71/72 67.8 29.8 12.0 44.0 
72/73 65.5 34.3 15.1 52.4 
73/74 114.8 53.7 56.5 46.8 
74/75 . 194.3 117.4 118.6 60.4 
75/76 146.0 137.0 17.0 93.8 
76/77 254.2 166.0 21.2 65.3 
77/78 306.9 192.0 15.7 62.6 
78/79. 202.9 169.4 (11.8) 83.5 
79/80 284.9 175.7 3.7 61.6 
Source: (1) Constructed fran data collected fron Ministry of 
Naticnal Planning. 
(2) Banking and Currency Section, Ministry of Finance 
and Naticnal Economy. 
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World Bank report on Sudan's economy concluded that "... it would 
appear that government development expenditure increased in real 
terms by well over 15% a 
The years before 1972/73 
stagnating level. The a' 
expenditure - in nominal 
was only 3.6% per annum. 
year over the period 1973-19771. " 
development expenditure was at a low and 
verage rate of growth of development 
terms - during the decade of the 1960s 
The fast rise in development expenditure during the 1970s 
could be explained by the following factors: 
1. The very ambitious development programme that the government 
has pursued following the signing of the Addis Ababa Accord 
in 1972 which ended the civil war in the south and brought with 
it a relatively greater political stability in the country as 
a whole. An Interim Action Programme was adopted instead of 
the Five Years Plan. Many projects aiming at achieving self 
sufficiency in basic commodities. like sugar, wheat, textiles, 
together with a large programme of infrastructure and roads 
construction were committed. 
2. The relatively high inflow of foreign aid flows over the 
past decade which provided the foreign exchange costs of the 
adopted development programmes. The association between the 
external development loans received by the country and the 
public sector investment expenditure will be investigated in 
Chapter 8. 
However, the implementation of the development programme 
during the 1970s has been constrained by the usual skill limitation 
combined with a severe drain of skilled personnel to the oil rich 
Arab countries. This problem is compounded by shortages of domesti 
1Report 
on the Economy of Sudan - World Bank October 1979. (p. 14). 
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counterpart funds, scarcities of vital inputs such as cement and 
fuel, inadequacies of supporting infrastructure such as roads, 
railways and power; as well as deficiencies in the local civil 
construction industry. Another constraint has been the rapid 
increase in the size of the development programme itself, as many 
project commitments were made within a short period of time lead- 
ing to an overburdening of the limited administration as well as 
the limited physical capacities. Projects at the various imple- 
mentation stages faced competition with each other for managers, 
staff, funds, railways, power, fuel and cement, causing long 
delays in implementation and serious cost overruns. 
In general, the ratio of the actual annual development 
expenditure to the annual planned or allocated funds (i. e. the 
funds absorptive capacity) could be used as an indicator to the 
implementation capacity in the public sector. Table 5.9, which 
gives trends in the funds absorptive capacity for the past two 
decades, shows that on the average only two-thirds or 66.1% of the 
allocated funds had actually been utilized annually. Clearly, 
this ratio is a reflection of the concept of the absorptive 
capacity limit emphasized by Rosenstein-Rodan (1961) and Chenery 
and Strout (1966) as we noted earlier. But it is clear from the 
above analysis that the absorptive capacity limit has not only 
been due to the lack of skills which is aggravated by the severe 
manpower drain to oil rich Arab countries, but it has also been 
due to delays in project implementation caused mainly by trans- 
portation and infrastructural bottlenecks, the lack of and delay 
in obtaining the building materials, the internal liquidity position 
etc. 
It is also worth noting that the high level of public 
sector investment after the year 1972/73 was reflected in substantia 
1 
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growth performance in some sectors of the economy. The expansion 
in the overall agricultural output has been a sustained feature 
of development particularly for crops like oil seeds (groundnuts 
and sesame) wheat and millet. In the transport sector there was 
a major expansion in the roads network. There has been growth 
in power generation though it lagged behind the needs of the 
economy. 
The conclusion we derive so far from the forgoing brief 
analysis of the public sector domestic savings effort is that, 
though the public sector saving effort had been deteriorating 
during the 1970s, public sector investment expenditure (develop- 
ment expenditure) had been rising. Reliance on external and inter- 
nal borrowing had been the major factor explaining rising public 
development expenditure at a time when public sector saving had 
been declining. 
5.3 THE EXTERNAL SECTORS PERFORMANCE AND THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
CONSTRAINT 
The main features of the external financial performance of 
the economy over the past two decades were reflected in the balance l 
of payments developments shown by Figures 5.5 and 5.6. The 
balance of payments developments over this period particularly after 
the year 1973 had been unfavourable and reflected a number of 
structural rigidities and difficulties in the overall economic 
performance and policies. 
There has been persistent deficits in the current account 
over the past two decades and in particular during the 1970s.: "7ith 
disbursements from external loans and other capital inflows being 
insufficient to compensate for these deficits, there was a severe 
drain on the foreign exchange reserves of the country. Table 5.10 
shows that during the second half of the 1970s international 
Third Party Material excluded from digitised copy. 
Please refer to original text to see this material. 
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Table 5.10 Foreign Exchange Reserves and Imports Cover 
in Weeks 1960-1980 (in Ls million) 
Year 
M Imports 
(visible & 
invisible 
payments) 
R 
total 
reserves 
R/M ratio 
% 
Imports cover 
in weeks (1) 
1960 76.3 58.0 76 39.5 
61 94.2 53.2 56 29.4 
62 111.7 50.2 45 23.4 
63 124.4 34.8 28 14.5 
64 114.8 24.8 22 11.2 
65 100.1 20.9 21 10.9 
66 104.0 19.9 19 10.0 
67 108.2 18.4 17 8.8 
68 120.2 16.6 14 7.2 
69 114.5 12.7 11 5.8 
70 132.0 7.6 6 3.0 
71 141.5 9.7 7 3.6 
72 154.9 12.4 8 4.2 
73 167.7 21.3 13 6.6 
74 264.8 37.2 14 7.3 
75 347.3 12.0 3 1.8 
76 310.0 -0.4 - - 
77 322.1 9.6 3 1.5 
78 382.4 12.6 3 1.7 
79 618.7 39.9 6 3.3 
80 909.4 32.5 4 1.8 
Source: Constructed from Bank of Sudan Annual Reports 1960-1980 
(1) Imports cover in weeks =Rx 
52; it shows the number 
of weeks of visible and invisible imports at the 
average annual rate that could be covered by reserves., 
ýa 
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reserves were on the average enough for only 1.6 weeks (or 11 
days) of imports. 
As foreign reserves ran out, arrears in external payments 
were accumulated. In September 1979 the total arrears amounted to 
about US$1.2 billion 
1, 
a situation which forced the undertaking 
of rescheduling arrangements in 1980. This situation led to 
severe lack of foreign exchange, causing widespread scarcities 
of spare parts and other vital inputs needed desperately for 
raising productivity in the existing production units; as well as 
causing delays in the implementation of the new import substitut- 
ion and export promotion projects under construction. 
The main causes for the unfavourable balance of payments 
developments can' be summarized in the following: 
1. The weak export performance 
2. import growth and the external shocks 
3. The sharp increase in the external public debt 
service burden 
4. The exchange rates policy. 
5.3.1 The Export Performance 
The export sector performance in volume terms constituted 
the primary cause of the balance of payments deterioration during 
the 1970s. Table 5.11 and Fig. 5.7 show a fluctuating but 
declining trend in the combined export volume during the 1970s 
for the four major export crops (cotton, groundnuts, sesame and 
gum-arabic). Since 1974 the annual average decline in the export 
volume of these crops has been 5.9%. Cotton export volumes declin 
from 236.0 thousand metric tons in 1971 to 128.4 thousand metric 
tons in 1980. A volume index for. cotton exports shows an annual 
1 
Unpublished report - Ministry of Finance and Economic-Planning. 
12 1'. ' 
Table 5.11 Trends in Export Volumes for the Four Major 
Export Crops 1964-1980 (in 000s tons) 
Year Cotton Ground- Sesame GLn Total % Growth 
nuts Arabic Rates 
1964 117.9 155.0 101.0 54.0 427.9 
65 104.2 159.0 70.0 58.0 391.2 (8.6) 
66 133.5 108.0 74.0 56.0 371.5 (5.0) 
67 164.0 109.0 64.0 52.0 389.0 4.7 
68 201.5 89.0 85.1 51.1 426.6 9.7 
69 177.1 82.9 113.0 47.0 420.0 (1.5) 
70 228.0 69.9 83.7 48.3 429.9 2.4 
71 236.0 115.0 84.4 43.0 478.4 11.3 
72 245.1 116.8 83.1 39.2 484.2 1.2 
73 229.1 138.4 101.9 33.9 503.3 3.9 
74 94.9 99.1 83.5 20.7 298.2 (40.8) 
75 145.1 205.0 56.6 15.6 422.3 41.6 
76 180.0 282.8 88.8 26.2 577.8 36.8 
77 164.6 143.3 93.0 33.3 416.2 (28.0) 
78 169.5 97.2 76.0 43.8 386.5 (7.1) 
79 184.0 37.4 16.0 44.1 281.5 (27.2) 
80 128.4 22.1 57.2 26.2 233.9 (16.9) 
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Reports (various issues). 
Note: Brackets indicate a negative rate of growth. 
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average fall of 21.5% in the volume of cotton exports during the 
1970s (see Table 5.12). 
Table 5.12 Volume Index for Cotton Exports 1970/1980 
1970 = 100 
Years Export Volumes Volume in 000s Bales Index 
1970 1,197 100 
1 1,239 103.5 
2 1,287 107.5 
3 1,203 100.1 
4 498 42.0 
5 762 63.7 
6 954 78.9 
7 864 72.2 
8 890 74.4 
9 966 86.7 
1980 674 56.0 
Source: Constructed from Bank of Sudan Annual Reports 
Note: 1 Bale = 420 lb 
The marked decline in cotton exports came as a result 
of the government policy to diversify the productive structure 
of the economy in 1974 by adopting the following policies: - 
1. The introduction of groundnuts, wheat and sorghum in the 
irrigated schemes leading to a reduction in cotton acreage 
as we noted earlier. 
2. The reduction in cotton acreage is accompanied by an 
explicit and implicit disincentives to cotton growing 
such as, first: the production relations which governed 
the distribution of costs has been unfavourable to cotton 
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growing. Cotton continued to carry all the costs of land 
preparation and irrigation even though only one-third of the 
cropped area was allocated to cotton. Secondly, the 
application of a relatively appreciated exchange rate for 
the conversion of cotton export receipts vis a vis other 
export crops. In 1972 for example the official exchange rate 
of Ls 1= US$2.87 was depreciated to an effective rate of 
exchange of Ls 1= US$2.50 through an exchange tax/subsidy 
scheme of 15% on all external transactions except for the 
proceeds from the exports of cotton lint and gum-arabic. In 
1978 the official exchange rate was set at Ls 1= US$2.50 while 
the effective exchange rate was depreciated to Ls 1= US$2.00 
through taxes and subsidies for all external transactions 
except for the proceeds from the export of cotton lint. As 
a result cotton growers, compared to the growers of other 
crops, continued to receive less for their output than they 
should. Thirdly, the application of an additional cotton 
export tax. 
3. Another factor which contributed to the decline in cotton 
exports has been the physical deterioration of the major 
irrigated schemes such as the Gezera and New Halfa in 
which agricultural export production is concentrated, lead- 
ing to falling yields per feddan of cotton. A primary cause 
of this physical deterioration (as we noted in Chapter 4) 
has been the policy of the government in the early 1970s 
to concentrate attention on establishing new projects rather 
than the existing ones. Top priority has also been 
assigned to infrastructural projects rather than directly 
productive projects. As a result of this policy the major 
schemes suffered an increasing lack of machinery and equipment 
which is exacerbated by the lack of spare parts and other 
vital inputs. However this policy has been reversed in 1977/78 
when it was discovered that there were insufficient funds 
internal or external to enable the implementation of the 
projects under construction, let alone more new projects. An 
agricultural rehabilitation programme, which came too late, 
has been adopted in 1980 supported by a programme loan from 
The World Bank. In the area of cost recovery, land and water ý; 
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charges were introduced to non-cotton crops in the 
Gezera Scheme in 1979, with the aim of encouraging 
cotton production. 
As far as the other export crops are concerned, there has 
been a noticeable expansion in the production of oil seeds 
(groundnuts and sesame) as we have seen in the previous chapter. 
But the insufficient capacity of the railways to transport 
groundnuts especially from the western part of the country has 
prevented the full export potential from being achieved. Moreover, 
the increased needs of domestic crushing mills caused by the 
rise in the local sale prices of edible oil has contributed to 
the fall in the export volume of the groundnuts and sesame. Hence 
the expansion in non-cotton export crops did not significantly 
offset the decline in cotton exports. Consequently, Sudan's 
overall export performance in volume terms had declined. 
As far as the export values are concerned, the rate of 
growth of export earnings (as shown in Table 5.13) has increased 
from an annual average rate of growth of 6% during the 1960s to 
11.2% during the 1970s. But this is rather a reflection of the 
increases in the average export unit prices rather than in export 
volumes. As shown in Table 5.14 the export unit price of cotton 
has shown a rising trend over the years, but this has not benefitteA 
the economy due to the severe drop in exported quantities of cotton. 
Hence the annual growth rates of export earnings could have been 
much faster than the above rates had the quantities of exports 
increased. 
5.3.2 Imports Growth and the External Shocks 
" ;i 
Like all other non-oil producing developing countries Sudan'si. '' 
trade and payments position has suffered during the 1970s"from 
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Table 5.13 
Year 
Balance of Trade Developments 
Ls million (current prices) 
Exports Imports Balance Coverage of 
ZYMUNI of imports by 
rate of rate of trade exports 
Value growth Value growth 
1961 61.3 - 77.8 - (16.5) 79% 
2 79.4 30 90.8 17 (11.4) 87 
3 78.8 (8) 99.2 9 (20.4) 79 
4 68.6 (13) 95.5 (4) (26.9) 72 
5 67.9 (1) 72.3 (24) (4.4) 94 
6 70.7 4 77.5 7 (6.8) 91 
7 74.7 6 74.3 (4) 0.4 101 
8 81.1 9 89.7 21 (8.6) 90 
9 86.2 6 92.5 3 (6.3) 93 
70 103.9 21 100.1 8 3.8 104 
1 114.4 10 115.4 15 (1.0) 99 
2 124.4 9 117.9 2 6.5 106 
3 152.2 22 151.8 29 0.4 100 
4 122.0 (20) 247.5 63 (125.5) 49 
5 152.5 25 359.9 45 (207.4) 42 
6 193.0 27 341.4 (5) (148.4) 57 
7 230.2 19 376.5 10 (146.3) 61 
8 202.3 (12) 449.5 19 (247.2) 45 
9 232.7 15 477.3 6 (244.6) 49 
80 271.3 17 788.2 65 (516.9) 34 
Source: 1) Bank of Sudan Annual Reports 
2) Department of Statistics - Foreign Trade and Research Section 
Note: Brackets indicate a minus sign. 
Table 5.14 Trends in Cotton Prices 1961-1980 
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I 
Year Cotton 
000 Bales* 
Value 
in Ls Millicn 
Price 
per bale 
1961 559 31.1 55.6 
2 872 44.7 51.3 
3 938 45.4 48.4 
4 619 33.1 53.5 
5 547 30.3 55.4 
6 701 34.2 48.9 
7 861 39.6 46.0 
8 1058 52.2 49.3 
9 930 51.5 55.4 
70 1197 62.9 52.5 
1 1239 67.0 54.1 
2 1287 72.6 56.4 
3 1203 82.6 68.7 
4 498 53.7 107.8 
5 762 68.4 89.8 
6 945 94.1 99.6 
7 864 112.2 129.7 
8 890 116.7 131.1 
9 966 151.7 157.0 
80 674 128.0 189.9 
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Reports 1960-1980 
1 bale = 420 lb 
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three kinds of external shocks at the same time: first, the four- 
fold increase in the price of oil in 1973-74 and the successive 
increases afterwards has a direct effect on imports growth 
arising from higher imports bill for oil and an indirect effect 
through the cost of imported industrial goods whose prices 
increased faster as a result of higher energy costs. Secondly, 
the implementation of stabilization policies in the industrial 
countries and the consequent slow down in economic activity 
has led to a reduction in the demand for imports from developing 
countries. As for all the developing countries - Sudan is no 
exception - the principal export markets are found in the 
industrial. world and the volume and prices for most types of 
exports are sensitive to demand conditions and rates of inflation 
in those trading partners. Thirdly, the implementation of 
stabilization policies -.. in. the industrial countries during the 
1970s caused a sharp rise in nominal and real interest rates 
in the world financial markets leading to higher costs of borrow- 
ing for the LDCs. 
The timing of the start of Sudan's balance of payments 
problems indicates that the sharp increase in oil prices and the 
steep rate of international inflation 1974-75, and the subsequent 
recession in the industrial countries, has been a major factor 
causing the balance of payments deterioration. 
During the period 1961-1973, the value of imports grew at 
an average annual rate of 6.3% whereas between 1974 and 1980 imports 
grew at an annual average rate of 29% (see Table 5.13). Sudan's 
oil bill - crude and products - shot up from Ls 9.9 million in 1973, 
to Ls 169.7 million in 1980. . 
Table 5.15 shows that oilinports in 1970 
absorbed 8.7% of export earnings, by 1980 oil imports absorbed 62.6 
of export earnings - almost the entire cotton export receipts. 
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Table 5.15 Oil Imports as a Percentage of Export Earnings 
in Ls million 
1970 1974 1978 1979 1980 
Oil imports 
Export earnings 
9.0 
103.9 
33.1 
122.0 
50 
202.3 
71.9 
232.7 
169.7 
271.3 
Oil imports as a per vent 
of export earnings 8.7 27.1 24.7 30.9 62.6 
Source: Constructed from Bank of Sudan Annual Reports 1970-1980. 
Moreover, as the production techniques used in the 
cultivation of Sudan's major exports are import intensive, the 
oil price increases have also affected the cost of essential input 
materials like fertilizers, pesticides and gasoline which are used 
in pump irrigation schemes. Cotton, for example, which is the 
major export crop, is also import intensive. It is estimated that 
20% of gross earnings from cotton exports goes to meet the 
spraying costs for pest controll. A study by Nashashibi (1980) 
showed that the cost of fertilizers per feddan for long stalle 
cotton rose from Ls 2.5 in 1972/73 to Ls 9.4 in 1976/77, that is, 
an increase of 280%; and for pesticides the cost per feddan of long 
staple cotton rose from Ls 4.2 to Ls 11.7 over the same period, 
that is, an increase of 179%. 
Sudan's terms of trade developments also suggest that the 
rapid increase in import value after 1974 is partially attributed 
Ministry of National Planning Unpublished Report February 1981. 
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to higher import prices. Between 1964 and 1973 Sudan's terms of 
trade have been, on an annual average basis, favourable by about 
1.3%1 whereas between the years 1973-78 it is estimated that 
there has been an average deterioration of about 3% per year2. 
Table 5.16 shows how Sudan's terms of trade compares - less 
favourably - with four of its East African neighbours. 
Table 5.16 Average Annual Growth Rates Income Terms of Trade 
Years 
Count 
Sudan 
Kenya 
Ethiopia 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
1961-1970 
2.1 
4.8 
3.3 
3.8 
5.5 
1970-1979 
-2.8 
0.9 
-0.7 
-4.4 
-0.8 
Source: World Bank Report on Accelerated Development 
in Sub-Saharan Africa 1981 p. 149. 
The high levels of imports after the year 1974 have not only 
been due to the effects of oil price rises, but also partially 
affected by the embarking on an extensive development programme 
by the government since 1973 (the Phased Action Programme) with 
the objective of achieving self. sufficiency in major import items 
The Economic Survey 1974, p. 129. Ministry of Finance and National 
Economy. 
2A *ý". emorandum on Sudan Economy - 1980 - Ministry of National Planning 
(unpublished). 
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such as sugar, textiles and wheat; as well as breaking the 
major infrastructural bottlenecks particularly the transport 
bottleneck. This policy has led to a rapid increase in develop- 
ment expenditure - as we noted earlier - with the consequent 
expansion in the volume of imports of capital goods. 
It is important to note, however, that not all the 
effects of. higher oil prices have been adverse. There has been 
favourable impacts on Sudan's balance of payments from the oil 
boom in the neighbouring oil rich Arab countries, arising mainly 
from more exports to those countries, an increasing amount of 
remittances of Sudanese migrant workers in those countries, and - 
as we shall see in the next chapter - the higher level of foreign 
aid from the Arab oil producing countries after the year 1974. 
Since the early 1970s remittances from Sudanese workers 
abroad (mainly in the Arab oil producing countries) are becoming an 
increasingly important source of foreign exchange. The remittances 
are encouraged by the government by special incentives such as 
exemption from import duties conditional to specific transfers, 
favourable exchange rates and sale of land. Table 5.17 clearly 
shows the rising trend in the magnitude of the remittances in 
absolute terms and relative to export earnings (good exports). 
Remittances share in relation to export of goods rose from 0.8% in 
1973/74 to 10.9% in 1978/79. However frequent policy changes with 
regard to governments incentive framework has adversely affected the 
confidence of the migrant workers on government policy. Speculations 
for further changes led to the holding of such transfers by some 
migrant workers. Nevertheless, the large (and increasing) number 
of Sudanese migrant workers in the Arab oil rich countries points 
clearly to the vital need to adopt appropriate policies to attract 
maximum remittances from migrant workers and to ensure that these 
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Table 5.17 Sudanese Workers' Remittances and Their Share in 
Relation to Total Exports of Goods 1973/74-1978/79 
Year Remittances (in As a percentage 
Ls million) of exports 
1973/74 1.1 0.8% 
74/75 1.7 1.1 
75/76 3.6 2.0 
76/77 6.9 2.9 
77/78 19.2 9.6 
78/79 24.4 10.9 
Source: Unpublished data collected from the Revenue 
Department Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning, February 1981. 
remittances make the optimal contribution to the growth and 
development of the country. 
5.3.3 The External Public Debt Service 
A third factor responsible for the unfavourable balance 
of payments developments during the 1970s has been the increasing 
trend in the external public debt service obligations. Table 
5.18 shows the developments in the public sector external debt 
service, the debt service ratio and the outstanding debts over 
the past two decades. During the 1960s the average debt service 
burden as a proportion of export earnings was 5.3% per annum, 
whereas during the 1970s this ratio was about 20.7% per annum. 
However, for the post 1974 period - that is 1974-1980 - the annual 
average debt service ratio has been as much as 25%. In comparison 
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Table 5.18 Trends in Public Sector Outstanding Debts and 
Debt Service Ratio 1960/61 - 1979/80 
Ls million 
Year Annual Annual Debt Outstanding 
Debt Exports Service Debtsl 
Service Ratio 
1960/61 - 62.4 0.0 26.1 
61/62 4.5 67.9 6.6 26.9 
62/63 5.2 87.5 5.9 30.5 
63/64 2.9 82.2 3.5 37.3 
64/65 2.3 67.9 3.4 44.8 
65/66 3.8 74.2 5.1 54.6 
66/67 4.1 74.7 5.5 69.2 
67/68 5.3 80.7 6.6 73.6 
. 68/69 5.8 92.5 6.3 93.3 
69/70 10.4 101.0 10.3 109.3 
70/71 12.5 106.6 11.7 110.5 
71/72 14.4 104.5 13.8 101.1 
72/73 20.5 130.8 15.7 119.2 
73/74 25.8 145.7 17.7 371.7 
74/75 47.2 157.8 29.9 254.3 
75/76 62.0 180.4 34.4 329.1 
76/77 37.9 237.6 16.0 394.9 
77/78 41.2 199.3 20.7 403.6 
78/79 50.9 223.5 22.8 598.8 
79/80 71.0 
. 
288.9 24.6 789.1 
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Reports 1960-1980 
1 Outstanding debts as at end of calendar year. 
134. 
to the debt service ratios of four of its neighbouring East 
African countries Sudan's debt service ratio (as shown in 
Table 5.18) has increased tremendously during the 1970s. J 
Table 5.19 Sudan's Debt Service Ratio: A Comparison with 
Four East African Countries 1970 and 1979 
Country Debt Service 
Ratio 1970 
Debt Service 
Ratio 1979 
Sudan 10.7 33.0 
Kenya 7.9 7.5 
Etheopia 11.4 4.9 
Tanzania 8.2 7.4 
Uganda 3.4 7.4 
Source: World Bank Report on Accelerated 
. Development 
in Sub-Saharan Africa 
1981 (p. 159) 
The accumulated outstanding external debt has also increased 
sharply over the past two decades. Total debts outstanding as 
a per cent of GDP rose from 6.6% in 1960/61 to about 19% in 
1979/80. 
The sharp increases in the debt service ratio and the 
accumulated outstanding debts during the 1970s could be explained 
on the one hand by the large number and magnitudes of external 
loans concluded during the 1970s relative to those concluded in the 
1960s. Also external borrowing - as we shall see in the next 
chapter - during the period 1974-77 has been characterized by 
relatively hard terms, i. e. a high interest rate and a short 
amortization and grace periods. 
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Another reason which contributed to the increased debt 
servicing was that at times a number of ministries - particularly 
the Ministry of Industry - were engaged in foreign borrowing and 
the administration of loans without getting prior authority from 
the Central Ministry of Finance. Also the division of the 
external loans administration between the Ministry of Finance and 
National Economy (which is responsible for repayments of debts) and 
the Ministry of National Planning (which is responsible for admin- 
istration and drawings from the external loans) made it difficult 
to find a central unit which had a complete picture of the total 
debt situation so that it can provide an effective debt management 
as well as an appropriate judgement on the borrowing terms. 
5.3.4 The Exchange Rate Policies 
In theory, currency devaluation is designed to restrict 
imports because their prices rise and to encourage exports because 
their prices on the world market go down (leading to an increase 
in the demand for exports). Domestic producers of export goods 
and import substitutes would experience increased supply incentives. 
Hence the economic resources would be directed to the external 
sector, leading to improvement in the balance of payments. The 
underlying assumption of these price effects on imports and 
exports is the existence of an economic structure that would 
direct resources to the traded goods sector while restrining demand 
for imports. It is important that supporting fiscal and monetary 
policies be adopted to ensure that incomes would rise less than 
the overall output, so that real resources can be directed to 
exports. 
. 
However, in LDCs the favourable export-import responses to 
devaluation are likely to be limited. Under conditions of prolonged 
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exchange control and quantitative restrictions on trade, the 
structure of imports ceases to be responsive to price changes. 
Moreover, the demand for the bulk of imports such as capital 
goods, intermediate goods and spare parts would be price 
inelastic as they are needed for the growth of output and export 
expansion in particular. Because of the low level of industrial- 
ization in LDCs import substitution is also limited in the short 
run. Supply rigidities in the export sector - as we explained 
earlier in the case of the Sudan - are also likely to haaraper 
the production of exportables. And the foreign demand for exports 
may not be responsive to price changes. 
In the Sudan, exchange rate changes have been adopted for the 
first time as a policy measure for the external adjustment problem 
in March 1972. A devaluation of 15% was undertaken in conjunction 
with stabilization measures. But the price effects of this 
devaluation were undermined by the decline. in the production and 
exports of cotton - the major export crop (see Table 5.12). 
As we noted in section 5.3.1 the decline in cotton production 
is explained by the distortions in incentives as well as by the 
physical deterioration of the major irrigated schemes, the lack of 
research and development of higher yielding varieties, labour 
shortages for cotton picking, and shortages in imported inputs. 
Raising yields and expanding production of exports depends to a 
large extent on the timely provision of imported inputs such as 
fertilizers, pesticides and packing materials (sacks). As the 
prices of such vital inputs rise as a result of devaluation, the 
cost of production of export crops rises thereby reducing the margin 
of the benefits to the producers. Moreover, the assumed increase 
in production of exportables in response to better incentives (higher 
137.1 
prices) and the reallocation of resources would not be transformed 
into foreign exchange unless these exports are processed and 
transported to Port Sudan for shipment abroad. In the Sudan, 
the lack of adequate transport - noted earlier - and other 
export servicing facilities such as ginning plants, oil seed 
crushing mills, storage and grading facilities - has acted as 
an active constraint on export trade. 
Moreover, domestic inflation as well as high prices of 
imported inputs (which in turn fuelled domestic inflation) since 
the early 1970s led to much faster increases in domestic resources 
costs than in export prices. 
Despite the 1972 devaluation of 15%, there has been a 
steady deterioration in the balance of trade (Table 5.13).. 
Clearly, the above account suggests that to improve the balance 
of payments position it is necessary to invest more in structural 
changes in the agricultural and transportation sectors of the 
economy, rather than to devalue the currency as the export-import 
responses to such devaluation are likely to be limited by these 
structural rigidities. However, since 1978 the government, 
adopted four successive devaluations - in 1978,1979,1981 and 
1982 (Table 5.20) - under the famous IMF stabilization package: 
devaluation of the currency, liberalization of foreign 
exchange, import controls, credit squeeze, reduction in current 
expenditure, abolition of consumer subsidies and higher taxes. And 
from the IMF side, credit tranches for balance of payments 
support, and debt rescheduling arrangements under the World Bank 
Paris-Club). Accordingly, the government has supported the 
exchange rate changes by a Programme for Economic Stabilization 
and Financial Reform in 1978 aiming at the rehabilitation of the 
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Table 5.20 Exchange Rate Changes 1960-1922. 
Year Official Exchange Effective Exchange 
Rate Rate 
1960-1972 Ls 1= US$ 2.87 US$ 2.87 
1972 to 2.87 2.50 (exchange tax/ 
subsidy schare) 
1978 it if 2.50 " 2.00 if 
1979 It 2.00 1.25 (parallel rate) 
1981 it 1.10 Floating 
1982 it to 0.77 " to 
Source: 1. Bank of Sudan. 
2. Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. 
irrigation schemes and breaking transport bottlenecks. And in 
1979 an Export Action Programme with the sole objective of 
increasing the volume of Sudan's two major export crops (cotton 
and groundnuts) was launched. 
Although the long term effects of these devaluations on 
the balance of payments are yet to be investigated in the light 
of future, developments in the external sector, the short term 
effects are likely to be undermined by the heavy dependence on 
imports, the limited scope for import substitution, sluggish 
export demand, various supply rigidities, and the inflationary 
pressures created by these devaluations. 
5.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
1. .. In general Sudan's development performance over the 
period 1960-1980 - and in particular during the 1970s - has been 
constrained by the three limits identified by the various foreign 
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aid theories explained in Chapter 2, that is domestic savings, 
foreign exchange and skill or (absorptive capacity) constraints. 
The public sector domestic savings performance has been poor. 
The average share of government savings in financing investment 
expenditure has been 34% per annum during the 1960s and declined 
to 25% during the 1970s. The poor savings performance is 
explained by the fact that central government expenditures were 
allowed to increase faster than revenues. This is compounded by 
the poor financial performance of the public enterprises leading to 
very little or no overall public savings for financing public 
investment programmes. A situation which in turn led to continuous 
reliance on domestic bank borrowing and foreign aid inflow. 
The balance of payments deterioration caused mainly by 
structural problems in the agricultural export production, as well 
as by external global factors, has led to a widespread scarcity in 
foreign exchange. During the 1970s, current account deficits rose 
from Ls 23 million in 1970/71 to Ls 133 million in 1979/80 (an 
increase of 478%). External indebtedness climbed from Ls l09.3 
million to Ls 789.1 million between 1970 and 1980 (an increase of 
621%), debt service ratio increased over the same period from 10.3% 
to 24.6%, and foreign exchange reserves fell sharply. In 1980 
Sudan's foreign exchange reservescovered only 1.8 weeks (or 13 days) 
of imports. The resulting foreign exchange scarcity caused wide- 
ranging shortages in equipment, spare parts and vital imported 
inputs which severely hampered both production and new investment. 
The skill limit common to many LDCs has been exacerbated 
in the Sudan - in particular-by a widespread drain of manpower at 
all skill levels attracted by uncomparably high wages and salaries 
in the oil rich Arabic speaking countries. The funds absorption 
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ratio (the ratio of actual investment expenditure to budgetary 
investment allocations) has been on the average 66% per annum. ' 
This ratio gives an indication to the absorptive capacity limit 
which is caused mainly by shortages in skills as well as the 
severe transportation and other infrastructural bottlenecks. 
2. It is important to note that all three constraints 
have simultaneously limited the growth process during the 1970s. 
The time sequence implied by Chenery and Strout (1966) does not 
manifest itself properly in the case of Sudan. It is also import- 
ant to note that, of the three limits, the foreign exchange limit 
as well as the absorptive capacity limit (the skill limit and the 
infrastructural bottlenecks) have apparently been more effective 
in limiting development performance than the domestic savings 
constraint which has been partially relieved by continuous resort 
to domestic bank borrowing. 
3. The three constraints - which are caused by internal 
structural factors as well as external shocks - that impeded 
Sudan's overall growth have been compounded by domestic policy 
inadequacies such as the adoption in 1972 of an over-ambitious 
development programme through the "Phased Action Programme" 
regardless of the availabilities of funds and physical 
capacities. 
4. Despite the domestic financial difficulties during the 
1970s, there has been a fast rise in the overall public sector 
investment which is supported mainly by external development 
loans. A further investigation of this high level of investment 
will be considered in subsequent chapters, when we relate the 
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growth of public investment in the 1970s - which is supported 
by foreign aid loans - to the growth and development perform- 
ance in the agricultural, industrial and infrastructural 
sectors of the economy. 
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CHAPTER 6 
EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENT AID TO SUDAN 1960-1980 
This chapter examines the general characteristics of the 
flow of external development aid received by the Sudan during 
the past two decades, that is 1960-1980. External development aid 
includes all public and publicly guaranteed short, medium and 
long term loans, as well as outright grants extended by foreign 
governments, international and regional organizations, commercial 
banks, as well as private sources for the purpose of financing 
development projects and programmes. Particular attention will 
be given to how much external development aid was given, on what 
conditions, from which sources, and to which economic sectors it 
was channelled. This exercise is important because the character- 
istics of such flows as well as their allocation have important 
repercussions on the overall effectiveness of foreign aid in 
promoting growth and development in the recipient country. 
l 
6.1 MAGNITUDES AND SOURCES 
It is clear from Table 6.1 that the three national develop- 
ment plans adopted since 1960 have increasingly assigned to 
foreign resources the role of supplementing domestic savings to 
maintain the required level of investment and the planned rates of 
growth of GDP. The planned share of external development aid in 
planned investment increased from 34.8% in the Ten Year Plan to 
51.2% in the Five Year Plan and to 53.2% in the current Six Year Plan 
Qayum, A: "Long term economic criteria for foreign loans" 
The Economic Journal, June 1966, argued that repayment terms and 
conditions of development loans affect the long term economic 
advantages that accrue to the borrowing country. 
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Table 6.1 Planned Share of External Development Aid in 
Planned Investment 
(in Ls million) 
Plan Invest- Savings External % Share of 
ment Dev't Aid 
ISFFaI 
1. The Ten Year Plan 1961/62-1970/71 337.0 219.7 117.3 34.8% 
2. The Five Year Plan 1970/71-1974/75 215.0 105.0 110.0 51.2% 
3. The Six Year Plan 1977/78-1982/83 1570.0 450.0 835.0 53.2% 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Eccncmic Planning (Planning) 
Note: The Six Year Plan assumes that Ls 285m will -he secured 
fron domestic bank borrowing 
The increasing reliance on external development aid was not 
affected by the suspension and the amendments of the plans - which 
we noted earlier - that took place during the course of their 
implementation. 
The total amount of authorized public and publicly guaranteed 
external development loans from all sources - multilateral, regional,, 
bilatera? -aried commercial - during the period 1960-1980 - amounted 
to Ls 1.3 billion. Appendix Table 6.1 presents detailed statistics 
collected from published and unpublished data about the dates, 
magnitude, sources, repayment terms and allocation of those 
authorized funds. The amounts of authorized external development 
loans - as shown in Table 6.2 - have been rising over the past two 
decades in absolute terms and relative to GDP. Measured against 
GDP authorized aid resources have been a small fraction amounting 
only to 2.3% on the average during the 1960s. However this ratio 
has more than doubled during the 1970s reaching, on the average, 
5.6%. 
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Table 6.2 Annual Authorized External Development Loans 
For Sudan 1960-1980 as a Per Cent of GDP 
(in Ls million) 
Year Amounts As % of GDP 
Authorized 
1959/60' 10.8 
60/61 15.2 
61/62 27.3 
62/63 8.8 
63/64 2.4 
64/65 4.5 
65/66 15.8 
66/67 - 
67/68 25.9 
68/69 3.5 
69/70 15.7 
70/71 21.1 
71/72 48.1 
72/73 29.9 
73/74 96.3 
74/75 131.6 
75/76 52.5 
76/77 126.2 
77/78. 124.6 
78/79 172.8 
79/80 348.4 
3.1 
3.9 
6.5 
1.9 
0.5 
0.9 
3.2 
0.0 
4.8 
0.6 
2.6 
3.3 
6.4 
3.3 
7.7 
8.7 
2.8 
5.4 
4.3 
5.0 
8.6 
Source: Constructed from Appendix Table 6.1 
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As shown in Table 6.3,89% of the total authorized funds 
have been secured during the decade of the 1970s, whereas only 
11% of the total authorized funds were secured during the period 
1960-1970. However, the authorized funds during the last six 
years of the decade of the 1970s - that is, from 1974/75-1979/80 
constituted 72% of the total authorized funds. A comparison of 
this time profile of authorized funds with the time profile of 
public sector investment shown in Chapter 5 would indicate that the 
period which is characterized by an almost stagnant public sector 
investment - that 1961/62-1972/73 is also characterized by low 
levels of authorized external development loans, and the period 
which is characterized by a relatively sharp increase in public 
sector investment, that is post 1974 period, is also characterized 
by high levels of authorized external development loans or 72% 
of the total authorized funds over the past two decades. 
Table 6.3 Time Profile of Authorized External Development Aid 
Concluded during the Period 1959/60-1979/80 
Period In Is In US$ % of 
million million Total 
1. Total amount 1959/60-1979/80: of which 1,281.4 3,311.0 100% 
2. 1959/60-1969/70 129.9 373.0 11.3 
3. 1970/71-1979/80 1,151.5 2,938.0 88.7 
4.1974/75-1979/80 956.1 2,377.0 71.8 
I 
Source: Constructed from Appendix Table 6.1 
The major sources of external development aid have been the 
OECD countries, the World Bank and the Regional Arab Development 
Funds. Table 6.4 shows the percentage share of each source out of 
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Table 6.4 Sources of External'Development Aid to Sudan 
Source 
Authorized 
amounts in 
Ls m. 
% of 
total 
1. OECD countriesl 572.8 44.7 
2. The World Bank2 311.8 24.3 
3. Arab Development Funds3 249.1 19.4 
4. Comecon Countries 81.2 6.3 
5. Other4 66.5 5.2 
Total 1,281.4 100% 
Source: Appendix Table 6.1 
Note: 1. Includes authorized grants from the EEC European 
Development Fund. 
2. ' Includes the IBR. D and the IDA 
3. Represents authorized Loans from The Kuwait Fund for 
Economic Development, the Arab Fund for Economic & 
Social Development, the Saudi Fund for Development, 
Abu Dahabi Fund for Arab Economic Development, the 
OPEC Special Fund and the Islamic Development Bank. 
4. Represents loans from the African Development Bank, 
the International Fund for Agricultural Development, 
and Peoples Republic of China and North Korea. 
the total amount of authorized funds. 69% of the total authorized 
funds were secured from the OECD countries and the World Bank. Arab 
sources became an important source of development aid following the 
oil boom of the 1970s. Arab sources provided 19% of the total 
authorized development aid to Sudan - over 90% of this share has 
been secured during the post-1974 period, suggesting-that 
Sudan - being an Arab country - has benefited from the oil price 
rises during the 1970s by receiving more development aid from oil 
producing Arab countries. The low level of development aid 
received from the Comecon countries (the USSR and the East European 
Socialist countries), that is 6%, has been mainly due to political 
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reasons, arising from the government's anti-communist campaign 
following an abortive communist coup in July 1971. Since that 
date, and with the exception of. two development loans from 
Romania and Czechoslovakia, no development aid was received from 
this group. However, it is not only the low authorized level that 
characterized development aid from this group, but also - as we 
shall explain later - the exceptionally low levels of actual 
utilization -of funds. 
6.2 THE QUALITY OF EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENT AID 
6.2.1 Source Tying 
Another important feature of the external development aid 
received by the Sudan was that 54% of the total amounts of 
authorized funds came from bilateral sources, whereas 46% came from 
multilateral and regional sources. In view of the fact that 
external development aid extended on bilateral bases is always 
'source-tied' - though the extent of tying varies from one country 
to another - we could say that 54% of the total development aid 
commitments to Sudan have been tied directly or indirectly to' 
purchases from the donors1. Undoubtedly source-tying is advantag- 
eous to donors with spare productive capacity as it promotes the 
donor's exports and domestic employment2, but, at the same time, it 
is likely to have adverse implications on the effectiveness of 
development aid in promoting growth and development. As the borrower 
is not permitted to search for the cheapest equipment or material, 
and is forced to accept those which the lending country provides, 
the real value of source-tied aid will decrease if the donor country 
For detailed methods of source tying see J. Bagwati 'The tying of 
Aid' in Foreign Aid ed Bagwati & Eckaus, Penguin Books, 1970. 
2 See Abbott, G. C. 'Econcmic Aid as a Unilateral Transfer of Resources' Journal of 
Political Eccnamy November/Dec. 1970, Also Hupkin, B. & Associates 'Aid and the 
Balance of Payments'. The Economic Journal, March 1970. 
r-- 
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is not the cheapest world source of supply of the goods in question. 
In addition, tying of shipment and insurance - as in the case of 
United States' aid - at rates which are appreciably above world 
rates, adds further unnecessary costs to the borrower. Moreover, 
the borrower will also have to purchase spare parts, maintenance 
equipment at relatively high prices from the donor for the whole 
life of the project concerned. Empirical studies on the losses 
incurred by the Sudan from source tying has not been undertaken 
yet. Some economists 
l, however, suggested that, in general, tied 
aid may be worth about 20% or so less to the recipient than untied. 
aid. Ul Haq (1967) examining twenty development projects financed 
by tied credits to Pakistan in 1960-63, found that the lowest 
prices from tied sources were just over 50% higher than the lowest 
international prices. Other research findings (Bhagwati 1970) 
seem to confirm that tying tends to reduce significantly the 
benefits of aid to recipients. 
However, the effective burden of source. tying can be reduced 
- as Bhagwati (1970) has argued - by the possibilities of 
substitution available for the recipient country. These possibil- 
ities of substitution would arise in so far as the recipient 
country would like to spend - anyway - on purchases from the tied 
source, from its total pool of foreign exchange earned from aid as 
well as from exports, an amount that equals, exceeds, or is less 
than the amount that is explicitly tied. In practice, however, 
it is doubtful whether these possibilities of substitution would 
exist. 
6.2.2 Project-tvina 
Most of the external development aid received by the Sudan 
1 
Singer, H. and Ansari, J. 'Rich and Poor Countries' George Allen 
& Unwin 1977, p. 171. 
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over the period of study has been tied to specific projects, 
that is project rather than programme loans. If we look for 
example at the World Bank loans to Sudan, we will find that 
out of the total amount of Ls311.8 million received, only an amount 
of Ls32.5 million or 10% is allocated for imports of necessary 
spare parts and equipment for the rehabilitation of the existing 
irrigation schemes. 
However, there are convincing arguments justifying the end 
use or project tying. The main arguments include: Firstly, by 
project tying the donor makes certain that the recipient is forced 
to develop proper projects, well prepared, studied, programmed 
and executed, whereas in the absence of such a restriction, the 
loan might not be spent for development purposes or would be 
wasted on hastily-prepared projects. Secondly, project aid 
makes it easier for the donor to combine financial aid with the 
proper technical assistance required by the project, such as 
skilled consultants for feasibility studies, pilot schemes and 
training of staff for running the project. Such essential services 
ensure that the physical equipment financed will make its full 
contribution to the country's development. 
Project aid is beneficial as far as it is. used as a safety 
valve against the misuse of scarce foreign resources which is 
likely to occur in some LDCs where economic decision making is 
monopolized by dictatorial or semi-dictatorial ruling groups or 
army officers. Also, it is not harmful so long as the project in 
question is embodied in the recipient's development plan or 
programme. But project tying may not enhance the overall product- 
ive structure of the economy in situations like those in the Sudan 
during the 1970s, where serious underutilization of capacity 
caused mainly by foreign exchange bottlenecks, have impeded 
r 
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production. The foreign exchange bottleneck has not been due to 
the lack of foreign resources, but rather because there have been 
too many project loans and not enough programme loans which can 
be used to purchase essential imports desperately needed to make 
fuller utilization of existing capacity in the agricultural and 
the industrial sectors of the economy. In this case, it would 
have been more appropriate for the Sudan to receive a balanced 
combination of project and programme loans which would be more 
effective in enhancing both new investment as well as the full 
utilization of existing capacities. 
6.3 SECTORAL ALLOCATION 
As shown in Table 6.5,50% of the total authorized external 
development aid to Sudan during the period of study has been 
earmarked to infrastructural activities including transport and 
communication, electric power and large-scale irrigation. 25% 
went to agriculture, 14% to industry - that is, 39% to the 
directly. productive sectors of the economy and only 4% has been 
earmarked to social services activities such as education, health 
and sewage disposal. 
Table 6.5 Sectoral Allocation of External Development Aid to 
Sudan 1959/60 -1979/80 
Sector Total aºr mt ear- 
marked in Ls million 
% of 
total 
1. Infrastructure 645.4 50.4 
2. Agriculture 319.8 25.0 
3. Industry 177.2 13.8 
4. Social Services 53.6 4.2 
5. Other (unclassified) 85.4 6.6 
Total 1281.4 100 
Source: Constructed fron Appendix Table 6.1 
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In view of the serious infrastructural problems in the 
Sudan which, as we have explained earlier, impeded production as 
well as the execution of development projects, the allocation of 
half of the external development aid to infrastructural activities 
seems to be justifiable. Although such activities are not 
directly productive and tend to lower the aggregate output-capital 
ratio, they deserve highest priority in a country like the Sudan 
where there are special transport problems caused by its sheer 
size and the distribution of its population, as well as the river 
water resources and the vast cultivable lands which require large 
irrigation works such as dams and canals to provide permanent and 
regular irrigation and electric power supplies. 
As infrastructural activities cannot produce directly goods 
which can earn or save foreign exchange, thereby enabling the 
servicing of the debts due on the foreign loans that financed them, 
it is important that only grants and long-term concessional credits 
should be allocated to such activities. In general this policy 
has been followed in the Sudan, but in some cases there has been 
an apparent misallocation of external resources as shown by the 
sourcewise sectoral allocation of authorized external development 
loans in Table 6.6. In both multilateral and bilateral sources, 
which generally provide concessional aid and grants, infrastructural 
activities were given top priority (over 50% of their development 
aid). Table 6.6 also shows that 53% of the non-concessional external 
development aid, obtained from all sources, was allocated to the 
industrial sector. This is explained by the fact that the relatively 
hard repayment terms and conditions of such loans are more suitable 
for industrial activities which can directly earn or save foreign 
exchange, than for other sectors of the economy whose returns are 
indirect. or longterm. But the allocation of 30% of the non- 
152. 
. 
Table 6.6 Sectoral Allocation of Authbrized External 
Development Aid: By Source (in percentage) 
Sector bio- Infra- Industry Social Other Lm- Total 
Souroe ulture structure Services classified 
1. Ccncessional sources 
a. Multilateral & regional 37.0 52.5 8.2 2.3 - 100 
b. Bilateral 14.7 55.4 7.5 7.1 15.3 100 
2. Non-concessional 15.5 30.3 53.6 0.6 - 100 
Source: Constructed from Appendix Table 6.1. 
concessional loans to infrastructural activities, whereas only 15% 
of them were allocated to the much more directly productive 
agricultural sector, represents a misallocation of foreign resources. 
In the next section we shall further explain the appropriatness of 
the repayment terms of the external development loans received by 
the Sudan in relation to their sectöral allocations. 
6.4 THE GRANT ELEMENT IN AUTHORIZED EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENT. -LOANS .: 
External development aid is transferred to developing countries 
through a number of arrangements which differ from one donor to 
another. The repayment terms of external development loans also 
vary substantially from hard loans with short maturity periods and 
at rates of interest reflecting the cost of borrowing in private 
international money markets, to soft loans at no interest rate other 
than 0.0075 per annum service charge with 50 years maturity. When 
loans are made on concessionary terms, that is terms which normal 
market incentives do not provide, they comprise an aid-component or 
a grant element. The grant element which measures the degree of 
51 
L 
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concession on the loan reflects the alternative cost that the 
borrower would have to pay if it did not have access to financing 
on concessional terms. Hence, it is conventionally calculated as 
the difference between the face value of the loan and the present 
value of all future repayments (amortization and interest payments) 
discounted at a proper rate of discount. 
In this section an attempt is made to estimate the grant element 
in 186 external development loans received by the public sector 
during the period 1960-1980. This estimate will give an indication 
to the alternative cost that the Sudan would have to pay if it did 
not have access to financing on concessional terms. It will also 
show the relationship between the loan terms and the economic 
sector to which it is allocated allowing for a judgement about the 
appropriateness of the aid allocation policy. Moreover it will give 
an indication to the degree of concession of the loans received from 
the various sources of external aid, thereby showing which source 
of finance to rely on in the. future, if the country is to receive 
concessional rather than non-concessional types of development loans. 
6.4.1 The Method Used 
The basic ingredients that are common to all repayment 
conditions of the external development loans are the rate of 
interest, the grace period and the repayment period. Given the 
values of these variables as well as the face value of the loan, 
then the value of the instalments repayable on the loan can be 
calculated. To measure the grant element, it is necessary to discount 
the future charges on the loan by using an appropriate discount rate. 
However, the choice of the appropriate discount rate is problematic. 
A discount rate which should reflect the real opportunity cost of 
capital in the Sudan is difficult to obtain because of the non- jý' 
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existence of capital markets. 
The following equation is used for the estimation of the 
grant element in the external development loans received by the 
Sudan over the period 1960-19801. Assuming that the debt servicing 
of a loan - that is the repayment of the principal instalment 
plus the interest - remains constant over time then, 
Q (1 + r°) g (1 +r1)t 
where: 
+ Al ýl - (1 + r1) 
tJ 
=O 
r 
Q is the face value of the loan 
r° is the rate of interest during the grace period 
g is the grace period in years 
rl is the rate of interest on the loan 
A is the equal annual instalments of debt servicing 
on the loan 
t is the repayment period of the loan 
Given the values of Q, r0, g, r1 and t, the equal annual 
instalments of debt servicing A can be calculated. Then using an 
appropriate discount rate, the present value (PV) of A can be 
obtained by: 
A /, -1 -1j= Pv 
i (1 + i) g (1 + i) t 
where i is the discount rate. 
The grant element which is usually expressed as a percentage 
of the face value of the loan is then derived by: 
Q- PV 
GE =Qx 100 
where Q is the face value of the loan and PV is its present value. 
The higher the percentage, the greater is the degree of concession 
of a given loan. 
However, a number of problems that this procedure raises 
1 The formula used is devised by M. A. Mal noud 'An Estimation of the Grant Elen-bent 
in Foreign Aid'. The Pakistan Dev't Review Spring 1977. 
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warrant emphasis: In the first place, this method takes into account 
only the financing conditions, that is the interest rate, the. 
repayment period and the grace period. This assumption leads 
to an overestimation of the grant element for source-tied loans. 
Because the cost of tying associated with such type of loan is 
overlooked. Source-tying - as we noted earlier - means increasing 
the cost of imports relative to what would have been paid in 
alternative sources. It implies a reduction in the nominal amounts 
of financing. In other words, it hardens the financial conditions 
through a higher effective interest rate. Any increase in the ' 
effective interest rate reduces the grant element of the loan. On 
the other hand it"will be difficult to compare the grant element of 
the loans extended by multilateral and regional sources which do 
not impose source-tying with loans from bilateral sources which 
are source-tied. Ignoring the cost of tying in our analysis is 
dictated by the apparent difficulty in calculating such additional 
cost for each of the 186 loans in view of the identification problems 
arising in determining alternative prices and the unavailability of 
the necessary data. 
Secondly, the method used assumes that debt servicing - that 
is principal instalments plus interest - remains constant over time. 
This may not be the case for all loans as in some cases the repayment 
schedule is arranged in such a way that debt servicing will be 
decreasing over time as interest is paid on the decreasing out- 
standing debts. 
Thirdly, the method used assumes that the entire amount of 
the loan is disbursed on the date of authorization, and that 
interest charged during the grace period is paid when the grace 
period ends. In practice, however, actual disbursements from the 
loan on which interest is charged are spread over time according to 
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the progress in the implementation of the project financed by. 
the loan in question. Also in many cases interest is charged and 
paid during the grace period, that is, interest payments are not 
postponed to the end of the grace period. 
In our attempt to estimate the grant element in the external 
development loans received by the Sudan, the rates of discount used 
are arbitrarly assumed. It is assumed that the rates chosen 
reflect a reasonable approximation of the opportunity cost involved 
if the Sudan is to borrow at commercial rates in international 
capital markets. The 20 year period is divided into four five- 
year periods, as it is unrealistic to assume a fixed discount 
rate for longer periods when interest rates-in international capital 
markets have been rising over the period. The following discount 
rates were assumed for the four periods with a margin of (±0.01). 
1960 - 1965 0.075 
1966 - 1970 0.095 
1971 - 1975 0.10 
1976 - 1980 0.12 
6.4.2 The Results 
Table 6.7 shows the estimate of the grant element for each 
of the 186 external development loans received by the Sudan 
during the past two decades, given the values of Q, r, g, t 
for each loan and the annual rate of discount - with a±0.01 
margin - for each period. The following general findings deserve 
highlighting: - 
1. According to the estimates of the grant element shown in 
Table 6.7 and assuming discount rates of 0.075,0.095,0.10 and 0.12 
for the first, second, third and fourth periods respectively, the 
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Table 6.7 Grant Element Estimates for External Development 
Loans Concluded During the Period 1960-1980 
Grant Element in Percentage 
Source- Q r r1 g t iß. 065 iß. 075 i=0.085 
FIRST PE RIM 1960/65 
1. World Bank (IBPD) 5.4 0.060 3 17 4.9 13.7 21.5 
2. "" 6.8 0.0575 7 18 7.1 21.6 31.4 
3. " (IDA) 4.5 0.0075 10 40 76.4 80.5 84.3 
4. " (IB1t) 10.8 0.055 5 20 12.0 22.3 31.2 
5. Kuwait Fund 6.8 0.040 4 6 16.0 21.6 26.7 
6. 1.7 0.035 3 11 21.6 27.5 32.8 
7. United Kingdan 2.7. 0.055 2 8 5.7 10.9 15.8 
8. " 4.9 0.055 5 10 9.0 17.1 24.3 
9. West Germany 3.9 0.050 1 4 4.7 7.7 10.6 
10. 6.4 0.0475 8 12 20.5 30.1 38.3 
11. 1.9 0.060 1 12 3.1 9.0 14.4 
12. Netherlands 1.3 0. C675 0.0 5 2. O 4.6 7.1 
13. 1.0 0.0575 7 19 10.2 22.0 31.9 
14. U. S. A. 0.7 0.00375 5 25 59.3 64.5 68.9 
15. Italy 2.5 0.055 2 8 5.7 10.9 15.8 
16. 0.9 0.055 2 8 5.7 10.9 15.8 
17. U. S. S. R. 8.0 0.025 0.0 12 20.5 24.6 28.4 
18. Yugoslavia 7.8 0.030 0.0 8 13.3 16.6 19.7 
19. Czechoslovakia 3.5 0.030 0.0 8 13.3 16.6 19.7 
20. Netherlands 0.9 0.065 0.0 10 -8.3 4.5 8.7 
SECC PERIOD 1966/70 
Source Q ro= ri g t 
Grant Eleffent in Percentage 
i=0.035 iß. 095 1-0.1 
21. world Bank (IBM) 1.9 0.0625 5 20 24.2 32.6 39.8 
22. 11 " (IDA) 2.9 0.0075 10 40 84.3 87.1 89.2 
23. If (IBPD) 8.3 0.0625 5 20 24.2 32.6 39.8 
24. Kuwait Fund 4.9 0.025 3 17 45.7 50.5 54.7 
25. United Kingdan 0.2 0.0075 2 23 59.2 62.9 6.6.2 
26. II 0.4 0.0075 2 23 59.2 62.9 66.2 
27. U. S. A. 2.5 0.03 5 25 54.7 60.1 64.7 
r 
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28. Italy 
29. Sweden 
30. It 
31. U. S. S. R. 
32. Bulgaria 
33. East Germany 
34. Hungary 
35. Peoples R. of China 
36. North Korea 
37. Netherlands 
39. 
39. " 
40. 
41. 
42. Italy 
43. of 
44. United Kingdan 
45. Austria 
46. Denmark 
47. Yugoslavia 
TARO PERIOD 1971/75 
4.0 0.045 2 10 
2.4 0.02 5 20 
1.0 0.02 10 15 
2.0 0.025 5 10 
5.0 0.025 0.0 8 
3.3 0.025 3 12 
3.5 0.025 3 10 
14.1 0.0075 15 10 
1.3 0.0075 1 10 
0.04 0.065 0.0 10 
0.03 0.0775 0.0 10 
0.02 0.0675 0.0 10 
0.81 0.07 0.0 10 
0.66 0.0775 0.0 10 
0.4 0.065 2 5 
1.0 0.05 3 4 
0.14 0.0625 0.0 5 
0.5 0.055 2 7 
0.5 0.0075 2 7 
3.9 0.03 1 7 
23.1 27.7 32.0 
57.5 62.2 66.3 
65.2 70.0 74.2 
43.6 48.4 52.8 
21.3 24.2 26.9 
39.6 44.2 48.3 
36.8 41.2 45.1 
77.5 81.2 84.3 
36.5 39.8 42.9 
8.7 12.7 16.3 
3.3 7.5 11.4 
7.6 11.6 15.3 
'6.6 10.6 14.4 
3.3 7.5 11.4 
8.6 12.6 16.3 
16.3 20.3 24.1 
5.8 8.2 10.5 
14.8 19.2 23.2 
35.0 38.3 41.4 
22.0 25.3 28.3 
Source 
Q ro=r1 g t 
Grant Elanent in 
i=0.09 i. =O. 10 
Percentages 
i=11.0 
48. World Bank (I1)2) 3.9 0.0075 10 4C 85.8 88.2 90.1 
49. it If 2.4 0.0075 10 40 85.8 88.2 90.1 
50. 14.6 0.0075 10 40 85.8 88.2 90.1 
51. 1.4 0.0075 10 40 85.8 88.2 90.1 
52. 8.4 0.0075 10 40 85.8 88.2 90.1 
53. 3.7 0.0075 10 40 85.8 88.2 90.1 
54. 3.5 0.0075 10 40 85.8 88.2 90.1 
55. if If 7.0 0.0075 10 40 85.8 88.2 90.1 
56. 8.0 0.0075 10 40 85.8 88.2 90.1 
57. " 2.4 0.0075 10 40 85.8 88.2 90.1 
58. Arab Fund 9.6 0.04 5 15 42.7 48.3 
59. " 5.7 0.04 5 15 42.7 48.3 
60. " 6.4 0.04 5 15 42.7 48.3 
61. Kuwait Fund 1.6 0.025 5 20 56.9 61.6 
62. " 4.4 0.04 5 10 37.4 42.8 
63. " 11 3.2 0.03 5 25 57.5 62.5 
64. " 14.2 0.03 5 25 57.5 62.5 
65. 1.9 0.04 5 10 37.4 42.8 
66. Saudi Fund 9.7" 0.03 5 15 49.1 54.1 
67. African Dev. Bank 0.3 0.06 2 8 15.7 20.2 
68. " It it 1.0 0.06 3 10 19.8 25.3 
69. " is it - 1.1 0.06 3 10 19.8 25.3 
70. " 1.5 0.06 5 10 24.2 30.6 
71. " 1.5 0.0075 10 40 85.8 88.2 
72. United Kingdan 0.3 0.0075 2 23 59.3 64.6 
73. " 1.1 0.0075 2 23 59.3 64.6 
74. " 8.6 0.0075 5 10 54.9 58.7 
75. " 8.3 0.06 2 8. 15.7 20.2 
76. West Germany 5.5 0.0075 10 40 85.8 88.2 
77. " 6.0 0.0075 10 40 85.8 88.2 
78. " it 5.9 0.0075 10 40 85.8 88.2 
79. " 11.1 0.0075 10 40 85.8 88.2 
80. Netherlands 1.5 0.025 8 30 70.0 74.4 
81. U. S. A. 3.8 0.03 10 40 73.6 80.1 
0 
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Grant E1en: ent in Percentages 
Source Q ro=rl gt iß. 09 iß. 10 iß. 11 
82. Italy 0.4 0.065 2 8 13.2 17.9 22.2 
83. " 0.07 0.065 1 5 8.5 11.7 14.7 
84. " 1.5 0.065 1 5 8.5 11.7 14.7 
85. " 5.5 0.065 3 10 16.7 22.4 27.6 
86. Denmark 0.7 0.0075 8 17 71.4 75.0 78.1 
87. " 1.1 0.0075 10 25 80.3 83.4 85.9 
88. Czechoslovakia 7.0 0.03 0.0 8 21.2 24.0 26.7 
89. Rcmania 25.0 0.025 2 8 31.7 35.4 38.8 
90. Peoples R of China 14.1 0.0075 15 10 79.5 82.9 85.7 
91. 11 if 8.5 0.0075 15 10. 79.5 82.9 85.7 
92. Netherlands 0.02 0.0775 0.0 10 5.4 9.5 13.2 
93. Italy 1.6 0.06 4 8 20.3 25.9 31.1 
94. 2.9 0.085 3 5 2.6 7.7 12.4 
95. 2.4 0.065 4 8 17.2 23.0 28.4 
96. 4.1 0.085 2 5 2.2 6.4 10.4 
97. " 13.7 0.08 3 7 6.0 11.5 16.6 
98. United Kingdcm 8.3 0.06 2 7 14.7 19.0 23.0 
99. it of 9.9 0.09 2 4 1.2 3.9 7.7 
100. U. S. A. 3.6 0.08 2 5 4.4 8.5 12.4 
101. 3.6 0.06 7 5 24.0 30.6 36.5 
102. 1.4 0.085 2 7 2.6 7.5 12.0 
103. 1.2 0.07 3 7 11.7 16.9 21.7 
104. Belgitan 12.6 0.085 3 7 3.0 8.7 14.0 
105. 8.5 0.09 1 6 0.0 3.8 7.4 
106. it 1.3 0.065 1 5 8.4 11.7 14.7 
107. 0.8 0.095 3 4 -2.5 2.4 7.1 
108. France 1.7 0.079 3 7 6.5 11.8 17.1 
109. 1.5 0.072 3 5 9.2 11.7 18.4 
110. West Germany 2.8 0.0895 3 5 0.3 5.4 10.3 
111. 5.1 0.08 3 5 5.2 10.1 14.7 
112. 1.4 0.075 3 5 7.8 12.5 17.0 
113. Austria 0.4 0.065 1 5 8.5 11.7 14.7 
114. 2.7 0.08 1 8 4.6 8.9 12.9 
115. Denmark 2.3 0.09 2 8 1.3 5.4 10.3 
116. Yugoslavia 1.0 0.06 1 7 12.3 16.0 19.4 
117. 1.3 0.03 2 8 29.6 33.4 36.9 
118. East Germany 1.5 0.025 281 31.7 35.4 38.8 
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119. Kuwait Trading Co. 
120. " It 
121. Sudan Dev. Corp. 
122. " 
D. FaJRL'H PERIOD 1976/ 
8.3 
12.5 
0.6 
7.3 
80 
0.085 
0.085 
0.09 
0.095 
3 
3 
1 
4 
7 
7 
2 
2 
3.0 
3.0 
-3.7 
-2.5 
8.7 
8.7 
2.2 
2.5 
14.0 
14.0 
4.4 
7.2 
Grant Element in Pe rcentages 
Source Q ro_rl g t i=0.11 iß. 12 iß. 13 
123. World Bank (IDA) 3.1 0.0075 10 40 90.1 91.7 93.0 
124. " (ARD) 7.0 0.0475 5 20 53.2 58.0 62.2 
125. "" (IDA) 1.4 0.0075 10 40 90.1 91.7 93.0 
126. " 6.8 0.0075 10 40 90.1 91.7 93.0 
127. "n 3.2 0.0075 10 40 90.1 91.7 93.0 
128. " (IBM) 4.8 0.0475 5 20 53.2 58.0 62.2 
129. "" (IDA) 8.8 0.0075 10 40 90.1 91.7 93.0 
130. 10.0 0.0075 10 40 90.1 91.7 93.0 
131. 6.4 0.0075 10 40 90.1 91.7 93.0 
132. " 6.0 0.0075 10 40 90.1 91.7 93.0 
133. " 16.4 0.0075 10 40 90.1 91.7 93.0 
134 " 6.0 0.0075 10 40 90.1 91.7 93.0 . 
135. " 52.0 0.0075 10 40 90.1 91.7 93.0 
136.. 52.0 0.0075 10 40 90.1 91.7 93.0 
137. 32.0 0.0075 10 40 90.1 91.7 93.0 
138. Arab Fund 15.9 0.04 5 15 53.3 57.7 61.6 
139. " of 6.3 0.04 5 15 53.3 57.7 61.6 
140. " 14.9 0.04 2 12 39.3 43.1 46.6 
141. Kuwait Fund 1.1 0.01 10 20 82.8 85.3 87.3 
142. " 10.8 0.03 5 15 58.6 62.5 65.9 
143. " 6.0 0.035 5 15 56.0 60.1 63.8 
144. " 10.7 0.035 5 15 56.0 60.1 63.9 
145. Saudi Fund 3.5 0.02 5 15 63.3 66.8 69.9 
146. 9.2 0.02 5 15 63.3 66.8 69.9 
147. " 3.9 0.02 5 15 63.3 66.8 69.9 
148. " it 3.5 0.02 5 15 63.3 66.8 69.9 
149 " 2.4 0.02 5 15 63.3 66.8 69.9 
150. " 1.2 0.02 5 15 63.3 66.8 69.9 
151. " 14.0 0.02 5 15 63.3 66.8 69.9 
152. " 17.8 0.02 5 15 63.3 66.8 69.9 
F 
162. 
153. Abudahbi Fund 6.4 0.05 3 10 35.4 39.7 43.6' 
154. 1.3 0.03 5 15 58.6 62.5 65.9 
155. if 3.8 0.03 5 15 58.6 62.5 65.9 
156. H is 0.4 0.03 5 15 58.6 62.5 65.9 
157. Islanic Dev. Bank 1.3 0.025 2 16 51.8 55.3 58.4 
158. of if 1.9 0.025 2 28 63.3 66.5 69.3 
159. 0PEC Special Fund 1.7 0.0075 5 15 68.7 71.6 74.2 
160. of it 3.8 0.0075 5 15 68.7 71.6 74.2 
161. It it 3.9 0.0075 5 10 62.2 65.3 68.2 
162. MAD 7.6 0.0075 10 40 90.1 91.7 93.0 
163. 7.5 0.0075 10 40 90.1 91.7 93.0 
164. African Dev. Bank 2.0 0.0075 10 40 90.1 91.7 93.0 
165. 1.9 0.07 5 15 34.3 40.5 46.0 
166. 4.2 0.0075 10 40 90.1 91.7 93.0 
167. West Germany 22.0 0.0075 10 40 90.1 91.7 93.0 
168. Netherlands 1.7 0.0075 10 40 90.1 91.7 93.0 
169. 11 0.6 
. 0.0475 
3 13 40.5 44.9 48.9 
170. if 0.6 0.0475 3 13 40.5 44.9 48.9 
171. Italy 6.9 0.065 3 10 27.6 32.4 36.8 
172. Denmark 2.4 0.0075 10 25 85.9 88.0 89.8 
173. Norway 13.9 0.0565 10 15 55.8 61.8 66.8 
174. Japan 3.4 0.03 10 26 74.7 78.3 81.3 
175. 11 6.8 0.02 10 20 74.7 78.3 81.3 
176. France 1.7 0.03 5 20 63.2 67.0 70.3 
177. 3.9 0.085 2 6 11.2 15.3 19.1 
178. 5.9 0.03 5 20 63.2 67.0 70.3 
179. 13.7 0.085 2 6 11.2 15.3 19.1 
180. United Kingdan 4.2 0.10 2 8 5.3 10.2 14.8 
181. Belgiun 1.8 0.07 2 3 13.5 16.5 19.3 
182. France 6.2 0.075 3 7 19.2 23.8 28.1 
183. Austria 4.8 0.075 3 8 20.2 25.0 29.5 
184. 2.0 0.065 2 8 22.2 26.2 30.0 
185. Poland 8.4 0.06 2 8 24.4 28.3 32.0 
186. Arab Investment Co. 2.4 0.05 4 6 12.3 17.8 22.9 
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total value of the grant element amounted to Ls 562.7 million 
or 56.3% of the total face value of the 186 authorized loans 
amounting to Ls 998.7 million. In other words, the alternative cost 
that the Sudan would have incurred, if it did not. have access to 
external development assistance, is about Ls 562.7 million. If, 
however, one adds to this figure the outright grants that the 
Sudan received for development purposes over the period of study, 
the overall grant component will increase to 66% (that is Ls 845.. 4 
million) of the total external development loans and grants received 
over the past two decades. Table 6.8 below illustrates. 
Table 6.8 The Overall Estimate of the Aid Component (in value and 
in percentage) in External Development Assistance 
Received by the Sudan 1960-1980 
Period Rate of Number Total face Estimated Grant ele- Disoount of value of value of ment in 
Assured loans loans in grant ele- percentage 
Is m. narrt in Ls m. 
A. Loans 
1. 1960-1965 0.075 20 82.4 18.8 0.23 
2. 1966-1970 0.095 27 65.7 24.3 0.37 
3. 1971-1975 0.10 75 359.7 164.5 0.46 
4. 1976-1980 0.12 64 490.9 355.1 0.72 
Totes. loans 1960-1980 - 
B. Total Grants 
186 998.7 
282.7 
562.7 56.3 
282.7 
C. Total Loans & Grants 1281.4 845.4 65.97 
Source: Derived fran Table 6.7 
2. In all the 186 loans examined the grant element has been positive 
(that is, the discounted sum of payments of interest and principal 
is less than the face value of the loan). However, in applying the 
lower 0.01 margin of the assumed discount rate, four loans (one in 
r 
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the first period and three in the third period) have showed a 
negative grant element (that is the discounted sum of payments of 
interest and principal is greater than the face value of the loan). 
All the four loans are either credit facilities or suppliers credits 
or credits obtained from the Euro-dollar market. 
3. Ranking the sources of finance according to the degree of 
concession of their loans, shown by Table 6.9, reveals that the 
loans extended by the International Development Association (IDA) 
and the African Development Fund (ADF) have the highest grant element 
(90% on the average). The standard repayment terms of these sources - 
Eihich are specially established by the World Bank (in the case of 
IDA) and the African Development Bank (in the case of ADF) to help 
the least developed countries within the LDCs club - are 40 years 
repayment period plus 10 years grace period with no interest rate 
other than a 0.0075 service charge. However, in contrast with their 
mother institution the loans from. the IBRD and ADB ranked 23rd and 
24th with a grant element of 34% and 28% respectively. 
All the loans extended by the OECD countries (except Italy) 
as well as the loans received from Arab fund sources have a grant 
element of over 50%. In contrast, the loans extended by the 
Comecon countries have a grant element of less than 45%. This is 
mainly due to the fact that, although the interest rates charged 
were relatively low ranging between 0.025 and 0.03, the repayment 
period is relatively short ranging from 8 to 12 years. The loans 
extended by the Peoples Republic of China have a high degree of 
concession (83% grant element). 
Export credits and loans received from the financial institut- 
ions in the OECD countries and elsewhere were made at almost commercial! 
terms, thus their grant element was low ranging from 21% to 8% 
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Table 6.9 Ranking the Sources According to the Degree of 
Concession of Their'Authorized Loans 
Source Weighted Average Grant 
Element in Perotacre 
1 The International Develognent Assoc. (IDA) 90% 
2 The AFrican Develo nt Fund (ADF) 90 
3 West Gentahy 89 
4 Denmark 84 
5 Peoples Republic of China 83 
6 Japan 78 
7 The Netherlands 74 
8 OPEC Special Fund 70 
9 U. S. A. 68 
10 France 67 
11 Sweeden 66 
12 Saudi Fund 65 
13 U. K. 63 
14 Norway 62 
15 Islamic Develcgt t Bank 61 
16 Abu Dahbi Fund 57 
17 Kuwait Fund 53 
18 Arab Fund 51. 
19 Genen Democratic Republic 42 
20 Hungary 41 
21 North Korea 40 
22 Kenia 35 
23 IBRD 34 
24 African Develognent Bank (ADB) 28.4 
25 Poland 28.3 
26 USSR 25 
27 Yugoslavia 22 
28 Czechoslovakia 20 
29 Italy 19 
Source: Derived from Table 6.7 
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- see Table 6.10 below: 
Table 6.10. Grant Element for Suppliers Credits and 
Loans Extended by Financial Institutions 
Denmark 21.6 
Austria 18.2 
Arab Investment Company 17.8 
U. S. A. 15.9 
France 15.5 
Netherlands 13.0 
West Germany 12.5 
U. K. 12.5 
Kuwait 8.7 
Belgium 8.6 
Source: Derived fron Table 6.7 
The ranking exercise would suggest that in future, if the 
Sudan is to receive concessional loans with over 50% grant 
element, the country should - given the same repayment conditions - 
rely more on loans from IDA, ADB, the OECD countries (except Italy) 
and the Arab development funds, in financing development. At 
the same time export credits and loans from financial institutions 
in the OECD countries and elsewhere, as well as loans from the 
IBRD and the ADB, should be avoided because of their very low 
grant element. 
4. There has been an upward trend in the grant element. It has 
steadily increased - as shown in Table 6.8 - from 23% during the 
first period 1960-65 to 72% during the fourth period 1976-80. 
This increasing trend could be explained on the one hand by the 
higher discount rates assumed for successive periods,, given the 
same repayment terms, and on the other hand by the improvements 
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made by some donor sources in the terms of repayment of the 
loans extended. As a matter of fact four OECD countries (West 
Germany, the Netherlands, UK and USA) have, since 1976, converted 
their official development assistance to the Sudan from loans 
to outright grants. 
5. The criteria for efficient allocation of external loans to 
the various sectors of the economy suggest that there should be 
a close relationship between the aid component of external loans 
and the sector to which they are directed; that is directly 
productive sectors, namely the agricultural and the industrial 
sectors, should receive loans with relatively lower grant 
elements than the loans directed to social services and infra- 
structural sectors which-are not directly productive sectors. 
It seems that this criteria has not been strictly followed in 
the case of allocating the 186 external development loans 
examined. The agricultural sector - as shown in Table 6.11 - 
which is a productive sector received on average loans with the 
highest grant element 56% whereas the social services sector 
and the infrastructural sector received on the average loans 
with a grant element of 49% and 54% respectively, which is 
lower than the grant element of the loans allocated to the 
agricultural sector. However, the allocation of loans to the 
industrial sector with the lowest average grant element of 34% 
seems to be appropriate. 
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Table 6.11 The Grant Element - Sectoral Comparison 
Sector Grant Element 
(Weighted Average) 
1. Agriculture 56.1 
2. Infrastructure 54.4 
3. Social Services 49.2 
4. Industry 34.0 
Source: Derived from Table 6.7 and Appendix Table 6.1. 
6.5 CONCLUSIONS 
A substantial amount (72%) of the total authorized external 
development assistance received by the Sudan over the past two 
decades had been secured during the second half of the 1970s, 
that is 1974-1980. This period had also been characterized - 
as we noted in Chapter 5- by relatively high levels of public 
sector investment. Prior to the year 1974 public sector 
investment had almost been stagnant, as was the level of external 
assistance (only 18% of the total). This observation is likely 
to suggest that there had been a close association between the 
flow of external development assistance and the level of 
investment in the public sector. Further investigation of this 
observation will be provided in the next two chapters. 
Tying of external development assistance - source tying as 
well as end use tying - is likely to limit its overall effect- 
iveness on growth and production in the recipient country. In 
the Sudan about 54% of the external development assistance 
received during the past two decades had been source tied. This 
tying involves a real loss in the value of the funds received as 
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the donor countries may not always be the cheapest source of 
supply of the goods in question. As far as end-use tying is 
concerned, the bulk of the external development received during 
the period of study - about 76% - has been tied to specific 
projects rather than programme or commodity loans which are 
more likely to be. tailored to the needs of the production process 
than the project loans. 
The estimation of the grant element in the external develop- 
ment loans received during the past two decades shows that, the 
Sudan would have paid Ls562.7 million more as additional cost 
of borrowing from international capital markets if it did not 
have access to external development assistance. This amount 
represents 56.3 of the total face value of the external develop- 
ment loans received during the period. If we add to this amount 
the value of the outright grants extended during the same period 
this ratio will increase to 66%. This substantial benefit to 
the economy cannot be overlooked when we assess the overall 
effects of external development loans on the growth and develop- 
ment of the country. 
It is important to note that, whereas the directly productive 
sectors of the economy, that is agricultural and industrial sectors, 
received about 38.9% of the total amount of external development 
assistance, the indirectly productive sectors, that is infra- 
structural and social services sectors, received 54.6% of the 
total. Undoubtedly, this allocation policy has important 
implications on the effects of'external development assistance on 
output and growth. Because infrastructural and social services 
activities usually have high capital output ratios and their 
effects on production and growth are long term and indirect. Hence 
it is important to take into consideration - when we examine the 
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impact of external development assistance on growth and 
development in subsequent chapters - the fact that over half 
of the total foreign assistance received by the Sudan during 
the past two decades went to indirectly productive sectors. 
In the next two chapters we shall confine ourselves to 
this exercise. In the first chapter (Chapter 7) we shall 
examine the effects of these flows on domestic savings, and in 
Chapter 8 we shall analyse its effects on investment, GDP growth 
rates, sectoral and overall development performance of 
the 
economy. 
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CHAPTER 7 
IMPACT OF EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENT AID 
ON PUBLIC SECTOR'S SAVINGS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The basic assumption in the literature explaining the 
impact of foreign capital inflow on economic growth of the LDCs - 
reviewed in Chapter 2- was that foreign resources were exactly 
additive to domestic savings and domestically financed imports. 
In other words, each dollar of foreign resources would result in 
an increase of one dollar in imports and investment. The dis- 
cussion on the role of foreign capital in economic development 
has also focussed on the catalytic effect of foreign capital in 
promoting savings and investment from internal sources. This would 
occur if foreign capital operated as autonomous investment opening 
new opportunities and generating induced savings and investment. 
However, the validity of these contentions - as we have shown 
in Chapter 3- has been questioned by several economists. Studies 
by Rahman (1968), Griffin (1970), Weisskopf (1972), Singh (1975) 
and Hazari (1975/6) have concluded that only a fraction of foreign 
resources inflows has been additive to domestic savings, while a 
large share was used to increase consumption. A number of theor- 
etical mechanisms that lead one to expect a negative correlation 
between foreign capital inflow and domestic savings have been 
suggested by them. Empirical evidence. for the existence of such 
inverse relationship has also been reported. A few of them, 
namely Griffin and Enos (1970) have extended their argument further 
to suggest that foreign capital inflow is likely to retard rather 
than promote growth and development in LDCs. 
r- 
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In this chapter the hypothesis put forward by the above- 
mentioned economists on the adverse effects of foreign capital on 
domestic savings will be discussed and tested by using time series 
data from the Sudanese economy over the period. 1960-1980, as well 
as cross-country data from 50 developing countries during the 
period 1977-79. The extreme view that aid retards growth will 
be investigated in the next chapter. 
7.2 AN EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN CAPITAL INFLOW ON 
DOMESTIC SAVINGS 
In evaluating the theoretical arguments and the empirical 
results of the studies that showed the negative impact of foreign 
capital inflow on domestic savings, we shall examine the reason- 
ableness of the theoretical explanations put forward in support of 
the hypothesis as well as the methods used in the empirical 
analysis. The hypothesis will also be tested by using relative- 
ly more recent cross-country data from 50 developing countries, as 
well as, in view of Sudan's experience over the past two decades. 
The hypothesis of the negative association between foreign 
capital inflow and domestic savings is based mainly on the 
postulation that when capital inflows are firmly anticipated, they 
will be treated as part of the total income when expenditure 
decisions are made. As normal marginal propensity to consume 
will apply in such cases, capital imports will raise total consump- 
tion and reduce domestic savings. Also the governmentsin LDCs, 
as Rahman (1968) suggests, relax domestic saving efforts when 
more foreign aid is expected. 
However, there are some plausible arguments which suggest 
a rise in domestic saving as a result of foreign capital inflow. 
If production expanded after the inflow of foreign capital - and 
this is, most likely - it may be possible to have increased 
F 
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consumption without any decrease in saving. In most LDCs 
investment - as the experience of the 1970s would suggest - is 
substantially a function of foreign exchange available to 
import capital goods, spare parts and necessary inputs to create 
new capacities and to keep installed capacity functioning. To 
the extent that foreign resources inflow increases investment and 
subsequently output, both income and saving will increase. 
Eshag (1971) stressing on the leverage effects of foreign 
- aid, argued that in the majority of LDCs there exists a substantial 
reservoir of unemployed labour resources and unutilized land and 
equipment which could be used effectively if foreign exchange is 
available. With foreign resources inflow, domestic savings are 
likely to increase on the grounds that some domestic resources 
which would otherwise have remained unemployed are used with foreign 
resources on new investment projects. 
Surely, in developing countries with low saving and invest- 
ment, capital inflows raise the rate of investment leading to 
higher incomes and subsequently higher saving rates. Even if the 
inflow is used in part for consumption it may well be argued that 
additional consumption - over the longer term - may also raise 
productivity and output thereby causing an increase in savings. All 
these production and income effects of capital inflows are ignored 
by the hypothesis of negative association between foreign capital 
inflow and domestic savings. 
Another plausible assumption that foreign resources may 
lead to an increase in domestic saving is that foreign capital 
inflow may raise domestic savings by increasing the income of 
groups like industrialists, exporters, and agents of foreign 
contractors executing aid-financed projects. This argument, however, 
holds only if we accept Houthakker's (1965) thesis that savings are ý+ 
a function of the level and the rate of growth of income of such 
groups. 
174. 
The principles that govern the flow of external development 
assistance in practice, also suggest that governments' savings 
efforts should be intensified rather than relaxed. As foreign aid 
loans usually finance the foreign exchange costs of the projects 
in question, local costs -and in some cases part of the foreign 
exchange cost - are left to the recipient to secure. Hence, any 
serious government is likely to intensify its domestic saving 
effort so that it can meet its obligation to secure the local 
component of the development programmes and projects whose foreign 
exchange costs are met by foreign aid loans and grants. 
The argument that external development loans increase con- 
sumption may be questioned in view of the fact that most aid- 
giving agencies - bilateral as well as multilateral - follow 
regulations which permit financing specific development projects - 
that is, end use tying. Hence, with the exception of food aid 
which goes directly for consumption -*and usually in small 
magnitudes relative to the total inflows - all foreign resources 
made available from development aid agencies go for investment 
directly. However, development aid can increase consumption only 
indirectly through multiplier effects, as additional investment 
made available by foreign aid is bound to be accompanied by 
additional employment for construction of buildings, roads, etc., 
and the wages paid to the additional workers will lead to an ' 
increase in consumption. But this consumption is likely to occur 
(anyway) whether investment is financed by foreign aid or by 
domestic savings. 
Turning to the empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis 
of a negative correlation between foreign capital inflow and domestic 
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savings, we may find that the statistical findings used raise 
some definitional and methodological problems that warrant further 
scrutiny. 
The negative statistical relationship between domestic 
savings and foreign capital inflow - as Papanek (1972) has 
argued - may be in part the result of an accounting convention 
rather than a behavioral relationship. Domestic savings (S) are 
calculated according to conventional practice by subtracting net 
foreign capital inflow (F) from gross investment (I), S= I-F. 
But in some cases this equation may give misleading results as. 
regards domestic savings. For example, when foreign capital in 
grant form - which does not represent a claim'on past or future 
savings - is used for what is conventionally regarded as govern- 
ment consumption expenditure such as education and health 
services or for other consumption purposes. In such cases con- 
sumption has increased, and although neither investment nor 
domestic savings are affected by foreign aid, the conventional 
method will show a decline in savings. Hence, it will be mislead- 
ing to subtract all foreign resources regardless of their uses 
and sources from investment in calculating domestic savings. 
A further clarification of this view is provided by 
Newlyn (1973) who argued that a distinction should be made (as 
in standard UN proceedures) between capital and current transfers. 
When this distinction is made consumption grants will be included 
in current transfers and will therefore not be deducted from 
investment in calculating national savings. Hence, only when 
consumption grants are inappropriately treated as capital transfers 
will the accounting convention S= 1-F give misleading results. 
However, this classification is made from the standpoint of what 
ought to happen. In practice foreign grants for consumption - for 
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example food aid - are shown as part of the current account 
deficit financed by capital. inflow (aid). 
In the Sudan for example imports under 
non-project aid (mainly grants for consumption and some imported 
goods such as IBM machines for the Statistics Department) for 
various government departments are taken into account in the 
total public capital formation Such imports are reflected in 
the current account deficit which is financed by foreign aid. 
Another important point emphasized by Newlyn that is 
worth noting is that if domestic savings is obtained as the 
difference between gross investment (I) and the value of net for- 
eign resource inflow, which is obtained as the deficit on current 
account "... negative values of the coefficient 
äF 
between 
0 and -1, which would normally mean a reduction in the dependent 
variable, actually mean no change in the absolute amount of 
national resources being used for investment but simply reflect 
the extent to which foreign resources have been used for con- 
sumption. Only if the negative value exceeds unity is there any 
substitution effect (absolute reduction in the amount of national 
resources being used for investment). In the unlikely event of 
positive values these would mean a complementary effect (absolute 
increase in national resources used for investment" (p. 869). In 
other words, while the reduction in the difference I-F (i. e. 
national savings) brought about by the use of foreign capital 
for consumption is correctly shown as dis-saving, national resources 
used for investment (i. e. domestic savings) are measured by the 
difference I-F, where F is the amount of foreign capital used for 
investment. 
1 'Manual for the Calculation of National Income of Sudan 1961/62' 
Department of Statistics. 
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The use-of the single equation S=I-F in calculating saving 
is also bound to commit an error, as it implies that there is a 
joint dependence between saving and investment: 
S= (I - F, Y) .... (1) 
I= (S + F) .... (2) 
Therefore, the relationship between savings and investment 
cannot be described by the single equation S= I (I-F), but rather 
by a system of simultaneous equations (1) and (2). Because of 
the existence of the endogenous variables S and I in the set of 
the explanatory variables of the functions expressed in (1) and 
(2), the application of ordinary least squares in estimating the 
values of S and I in the equation S= oý (I - F) yields bias- 
ed and inconsistent estimates 
l. Two stage least squares could be 
used in order to eliminate the simultaneous equation bias. 
Unfortunately, we cannot test this model using data from 
the Sudan, because S, F and I are not independently collected. 
As is apparent from the published data (Appendix Table 8.1) 
only two series are collected by the Department of Statistics and 
the third one is obtained by them from the identity I=S+F. 
However, Mead Over (1975) has shown that the estimate of 
AS 
f obtained 
by ordinary least squares is negative only if 
foreign aid is exogenously determined. On the basis of his 
belief that foreign aid is determined "... not exogenously, but 
to fill the need as measured by the difference between investment 
and saving" (p. 753), and that investment is exogenously determined 
by government development plans, he re-estimated the model used by 
Griffin and Enos (1970) using a system of two equations; in the 
1 
A. Koutso iannis "Theor of Econometrics" yy, pp. 321-335,1973. 
178. 
first Y is regressed on Y, and in the second equation is 
regressed on the theoretical value of y (labelled ) calculated 
from the first equation. Using the same data used by Griffin and 
Enos he obtained the following results: 
-4.49 + 0.51(i), R2 = 0.135 
(3.8) (0.22) 
n 
S=8.69 + 0.96 (. ) 
(1.93) (0.43) 
where 
y=F. 
i=I S=Y 
Clearly, this re-estimation of 
S- 
under the assumption that QF 
foreign aid is endogenous - yields a positive value very close 
to 1.0 (i. e. 0.96) suggesting that foreign aid flows cause an 
additional matching increase in domestic savings rate which would 
be a considerable stimulus to growth. 
However this result has not been accepted by Enos and 
Griffin (1975) on the grounds that foreign aid is exogenous given 
the environment within which foreign assistance is allocated, 
that is the political factors in lending countries. 
Another problem that requires further scrutiny in the 
statistical findings of a negative association between foreign 
capital inflow and domestic savings is that, since most of the 
statistical studies on this relationship had been undertaken for 
the 1960s - and in some cases for the 1950s - the results may 
reflect the conditions, domestic as well as global, that character- 
ized that period. A study of this relationship for a more recent 
period may be useful in explaining whether the negative relation- 
ship holds at all times. 
Using data published in the World Bank's World Development 
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Report for the years 1977,1978,1979, we regressed the average 
gross domestic savings as a percentage of GDP (Y) for the three 
years on the average level of net foreign capital inflow (F) 
(public and publicly guaranteed medium and long term loans) for 
the same period for a sample of 50 low and middle income 
developing countries (see Table 7.1). The regression result is 
found to be inconsistent with the general finding of negative 
association between foreign capital inflow and domestic savings. 
Y=9.8 
+ 0.008 F R2 = 0.16 
(1.5) (0.003) 
(figures in parenthesis represent the standard error of the 
regression coefficient). 
This regression result suggests that the effect of the 
level of net foreign capital inflow on domestic savings is positive 
(or additive), the regression coefficient being positive and 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level of significance. It 
may as well give a rough indication that the statistical findings 
on the relationship between foreign capital inflow and domestic 
saving at different time periods may produce contradicting results 
on the account of the domestic as well as the global conditions 
that prevailed during the period of study. A more refined study 
would, however, investigate further the specific global and 
internal characteristics that could explain the sign of the re- 
gression coefficient. 
Another important point that deserves further discussion 
is the fact that, whereas the impact has been focused on foreign 
aid, what is being analysed in the work of the previous investig- 
ators is all forms of capital imports. That is, the deficit in 
the current account of the balance of payments. 
Most of the studies on the relationship between capital 
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Table 7.1 Net Foreign Capital Inflow and Saving/GDP Ratio 
50 Developing Countries 
Country 
Net Foreign Capital Gross Darestic Saving as 
Inflows* % of GDP 
1977 1978 1979 3 eý11977 
1978 1979 Average 
Bangladesh 286 437 500 407.6 (1) ý-" 2 0.3 
Etheopia 34 80 109 74.3 9 6 (4) 3.7 
Mali 51 62 73 62.0 8 5 (5) 2.7 
Somalia 115 111 86 104.0 "" 2 2 1.3 
Burundi 13 21 36 23.3 9 5 4 6.0 
Chad 27 31 12 23.3 31) (7) (14) (17.3) 
wanda . 
27 18 41 28.7 "- 4 12 5.3 
Upper Volta 46 39 64 49.7 24) (3) (3) (10) 
Zaire 411 6 143 186.7 20 12 12 14.7 
Bunn 137 277 349 254.3 9 13 15 12.3 
Malawi 49 78 127 84.7 10 16 13 13.0 
India 628 555 576 586.3 22 20 20 20.7 
Niger 31 63 78 57.3 "" 12 19 10.3 
Afghanistan 125 134 36 98.3 11 10 11 10.7 
Pakistan 580 544 610 578.0 8 7 6 7.0 
Sierra Leone 20 55 54 43.0 6 9 4 6.3 
Tanzania 143 151 198 164.0 17 7 8 10.7 
Sri Lanka 48 175 139 120.7 20 17 14 17.0 
Haiti 49 35 37 40.3 9 9 9 9 
Central African Republic 18 19 12 16.3 -- - 8 8 8 
Kenya 136 165 326 209.0 25 18 15 19.3 
Mauritania 54 93 28 58.3 7 7 14 9.3 
Sudan 85 250 193 176.0 "' 2 5 3.5 
Indonesia 1163 639 610 804.0 22 22 30 24.7 
Togo 96 168 238 167.3 1 14 11 8.7 
Egypt 2278 1642 1489 1803 15 14 16 15 
Cameron 198 229 444 290.3 19 21 10 16.6 
Ghana 87 58 120 88.3 5 6 5 5.3 
Honduras 100 135 148 127.7 18 20 24 20.7 
Liberia 62 60 119 80.3 31 18 23 24 
Thailand 186 649 992 609 21 22 21 21.3 
Senegal 76 121 140 112.3 0.0 11 2 4.3 
Philippines 740 932 1171 947.7 25 24 24 24.3 
Zambia 102 (41) 161 74.0 21 31 28 26.7 
Congo P. R. 62 205 33 100.0 "" 8 12 6.7 
Morocco 1168 895 1046 1036.3 7 11 9 9.0 
Bolivia 352 265 188 268.3 17 13 14 14.7 
Ivory Coast 733 725 660 706 26 30 27 27.7 
Jordan 189 187 193 189.7 (19) 26 2.3 
Colombia 194 110 603 302.3 18 25 26 23 
Paraquay 91 119 53 87.7 18 20 20 19.3 
Ecuador 522 395 595 504.0 26 26 27 26.3 
Guatemala 41 98 115 84: 7 18 17 14 16.3 
Nicaragua 220 93 98 137.0 19 19 12 16.7 
Korea R. 1501 2777 '2949 2409.0 25 28 28 27.0 
Dominican Repub. 100 125 123 116.0 22 18 14 18.0 
Peru 879 411 631 640.3 11 17 24 17.3 
Tunisia 636 470 591 565.7 22 20 23 21.7 
Syria 474 514 307 431.7 10 14 10 11.3 
Turkey 566 536 3763 1621.7 16 17 16 16.3 
Source: World Bank Worl d Development Report 1977,1978,1 79. 
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imports and domestic saving consider foreign resources inflow 
as the difference between current imports and exports of goods 
and services. A possible error may arise in such a definition 
of foreign aid. A balance of payments deficit on current account 
may be financed in a. number of ways including running down of 
reserves, short term capital movements and movements in the long 
term capital. If the main concern is the effect of foreign aid, 
then the relevant figures are movements in public long term 
capital. 
A study by Stewart (1971) on the relationship between long 
term capital inflow and the balance of payments surplus or deficit 
for a number of Central and South American countries revealed 
considerable variations in the relationship between long term 
capital inflow and the balance of payments on current account, 
both between countries at a single point in time and for one 
country over time. She concluded from this result that current 
account deficit cannot represent movements in the long term capital 
inflow. Therefore the regressions which Rahman, Griffin & Weiskopf ran 
showed the relationship between the current account of the balance 
of payments and domestic savings and cannot be interpreted as a 
guide to the impact of long term capital on domestic savings. 
One would not expect foreign aid (that is long term con- 
cessional loans) to have the same impact on savings as private 
foreign investment or short-term capital movements, commercial 
borrowing and changes in reserves. To draw conclusions about the 
impact of external development aid on domestic savings, one needs 
to analyse it separately from other flows. To do this, an attempt 
is made in this section by fitting time series data from the 
Sudanese economy over the period 1960-1978 on the same equation 
used by Rahman (1968) and Griffin and Enos (1970). But the 
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"current account deficit" is replaced by the external development 
loans received by the public sector (Fp) - which are generally long 
term concessional loans, and more likely to represent foreign aid 
than other capital movements. Also, instead of domestic savings-of 
the national economy, public sectors savings (Sp) are considered 
(Table 7.2). 
Table 7.2 External Development Aid and Public Sector Savings 
(In Ls million) 
Year GDP Public Sector External Savings Development Aid 
1960/61 386.8 12.3 6.9 
61/62 420.0 13.2 10.7 
62/63 456.2 26.3 9.0 
63/64 463.8 15.0 10.9 
64/65 476.8 4.1 11.9 
65/66 492.0 (9.4) 18.7 
66/67 497.6 0.6 12.4 
67/68 536.3 15.6 16.1 
68/69 583.3 (5.6) 12.2 
69/70 602.6 (8.5) 12.8 
70/71 637.6 20.7 15.8 
71/72 752.1 8.3 17.0 
72/73 896.8 3.3 17.9 
73/74 1246.2 (30.4) 34.4 
74/75 1510.8 (60.2) 44.6 
75/76 1848.0 (17.2) 58.8 
76/77 2339.7 (46.9) 74.5 
77/78 2878.4 37.0 78.8 
78/79* 3462.0 (72.9) 74.0 
79/80* 4072.1 (37.5) 91.4 
Sources: 1. Departn ent of Statistics - Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning 
2. Bank of Sudan Annual reports 
3. The Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning 
4. External Loans and Technical Assistance Administration. Ministry 
of Finance and Eccncanic Planning. 
Note: * Provisional estimates for GDP figures. 
Brackets indicate a minus sign. 
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According to Rahman (1968), Griffin and Enos (1970) and 
Weisskopf (Fp) adversely affects (Sp). They believe that 
savings in LDCs are substantially determined by government policy 
and that government's saving effort may be voluntarily relaxed 
when more foreign aid is available than otherwise. But, the 
formal mechanisms of foreign aid disciplines may suggest the 
reverse. Most aid giving agencies, bilateral as well as multi- 
lateral, follow regulations that permit only the financing of the 
foreign exchange costs of aid financed projects and programmes, 
leaving the local costs - and in some cases part of the foreign 
exchange cost - for the recipient government to secure. This 
policy induces the recipient government to maximize efforts to 
raise local capital through increased taxation and cuts in 
current expenditure. 
The local currency component of the projects or development 
programmes financed by foreign aid, such as costs of local mater- 
ials, wages for local labour, local transportation, import 
duties, etc. vary on average between 40% to 60% or more of the 
total cost of the projects and or the programmes supported by 
foreign aid funds. In theory recipient governments have two 
options to secure the local costs of such projects and programmes. 
They can: 
1. Increase savings through increasing taxation or 
reducing government expenditure. 
2. Borrow from the central bank or from the general public. 
The recipient government's saving effort can be enhanced 
by increasing taxation and reducing current expenditure. Tax 
receipts can be increased through higher tax rates, introducing 
new taxes and improving efficiency in collecting taxes. There 
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are no economic reasons why any or all of these measures 
should not be adopted. But, tax reform and current expenditure 
cuts are always politically undesirable particularly for the 
shakey political regimes that govern most of the LDCs. The other 
option available for the recipient government to secure the local 
cost component of projects and plans supported by external 
development aid is domestic borrowing. Here, the ability of 
governments in LDCs to borrow is limited. Borrowing from the 
Central Bank is economically undesirable because of the inflation- 
ary pressures it exerts on the economy and the subsequent adverse 
effects on the balance of payments. We may also find regulations 
that restrict government borrowing to a certain limit'. Borrow- 
ing from the private sector, on the other hand, is also limited 
by the absence and/or the limited financial markets. 
In practice, however, recipient governments usually increase 
taxation and borrow from the Central Bank at the same time, in 
order to meet their obligation to secure the local cost component 
of aid financed development programmes, as well as to meet other 
current expenditure. To the extent that public sectors saving 
and taxation effort were encouraged as a result of this obligation, 
then it is not possible to accept the argument that governments 
saving effort may be voluntarily relaxed when more foreign aid 
is available than otherwise. 
Nevertheless, the experience of the Sudan over the past two 
decades seems to suggest that government saving effort may be 
relaxed when more foreign aid is available. As we noted in 
1 In the Sudan, a ceiling for Central Government borrowing under 
article 57(1)A of Bank of Sudan Act - is set at 10% of the 
estimated total revenue for the current financial year. 
Chapter Five, despite the increasing reliance on external 
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development aid in financing the import content of development 
programmes in the Sudan over the past two decades, public 
sector's saving needed for the local cost component of those 
programmes has deteriorated. Current government expenditure - 
in nominal and real terms - is allowed to increase at a rate 
faster than that of current revenues, tax ratios have declined 
from 18.9% in 1970/71 to 10.4%'in 1979/80, and the financial 
performance of public enterprises has been poor. Whether the 
availability of foreign development assistance has led to the 
relaxation of public sector's saving effort needs to be 
investigated. This is done by fitting time series data for 
the period 1960/61 - 1977/78 to a modified version of the 
regression model employed by Rahman (1968) and Griffin (1970) 
to allow for the investigation of the relationship between 
public sectors savings Sp and external development loans 
received by the public sector Fp. We obtained the following 
result: 
Sp 
= 5.9 - 2.5 (FP) R2 = 0.24 
Y (2.8) (1.1) Y 
(Figures in parenthesis represent standard errors of the 
regression coefficient) 
where 
SP is the public sector savings as a per cent of 
Y GDP, and 
Sf is the external development aid received by 
Y.: the public sector. 
Clearly, this result suggests that with more external develop- 
ment aid, public sectors saving's effort has slackened rather 
than increased. 
_ 
The regression coefficient on 
Fp 
was 
Y 
negative and statistically significant at the 5% level of 
I 
significance. However in adding time (T) as a variable in 
the above equation the following result is obtained: 
Sp 
= 6.8 - 1.5 ('P) - 0.24T R2 = 0.45 
Y (2.48) (1.03)`Y (0.099) 
The coefficient on 
FP is also negative, but the negative 
Y 
effect is reduced and the coefficient is not very well deter- 
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mined casting some doubt on the causality implied by the equation. 
The result also suggests. that public sector savings have been 
declining over time. 
The government, in order to meet its obligation to secure. 
the local cost component of the aid financed development 
programmes has, therefore, adopted the painless policy of borrow- 
ing from the Central Bank rather than encouraging public sector 
savings. Table 7.3 clearly shows the heavy and increasing 
reliance on public sector borrowing (deficit financing) in 
financing the local costs of aid financed development programmes. 
Table 7.3 Sources of Financing Public Sector Investment 
Programmes 1965-1980 (in Ls m. and in percentage) 
Period 1965/66-1969/70 1970/71-1974/ 75 1975/7 6-1979/80 
Sources of finance 2m unt % unt % Amount % 
Total public sector invest- 
ment:. 142.5 100 261.8 100 840.1 100 
Sources of finance: 
1. External resources 72.2 51 129.7 50 377.5 45 
2. Public Sector's Saving 16.2 11 32.3 12 37.0 4 
3. Deficit Financing 54.1 38 99.8 38 425.6 51 
Source: Ccnstructed from Tables 5.9 and 7.2. 
Whereas the share of public sector borrowing in financing public 
investment has been rising (from 38% to 51%) public sector's 
savings share - which continued to be the lowest share - declined 
n.. 
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to only 4%. However, the existence of any causality for the 
negative association between Sp and Fp could be questioned on the 
grounds that in many cases the negative relationship is likely to 
be the result of exogenous shocks affecting both Sp and Fpl. 
These exogenous shocks or factors may arise because of political 
disturbances, wars, terms of trade deterioration and weather 
conditions. This may be true in the case of the Sudan where some 
exogenous factors have caused Sp to decline and FP to increase 
at the same time. For example, following the signing of the 
Addis Ababa Accord in March 1972 which brought to an end seventeen 
years of civil war in the Southern region, the Central Government's 
savings were affected by the extra funds required for rehabilitation 
and reconstruction as well as the establishment of the new 
administration (regional government). At the same time foreign aid 
to the Southern region has increased substantially. Also the 
refugee problem caused by political unrest in neighbouring Uganda, 
Chad, Central African Republic and Ereteria during the 1970s 
has increased government expenditure on refugees, thereby affecting 
government savings. At the same time the government received 
increased aid to support the urgent requirements for refugee 
settlements. 
Substantial changes in terms of trade, particularly for 
countries like the Sudan in which export earnings rely heavily on 
one commodity (cotton), may also lead to low savings and high 
foreign capital inflow. A drop in the terms of trade may cause a 
fall in savings from exports (in Chapter 3, we noted that in LDCs 
savings is a function of export earnings) at the same time foreign 
1 Papanek, G. F. "The Effect of Aid and Other Resource Transfers on 
Savings and Growth in LDCs" Economic Journal 1972. 
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exchange earnings will be drawn down and resort to foreign 
capital will be expanded to maintain the level of imports and 
investment. Papanek (1971) cited Ghana's experience in the 1960s 
as an example of a country with relatively low savings and 
high foreign capital inflow arising partly from deterioration 
in its terms of trade when cocoa prices fell between 1959 and 
1965. 
The sudden sharp rises in the price of oil in 1974 onwards 
is also an example of exogenous shocks which simultaneously 
reduced the economic performance in general and savings as well, 
and led at the same time to increased capital inflows. This 
point has been explained in detail with respect to Sudan's 
experiences in Chapter 5. Another example of exogenous shocks 
that led to decreases in government saving in the Sudan is that 
the government has a monopoly on the sugar trade, buying on the 
international market and selling locally for about 30% profit 
with minimal costs of storage and distribution. This operation 
used to bring some Ls40 to 50 million each year to the treasury. 
In 1974 when international prices for sugar rocketed the 
situation was reversed, instead of gaining revenue the government 
had to start subsidizing imported sugar, thereby leading to less 
government savings. 
It is plausible, therefore to accept that exogenous factors 
such as political and military disturbances, sudden falls in 
export prices or sudden rises in import prices, bad weather and 
other shocks, cause high foreign aid inflows and low saving rates 
simultaneously. Hence the regression results showing a negative 
correlation between domestic savings and foreign capital inflow 
should be considered with prudence as time series and most cross 
189.. ; 
section analysis would be affected by such exogenous temporal 
factors. 
CONCLUSION: 
In spite of the statistical findings supporting the view 
that foreign aid inflows adversely affect domestic saving effort, 
there are plausible saving functions that may produce a rise in 
savings as a result of foreign aid flows. Foreign aid resources 
raise investment, after a time this raises income per head, and 
after more time the share of income saved also goes up. Also, 
governments are expected to intensify their saving effort so as 
to meet their obligations under foreign aid loan agreements to 
secure the local costs of aid financed projects. The relation- 
ship between aid flows and public savings may be influenced by 
the policies pursued by the recipient as well as on exogenous - 
domestic or global - factors that characterize the period. 
Our analysis of the public sector saving performance in 
Chapter 5 and the regression results presented in this chapter 
suggest that in the Sudan with more foreign aid resources 
public sectors' saving effort has slackened rather than intensified. 
This is mainly due to inadequate policy measures, inefficient 
management of public enterprise as well as exogenous shocks such 
as political instability (domestic as well as regional), and sudden 
rises in import prices. 
In the previous studies, we find that while the criticism 
has been focused on foreign aid, what is being analyzed is all 
forms of capital inflows, that is "the current account deficit 
of the balance of payments". In our analysis of Sudan's experience, 
however, the external development loans received by-the public 
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sector - thought to be a more appropriate indicator of foreign 
aid flows than the current account deficit of the balance of 
payments - has been considered. And, instead of examining the 
effect of external development aid on aggregate domestic savings, 
the impact on public sector savings has been investigated. The 
selection of public sector savings and external development loans 
has also enabled overcoming the error possibility arising from 
the claim - explained earlier - that the negative association 
between foreign capital inflow on domestic savings may be due 
to the accounting convention S=I-F, and not due to a behav- 
ioural relationship. 
Whereas it is expected that the recipient of external develop- 
ment aid should intensify public sector saving effort so as to 
secure the local cost component of aid financed projects and 
programmes, in the Sudan the government has not adopted the 
appropriate policy of mobilizing public sector savings through 
increasing taxation and reducing current expenditure. But rather 
relied on the relatively painless way of raising funds, that is 
borrowing from the Central Bank, thereby causing inflationary 
pressures on the economy. 
However, the poor public sector savings performance should 
not lead us to jump to the conclusion that foreign aid has 
retarded growth and development in the Sudan. The proper test 
of the effectiveness of foreign aid is its impact on the level of 
investment and growth as well as on other development objectives, 
rather than on savings as conventionally measured. 
This point will be elaborated further in the next chapter 
when we examine the effects of the external development aid on 
public sectors investment and the growth performance of the various 
sectors of the economy. 
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CHAPTER 8 
IMPACT OF EXTERNAL AID ON INVESTMENT, 
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The basic argument used in support of external develop- 
ment aid is that it can he used as a basis for a significant 
acceleration of investment and growth in the LDCs. As we have 
seen in Chapter 2, many models have been constructed showing 
how external resources change the aggregate performance of the 
economy. ' Their logic is simple. Economic development in the 
LDCs is frequently constrained by lack of finance. The 
resources supplied by external aid enable. LDCs to overcome this 
constraint and allow. them to take off into self-sustained 
economic growth. In order to achieve a target rate of growth 
a country requires a certain amount of investment. If domestic 
savings is insufficient to finance the required investment - 
that is a saving gap situation - the growth target will be achieved 
either by raising domestic savings - which may be impossible in 
LDCs - or alternatively by an inflow of foreign finance. In 
many cases, as Chenery-type models suggest, even if a country 
is able to generate sufficient domestic savings, it may still be 
unable to reach its growth target, mainly because of the structural 
inability to earn enough foreign exchange to buy the imported 
goods that are needed for development. 
The forgoing logic would lead one to expect that there will 
be a positive relationship between external aid and growth. And 
in practice this relationship has been discovered by some economists 
Chenery (1970) for example cites the examples of seven countries - 
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Israel, Taiwan, Jordan, Greece, Puerto Rico, South Korea and 
Panama - following a high aid strategy in which substantial 
inflows of foreign capital between 5 to 10 per cent of GNP 
for sustained periods, have been accompanied by a considerable 
increase in the investment ratio and a relatively high and 
generally accelerating growth rate of GNP. Papanek (1973) 
relates growth to three types of foreign resources, aid, 
private foriegn investment and other foreign inflows. Using 
data from eighty-five countries, and including the domestic 
savings ratio as an additional explanatory variable, he finds 
that the aid coefficient is both positive and highly significant, 
and that aid is more productive in generating growth than any 
other single factor. 
However, a considerable amount of scepticism concerning 
the relevance of foreign aid to growth has been emphasized by 
several economists. For example, Griffin and Enos (1970) 
believe that "foreign assistance is not associated with progress 
and, indeed, may deter it" (p. 317). Bauer and Yamey (1981) hold 
the view that foreign aid contribution to Third World develop- 
ment cannot be significant, and is much more likely to be 
negative. In this chapter, we shall analyse the theoretical 
case and the empirical findings put forward in support of the 
view that foreign aid may not foster development and may even 
retard it. The impact of external development aid on Sudan's 
growth and development performance is also examined. In the light 
of Sudan's experience of development with foreign aid, we draw 
some conclusions that may be useful in clarifying the debate 
over the effects of foreign aid on growth and development in 
the LDCs. 
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8.2 EXTERNAL AID, GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CRITICS' ARGUMENT 
The view that external aid may retard rather than accelerate 
growth and development in the LDCs rests on various theoretical 
arguments as well as on some empirical findings derived by 
regression models using cross-country and time series data. In 
a number of articles Griffin (1970,1971,1972) and Griffin and 
Enos (1970) argue that foreign aid has little positive effect on 
development in LDCs, and it may have a negative effect. This is 
mainly because most foreign aid is used to supplement consumption 
leaving only a small portion to increase investment. This small 
addition to investment is likely to be offset by a fall in the 
overall effectiveness of investment, because "... there are 
indications that the output - capital ratio falls as aid increases" 
(1972, p. 128). The reason for this, according to Griffin and 
Enos, is that aid donors concentrate their aid on large projects - 
despite their low economic return - which will stand as monuments 
to their generosity because the motives of the donors are largely 
political. Also, foreign aid agencies have certain ideological 
biases against government ownership of directly productive 
activities leading to a change in the pattern of investment in 
favour of social overhead capital and economic infrastructure 
such as transport facilities, dams, etc. Hence this general bias 
against directly productive activities tends to lower the aggregate 
output-capital ratio. Moreover, there is - apart from the rigid 
administrative rules and regulations and unnecessary delays -a 
problem of administrative economies of scale which is manifested 
by the preference of the aid agencies to lend; for example -a £30 
million loan to finance one project costing £30 million rather 
than to finance ten projects costing £3 million each. In this 
N 
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way aid agencies will reduce the difficulties of supervision and 
keep down the administrative costs. Furthermore, as foreign aid 
finances only the foreign exchange costs of the project, projects 
which are intensive in foreign exchange are likely to be selected. 
Also projects are likely to be designed in such a way as to max- 
imize the foreign exchange component of the total cost. This 
bias towards foreign exchange intensive projects tends to reduce 
the effectiveness of investment. The practice of aid-tying 
increases the costs of investment which also lowers the aggregate 
output-capital ratio. Finally, the flow of aid inhibits - in 
general - institutional reforms necessary for development. 
Bauer and Yamey (1972,1981) argue that, in practice aid 
may retard development because foreign aid tends to increase the 
level of public sector spending, and as the public sector is 
inherently less efficient than the private sector, economic 
efficiency and growth will be reduced. They argue further that 
foreign aid encourages governments to carry out policies which 
will distort the development process and/or lead to lower growth, 
such as policies of extravagant government expenditure, wasteful 
protection of some industries and over-investment in physical 
infrastructure. It is interesting, however, to note that in 
citing examples. of countries where foreign aid has encouraged 
such policies, Griffin and Enos (1970) and Bauer and Yamey 
expressed conflicting views on the kind of policies inimical to 
growth and development. Griffin and Enos (1970) cited Tanzania 
as an example of a country which has been denied aid from the 
West because it was "... intent on reforming the society and 
re-organizing the economy" (p. 325). The same country - Tanzania -'ý 
has been cited by Bauer and Yamey (1981, p. 3) as a ".. favoured 
aid recipient, yet its domestic policies - enforced villagization, 
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inappropriate land reform, confiscation of foreign enterprises - 
have seriously undermined the country's economy and made it 
heavily dependent on aid and imported goods". Clearly, what is 
considered by Griffin and Enos as policies and institutional 
changes conducive to development in the case of Tanzania, is 
seen by Bauer and Yamey as policies inimical to growth. 
Empirically,. there have been a number of cross-country and 
time series studies of the effects of foreign capital on economic 
growth. Griffin and Enos (1970), in an attempt to test their 
hypothesis of a lack of positive growth effects from foreign 
capital compared the changes in development aid with the growth 
rates of national product for 15 African and Asian countries over 
the period 1962-64. They-found no close association between 
the amount of aid received and the rate of growth of GNP. The 
correlation coefficient is low and the standard error of the 
regression coefficient is high. The following regression result 
has been reported: 
Y=4.8 + 0.18 Any 
(0.26) 
R2 = . 33 
where Y= average rate of growth of GNP 1962-64 
and 
A/Y 
= ratio of foreign aid to GNP 1962/64. 
Taking the average rate of growth of GNP for 12 Latin 
American countries over the period 1957-64, they found that the 
average rate of growth of GNP (Y) is inversely related to the 
ratio of foreign aid to GNP A/y. The regression result was: 
Y= 42.97 - 6.78 
Any R2 = 0.13 
Although the association is loose - i. e. the fit was not 
very good - R2 = 0.13 and the period is short - 1957-64, Griffin 
N 
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and Enos (1970) maintained that "... the general tendency is that 
the greater the capital inflow from abroad the lower the rate of 
growth of the recipient country" (p. 318). Moreover, for a 
single country and a relatively longer period Griffin and Enos 
have correlated a one year lagged percentage change in GNP per 
capital (Q) with the amount of foreign aid received (A) for 
Turkey over the period 1951-65 (15: years). The relationship 
between Q and A was negative with a significant regression 
coefficient at the 0.05 level of significance. 
l 
Q= 12.5 - 0.047 At R2 = 0.62 
t+l (0.011) 
Nevertheless, a cross-country regression analysis under- 
taken by Papanek (1973) of 34 LDCs for the 1950s, and 51 LDCs 
for the 1960s, produced results that contradict the results 
obtained by Griffin and Enos. The approach used by Papanek 
differs from that of Griffin and Enos by, first, disaggregating 
inflows into their principal components, that is, foreign private 
investments, and aid. Secondly, by assuming that foreign capital 
inflow and domestic savings are independent variables in explain- 
ing growth, Griffin and Enos hold the view that foreign capital 
inflow and domestic saving are not independent of each other. 
Thirdly, the sample size is increased to 85 observations, thereby 
reducing the statistical weakness of the results. 
As conventional economic wisdom emphasizes, Papenek regarded 
investment as one of the major determinants of growth. He 
examined its effects on growth by separating the contribution of 
It is important to note that this result may also be explained 
in another way, that because countries have low rates of } growth they received more aid. 
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its components, that is domestic savings and various forms 
l 
of foreign resources inflow. The following regression result 
is obtained: 
G=1.5 + 0.20S + 0.39F1+ 0.17F2+ 0.19F3 R2 = 0.37 
(2.5) (5.0) (5.8) (2.5) (2.1) 
(figures in brackets represent t ratios) 
where: G= annual rate of increase of GDP; Fl, F2 and F3 
represent aid flows measured as the net transfers received by 
governments plus long term borrowing, foreign private invest- 
ment measured as private long term borrowing plus net private 
direct investment, and other foreign inflows measured as net 
private transfers, short term borrowing and errors of omission 
in the balance of payments respectively. S represents gross 
domestic savings. All the independent variables, i. e. S, Fl, 
F2 and F3 are expressed as percentages of GDP. 
The results obtained by Papanek suggest that savings and 
the components of foreign capital inflow explain over a third 
of growth rate. And foreign aid has a more significant effect 
on growth than savings or the other forms of foreign resources 
inflow. It is clear that this result is inconsistent with the 
results obtained by Griffin and Enos (1970). 
In the literature there are also some other empirical 
studies which indicate both inverse as well as positive 
relationships between foreign capital inflows and growth. 
This has been done by making a distinction between the 
type of economic systems in the recipient countries (Gorgens, 
1976), or by analysing the stocks and flows of foreign capital 
Papanek was careful to point out that a complete model would 
require additional variables to explain growth. But, as the 
aim of his analysis is the impact of foreign resources on 
growth his partial analysis may be justified. 
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inflow separately (Bornschier and others 1978). 
Gorgins (1976) relates the effectiveness of foreign aid 
in promoting growth, to the type of economic systems in LDCs. 
He believes that the conditions of the economic systems in LDCs 
have a substantial influence on economic development, hence the 
growth effectiveness of development aid is also partially deter- 
mined by these conditions. According to him, a cross-country 
analysis for 53 LDCs reveal that in planned economy oriented 
countries (24 countries) no relationship between growth and 
private or public development aid exists. Also, with rising 
development aid, the marginal productivity of capital tends to 
fall slightly, reflecting a general tendency to waste capital as 
well as inadequate structural allocation of aid resources. On 
the other hand, in the more free-market-oriented countries (29 
countries) - where average growth rates and private foreign 
investment are distinctly higher than in the planned economy- 
oriented countries -a positive relationship exists between growth 
and development aid (the correlation coefficient is +. 30). 
When domestic savings are added as an explanatory variable with 
foreign aid he found a closer association between growth and the 
simultaneous impact of domestic savings and foreign capital inflow 
(the correlation coefficient is + . 59). This positive association, 
according to Gorgens is due to the productivity effect of the 
private foreign capital in such types of country. Moreover, a 
comparison of the overall average of both groups together reveal 
that, whereas in the free-market-oriented countries the share of 
development aid in GDP of 3.8% compares with an average growth 
rate of 6%, in planned economy-oriented countries a considerably. 
lower average real growth rate of 4.3% accompanies a higher share ý; ' 
of development aid of 4.3%. 
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The analysis presented by Gorgen does not imply the 
rejection of the notion that aid promotes growth, but rather 
suggests securing positive growth effects from foreign aid by 
reforming the economic system through a lesser intervention in 
the domestic market and fewer quantitative restrictions in 
foreign trade as well as policy changes preventing state inter- 
vention. For example, export promotion strategy implies less 
state intervention than import substitution strategy. 
Bornschier and others (1978) in an attempt to explain the 
apparently inconsistent empirical findings of the studies on the 
effects of foreign capital inflow on growth, proposed a dis- 
tinction between stocks and flows of investment capital and aid 
which they believe have opposite effects on growth. In their 
view the current inflow of foreign investment and aid cause short- 
term increases in growth due to the contribution to capital 
formation and demand as foreign corporations purchase land, labour 
and materials and start production, while the long run cumulative 
effects of foreign investment and aid operate to reduce the rate 
of economic growth. Because the long run structural distortions 
of the economy produced by foreign investment, the exporting of 
profits and debt servicing, and the diversion of the countries 
receiving foreign aid from the optimum development strategy, all 
tend to produce negative effects on economic growth over time. 
However precise examples for structural distortions of the economy 
caused by foreign investment and aid are not given. 
In testing this hypothesis, Bornschier and his associates 
compared the results of previous investigators. on the impact of 
foreign capital inflow on growth by distinguishing between the 
studies using the measure of 'flows' of foreign investment and 
aid (i. e. current foreign investment and aid flows with those 
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using the measure of 'stock'. They found that seven of the 
eleven studies employing the 'stock' approach reported a 
negative effect of private foreign investment and aid on growth. 
On the other hand four of the six studies employing the 'flows' 
approach reported positive effects. The pattern found by this 
comparison suggests that the immediate effect of inflows of foreign 
capital and aid is to increase the rate of economic growth while 
the long run effects would reduce growth rates. This finding 
also allowed them to suggest that the inconsistent and contra- 
dictory findings of the previous studies could be explained or 
reconciled by whether one measures foreign investment and aid by 
'stocks' or 'flows'. It is important to note, however, that six 
studies do not fit the pattern suggested by Bornschier. Four 
of the studies employing the 'stock' approach reported positive 
effects indicating that the long term effects of foreign invest- 
ment and aid on growth are positive. Two studies employing the 
'flow' approach reported negative effects indicating that the 
short term effects of foreign investment and aid on growth are 
negative. This is also an apparent inconsistency which needs to 
be explained as well. 
8.3 EVALUATING THE CRITICS' ARGUMENT WITH REFERENCE TO 
SUDAN'S EXPERIENCE 
8.3.1 Impact on. GDP Growth Rate 
The critics' argument, as well as the apparently inconsistent 
empirical findincp presented in the previous section, suggest that 
a blanket rejection of the phenomenon of foreign aid on the grounds 
that it retards growth is hardly justified. But, rather indicates 
the need for examining individual countries' experience of growth 
with foreign aid over time, as well as for greater differentiation 
v 
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according to the forms of foreign capital inflow and the 
economic policies pursued in the respective country. So that, 
appropriate reform measures to foreign aid machinery and to the 
economic policies of the recipients could be suggested and 
adopted to ensure maximum effectiveness of foreign resources in 
promoting growth and development of the recipient country. In 
the rest of this chapter we shall deal with these issues, but 
first we shall start by evaluating the hypothesis of a lack of 
positive growth effects from foreign aid in view of the experience 
of the Sudan over the past two decades. 
As we noted in the previous section the main argument put 
forward in support of the hypothesis that foreign aid retards 
growth is based on the statistical findings of inverse relation- 
ship between foreign capital inflow and domestic savings (see 
Chapter 3a7) More precisely, the critics claim that capital 
imports tend to supplement consumption and very little portions 
of it goes to investment. But we may argue that in the Sudan the 
reverse has been true. Foreign aid resources received during the 
past two decades - because of the more or less strict end-use 
tying - were used directly for financing public sector investment 
and negligible portions were used for consumption directly 
through food aid. It is not even possible to claim that foreign 
aid has increased consumption indirectly through 'fungibility' 
because successive foreign exchange budgets have always restricted 
imports of consumption goods to the minimum essential commodities 
necessary for keeping the economy functioning. In other words 
the resources allocated to the imports of consumption goods would 
have been released anyway . whether foreign aid resources were 
available or not. Moreover, foreign aid resources finance only 
the import content of the projects leaving the rest of the cost for 
N 
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the recipient to secure from its own resources. Here 
'fungibility' or switching is likely to operate in reverse. 
Instead of setting resources free to carry out another project 
or to release them for consumption, the limited resources have 
to be withdrawn from other projects or from consumption to cover 
the recipient's share in the cost of the investment programme. 
Needless to say, foreign aid increases consumption indirectly 
when more jobs in the productive and the services sectors of the 
economy are created by aid financed projects. More jobs mean more 
wages and more consumption. But this indirect way of increasing 
consumption is not an undesirable sequence, as the creation of 
more jobs, which is likely to improve living standards as well as 
income distribution, lies in the heart of the objectives of 
development in LDCs. 
The proper test of the effectiveness of foreign aid on 
the growth process is its effect on a real GDP growth rate, 
sectoral growth as well as social objectives such as employment 
and income distribution rather than on savings as conventionally 
measured. If the major objective of a development plan or programme 
is to maintain a specific rate of growth over time, then less 
domestic savings caused by capital inflows do not diminish growth 
rates if the whole of the negative increment of domestic savings 
is compensated for by foreign resources or by other domestic 
sources of finance such as domestic bank borrowing. So long as 
the desired level of investment is not affected , 
by the substitution 
effect of foreign aid then the poor domestic savings performance 
may not be a major factor in failure to meet the required growth 
rate. And as Rottenberg (1971) argued, ".. if the terms on which 
foreign assistance is received are such that it costs less than 
domestic saving; it pays the recipient country to have it, and 
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its people are on the average better off than if they had 
rejected assistance" (p. 150). Hence, despite domestic savings 
deficiency, it is possible to maintain the desired level of 
investment by increased foreign aid and/or domestic bank borrow- 
ing, thereby achieving the target rate of growth. But, 
clearly such a policy is not without a cost. Although the 
objective of maintaining the target rate of growth may be realized, 
the other main objectives of the recipient, namely achieving self- 
sustaining growth, is likely to be delayed or prolonged as a 
result of the continuous dependence on foreign resources to 
finance the required investment. 
In the Sudan, as we noted earlier, foreign aid resources 
were used to supplement domestic savings in financing development 
plans and programmes over the past two decades. During this 
period - as we shall explain in section 8.3.3 - almost all the 
major development projects in the major productive and infra- 
structural sectors of the economy have been prepared, financed, 
and executed with the support of foreign aid resources (financial 
aid as well as technical assistance). 
The changes over the past two decades of domestic savings, 
investment and net foreign resources are shown by Table 8.1a and 
8.1b and Figures 8.1a and 8.1b, first in terms of actual amounts 
of flows of the three series and secondly in terms of three years 
moving averages, which are intended to smooth out the short term 
fluctuations. It is clear from Fig 8.1 that the period which is 
associated with substantial increases in the level of investment - 
namely 1973/74 onwards - coincided with the period of relatively 
high levels of foreign capital inflows. Between 1960/61 and 
1972/73 the investment ratio has averaged 14% per annum compared 
with a higher average ratio of 18.1% per annum after the year 
6. - 
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Table 8.1a. Domestic Savings, Investment and Net Foreign 
Capital Inflow as a Percentage of GDP 
1960/61 - 1977/78 
Year S/GDP I/GDP F/GDP 
1960/61 12.6 11.9 -0.7 
61/62 13.8 16.3 2.5 
62/63 14.9 16.8 1.9 
63/64 11.8 14.9 3.1 
64/65 10.5 14.9 4.4 
65/66 10.5 12.8 2.3 
66/67 12.3 15.2 2.9 
67/68 11.1 13.6 2.5 
68/69 10.6 13.9 3.3 
69/70 17.6 15.9 -1.7 
70/71 12.2 14.0 1.8 
71/72 9.0 10.1 1.1 
72/73 13.4 11.6 -1.7 
73/74 17.6 18.4 0.8 
74/75 8.7 17.5 8.8 
75/76 14.7 23.1 8.4 
76/77 10.1 17.1 7.0 
77/78 6.0 14.3 8.3 
Source: Constructed from Appendix Table 8.1. 
Table 8.1b. Domestic Savings, Investment and Net Foreign 
Capital Inflow as Percentages of GDP 1960/61- 
1977/78 (Three years Moving Average) 
Year S/GDP I/GDP F/GDP 
1960/61 12.6 11.9 -0.7 
61/62 13.8 15.0 1.2 
62/63 13.5 16.0 2.5 
63/64 12.4 15.5 3.1 
64/65 10.9 14.2 3.3 
65/66 11.1 14.3 3.2 
66/67 11.3 13.9 2.6 
67/68 11.3 14.2 2.9 
68/69 13.1 14.5 1.4 
69/70 13.5 14.6 1.1 
70/71 12.9 13.3 0.4 
71/72 11.5 11.9 0.4 
72/73 13.3 13.4 0.1 
73/74 13.2 15.8 2.6 
74/75 13.6 19.7 6.0 
75/76 11.2 19.2 8.0 
76/77 10.3 18.2 7.9 
77/78 6.0 14.3 8.3 
205. 
Source: Constructed from Appendix Table 8.1 
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1973/74. Foreign capital inflow as a percentage of GDP 
followed the same pattern, with an average of 1.7% per annum 
in the former period and a much higher average of 6.7% per annum 
in the latter period. 
The relatively high level of foreign aid flows after the 
year 1973 has permitted a high level of investment and relatively 
high growth rates at a time when a severe shortage of foreign 
exchange became the effective constraint on the economic growth 
of the country due to the simultaneous increase in import prices - 
oil in particular - and a fall in export demand for all non- 
oil producing LDCs of which Sudan is no exception. Table 8.2 
and Figures8.2 and 8.3 show clearly how real GDP growth rates, 
real per capita GDP growth rates, and foreign capital inflow 
as a percentage of GDP have followed the same rising pattern 
after the year 1972/73. 
An attempt is also made to test the relationship between 
foreign capital inflow and the growth rate of GDP as well as 
per capita growth rate by fitting time series data from the 
Sudanese economy on - more or less - the same regression model 
employed by Griffin and Enos, but for a longer and relatively 
more recent time period 1960/61 - 1977/78 (18 years). The 
results obtained are contrary to the results found by them for 
Turkey over the period 1951-65. Regressing the real GDP growth 
rate (G) (and then the real per capita frowth rate G*) on net 
foreign capital inflow as a per cent of GDP (F/y) for the period 
1960/61 - 1977/78 (see Table 8.1), the following results were 
obtained: 
G: 2.15 + 1.22 
F/y R2 = 0.66 (1), 
(0.66) (0.22) 
nt 
ý 
( figures in parenthesis represent the standard error of the regression ooefficiei, ; 'j 
G*= -0.14 + 1.16E/y R2 = 0.60 (2) 
(0.69) (0.23) 
r 
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Table 8.2 Net Foreign Capital Inflow, Real GDP and 
Per Capita Growth Rates (in percentages 
three years' moving average) 
Year F/GDP Real GDP 
growth rate 
Real per 
capita growth 
rate 
1960/61 0.4 3.3 0.6 
61/62 0.6 4.4 0.8 
62/63 1.1 3.1 -0.6 
63/64 1.4 3.1 0.1 
64/65 1.5 2.4 -0.5 
65/66 1.5 -0.3 -2.9 
66/67 1.2 3.6 1.1 
67/68 1.4 2.5 0.3 
68/69 0.6 3.7 1.5 
69/70 0.5 0.1 -1.7 
70/71 0.7 3.0 1.6 
71/72 0.2 5.0 4.0 
72/73 0.1 5.2 3.7 
73/74 2.2 4.8 2.7 
74/75 4.5 10.2 7.4 
75/76 6.2 11.3 7.6 
76/77 6.4 10.8 7.2 
77/78 6.4 7.6 7.2 
Source: Constructed from Appendix table 8.1. 
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The results in (1) and (2) indicate that foreign capital 
inflow is positively associated with the real GDP growth rates and 
the real per capital GDP growth rates. The regression coefficient 
is positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level of 
significance. R2 is high 0.66 and 0.60 for (1) and (2) respect- 
ively. It is important however, to take note of two qualific- 
ations with regard to the data used in equations (1) and (2). 
First, as there is no official GDP deflator for the Sudan, the 
available price data is used to estimate real GDP growth. Given 
that GDP consists of consumption plus savings, which could be 
rewritten as consumption + investment - foreign capital inflow 
(Y = C, + I- F), consumers price index is used to deflate 
consumption expenditure, and the import price index is used to 
deflate investment and net foreign capital inflow on the 
assumption that large proportions of investment and foreign 
capital inflow are spent on imported capital equipment and raw 
materials. Secondly, a three years moving average of the real GDP 
growth rates, real per capita growth rate and net foreign capital 
inflow is used instead of year to year changes. This may help 
in overcoming the problem of the choice of the appropriate time 
lag, as it is apparently difficult to determine an appropriate time 
lag between foreign capital inflow and the real growth of GDP 
generated by such flows because different types of investments in 
the various sectors of the economy have different time lags. 
8.3.2 Impact on Public Sector Investment 
The effect of foreign aid resources in the growth and devel- 
opment of Sudan's economy may also be explored by their contributior. j 
to public sector investment. In the Sudan, as we have seen in 
Chapter 4, the public sector dominates the non-traditional 
r 
213.1 
economic activity, it owns and operates all the public utilities 
such as railways, steamers, roads, electricity and water, almost 
all the modern agricultural schemes, and the bulk of industrial 
activity particularly in sugar and textile industries. It is 
therefore, justifiable to claim that public sector investment 
in the Sudan is a major determinant of growth. 
As we noted in Chapter 5 public sector investment has been 
more or less stagnant during the 1960s and early 1970s. Only 
in the year 1973/74 onwards did the level of public sector 
investment increase substantially. Though the large increases-in 
public sector investment during the period 1973-80 may in part 
be explained by cost escalations in almost all development projects 
caused by international price rises in equipment, machinery; raw 
materials and oil, the main factor causing the increase in public 
sector investment has been the ambitious development programme - 
the Phased Action Programme - that has been launched in 1972. 
Under this programme, the magnitude of investment in the original 
plan - the Five Year Plan 1970-1975 - has been increased substan- 
tially as a result of introducing a number of large infrastructur- 
al projects that aim at containing the transport bottlenecks as 
well as agricultural and industrial projects to achieve self 
sufficiency in the basic necessities such as sugar, textiles and 
food. 
The foreign exchange component of this ambitious programme 
has been financed by high levels of foreign aid resources, thereby 
allowing the implementation of the development projects embodied 
in the programme at a time when the growth and development of the 
country has been severely constrained by widespread shortages of 
foreign exchange following the 1970s import price rises and the 
global recession. Table 8.3 shows the actual drawings from 
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Table 8.3 Actual Drawings from External Development Loans as aper 
Cent of Development Expenditure, Imports & Exports 
1960/61 - 1979/80 
(in percentage) 
p 
Actual drawings As a per cent As a per as a per 
Years fran external of public sec- cent of cent of dev't loans tor dev't ex- imports exports 
. 
(gross) in Ls m penditure 
1960/61 6.9 30 10 11 
61/62 10.7 39 13 16 
62/63 9.0 24 10 10 
63/64 10.9 23 10 13 
64/65 11.9 37 16 18 
65/66 18.7 65 24 25 
66/67 12.4 44 15. 17 
67/68 16.1 64 18 20 
68/69 12.2 41 13 13 
69/70 12.8 42 14 13 
70/71 15.8 59 13 15 
71/72 17.0 57 14 16 
72/73 17.9 52 16 14 
73/74 34.4 64 23 24 
74/75 44.6 38 16 28 
75/76 58.8 43 22 33 
76/77 74.5 45 33 31 
77/78 78.8 41 32 40 
78/79 74.1 44 24 33 
79/80 91.4 52 19 32 
Source: Foreign Aid and Technical Assistance Ac ne inistration - Ministry 
of Finance and Eccmcmic Planning, Bank of Sudan Annual Reports. 
215. E 
official external development loans and grants as a per cent of 
public sector development expenditure, imports, and exports during 
the past two decades. During the 1960s foreign aid loans and 
grants financed on the average 41% of total public development 
expenditure compared to a much higher average percentage of 50% 
during the 1970s. Also foreign loans and grants as a per cent of 
imports and exports followed the same pattern with average percent- 
ages of 14.3 for imports and 15.6 for exports during the 1960s 
compared to a much higher percentage during the 1970s of 21.2 and 
26.6 respectively. It is clear therefore that the relatively high 
levels of external aid resources supplied during the period 1970- 
80 have permitted higher levels of investment in the public sector 
than would otherwise have been. 
As far as the local currency component of the public 
investment is concerned, the government and the public enterprises 
(as we have shown in Chapters 5 and 7), relied on borrowing from the 
Central Bank to finance the local currency component of the 
development budgets as well as other current budget deficits. 
However, following the critics of foreign aid argument, it 
may be claimed that, though external development aid has supported 
higher levels of public investment during the past two decades, 
the growth effects of such aid financed investment may be very 
little in view of the claim that foreign aid resources alter the 
composition of investment to the disadvantage of the recipient 
country through financing capital intensive projects, foreign 
exchange intensive projects, large infrastructural projects, 
monumental projects, thereby raising the capital output ratio which 
subsequently leads to a fall in the growth rate. Empirical evidence 
on such relationship between capital output ratio and foreign aid 
flows has not yet been reported. A simple test of the association 
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between capital - output ratio and foreign aid resources would be 
- as Griffin (1970) has suggested - to regress ICOR (K) on the 
ratio of foreign capital to investment 
F/I. If the association is 
positive then ICOR increases as foreign aid increases leading to 
a fall in the rate of growth. And if the association is negative 
then as foreign aid increases ICOR decreases leading to a rise in 
the rate of growth. 
In view of the fact that about 55% of the external develop- 
ment aid received by the Sudan during the past two decades has 
been allocated to infrastructural and social services activities 
(see Chapter 6 Table 6.5) one should expect a positive association 
between foreign aid and ICOR that leads to lower growth rates. 
on Iýfl 
But, an attempt to regress COR (K)/ has failed, because year by 
year there has been extreme variability in the capital output 
ratio. 
However, in a vast country like the Sudan where transport 
and communication bottlenecks create special constraint to growth 
and development, the economic return from investment in such types 
of projects- though long delayed - will be high. In countries like 
the Sudan where the high costs of infrastructural projects are 
clearly beyond the means of the government and by their very nature 
too indiscriminate for private investment, the only way to finance 
such projects is through concessional foreign aid loans and grants. 
It is true that infrastructural and social services projects 
tend to have a relatively high capital-output ratio as convention- 
ally measured. But the economic justification of such types 
of investment is that they have external positive effects on the 
economy so that their economic return to the economy can be very 
high. The capital output ratio which is relevant in analysing the 
role of foreign aid in the growth process is not that of isolated 
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projects but the capital output ratio of the aggregate economy 
which is likely to fall in the long run as greater availability 
of foreign aid resources breaks up infrastructural bottlenecks 
that apparently hamper the growth process and thereby enable the 
more productive use of the capital resources of the country. 
Needless to say, the importance of infrastructure in the 
growth process in LDCs does not suggest the construction of such 
installations ahead of development, but rather emphasizes the need 
to build the basic infrastructural services that are required dur- 
ing the course of the growth process itself. An agricultural 
scheme for food or export production may not be established 
unless we construct a dam, which may also be needed for electric 
power generation. In the Sudan, for example, two major transport 
projects namely, Khartoum-Portsudan Road (1287 km), and Portsudan- 
Khartoum petroleum products pipeline have been built mainly with 
foreign resources after the year 1974 when it became apparently 
clear that the transport of exports and imports - particularly on 
the vital Khartoum-Portsudan route - represented a major obstacle 
to the growth process of the country as the railways, with a single 
track to Portsudan - have failed to meet the increasing transport 
needs, and suffered from frequent washouts and sand dunes. 
Foreign aid resources which finance social services 
expenditure such as health and education - conventionally regarded 
as consumption expenditure - and food aid may not always be 
undesirable consumption. There are many economists, for example, 
Kennedy & Thirlwall (1971) and Stewart (1971), who correctly 
emphasize that expenditure on health, education and nutrition are 
likely to improve skills, reduce illness and improve diet which 
ultimately raise the productivity of labour and raise the rate of 
growth. 
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More recently, emphasis has been laid on the Basic Human 
Needs Development Strategy' which focuses on achieving equitable 
society and reducing poverty through the provision of tangible 
necessities of life such as food, water, shelter, health and 
education without which a person has little or no chance to lead a 
fulfilling existence. This approach, however, does not suggest 
that the development strategy must not provide for increases in 
the overall GNP growth rates. It rather regards aggregate output 
growth a necessary, but by no means a sufficient, condition for 
progress. It will therefore be justifiable to allocate foreign aid 
resources to such consumption expenditures under the Basic Human 
Needs approach so long as the ultimate objective of development 
strategy is to achieve sustainable improvements in the material 
wellbeing of the individual rather than to increase aggregate 
output growth that leads usually to income inequality within 
the recipient country. 
However, food aid in particular, with its tangible effect on 
consumption, is more vulnerable to the argument that foreign aid 
resources reduce domestic savings and thus future growth. Not 
only this, but the increase in food supplies provided by food 
aid depresses prices received by farmers, and encourages recipient 
governments to adopt inadequate agricultural policies so that food" 
production will eventually decrease. This view is also debatable 
in view of the main objectives of food aid which can be briefly 
summarized as: first, food aid provides food for the poor by 
direct subsidized distribution and by helping to contain food price 
increases which tend to hit the poorest of the poor. Secondly, it 
1 This approach was first put forth by the ILO at its 1976 World 
Employment Conference, and was subsequently elaborated by others 
at the World Bank, the OECD and the US AID. See Streeten, P. 
and Burki, S. J. (1978), and Crosswell, M. (1978). 
.I 
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provides financing for specific government development projects 
particularly in the agricultural sector. For example the 
agreements for American food aid to the Sudan - started in 1978 - 
contained a number of commitments by both the US AID and the 
government for expansion and improvement of agricultural 
production within the framework of Sudan's own targets and plans. 
Thirdly, food aid can be used to build up stocks which can 
contribute to both consumers'and producers' welfare by reducing 
fluctuations and uncertainties. Finally, food aid, as Isenman 
and Singer (1975) have argued, eases a major constraint on growth 
in output and employment. In their view in low income countries 
a high proportion of workers' incomes (two-thirds or more) goes 
for food - most of it food grains. In such cases, "... increments 
to public or private employment through fiscal and monetary policy 
must be measured against food supplies, in many ways as if the 
whole economy consisted of a public sector food-for-work programme 
in which all workers were paid two-thirds of their wages in food" 
(p. 2). Hence food aid may permit the recipient to expand employ- 
ment. Moreover, in their empirical study of the price effect of 
food aid on food grain output in India, they found that during the 
food aid period 1956-71, only a short period (1960-62) showed a 
decline in relative food prices, a conclusion which is inconsistent 
with the critics' view that food aid leads to a reduction of food 
production through its depressing effect on prices received by 
food grain producers. 
In the Sudan food aid over the past two decades has not been 
transferred on large quantities or regular time periods to enable 
a judgement about its effect on food production. Only in the year 
1978 onwards that the country started to receive relatively large 
quantities of wheat flour (100 thousand tons per year) under the 
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US AID PL480. Hence any judgement about the effect of food aid 
on food prices and food production would be premature in view 
of the short period of food aid and in view of the fact that the 
major wheat production areas in the Gezera Scheme were adversely 
affected by floods caused by excessive rains during the 1978/79 
season which led to a large drop in wheat production. 
It appears however, for food aid - as well as for non- 
food aid - the negative effects on output may be avoided if 
appropriate policy measures are adopted by the recipient and 
donors. The recipient can undertake the necessary self-help 
efforts to ensure that any disincentive effect is offset by using 
foreign aid resources as a basis for additional output. 
8.3.3 Impact on Sectoral Growth Performance 
The impact of foreign aid flows on growth and development 
of the Sudan over the past two decades may also be shown by a close 
examination of the effect of foreign aid resources on the growth 
performance of the major sectors of the economy, namely, agriculture 
transport and infrastructure, and industry. 
In the agricultural sector, all the major agricultural 
schemes - apart from the Gezera Scheme which was established 
during the British colonial era - irrigated as well as mechanized 
rain-fed schemes have been supported by foreign aid resources. 
The early 1960s witnessed a substantial increase of irrigated land 
through the Managil Extension Scheme (800,000 feddans and Khashm 
El Girba (New Halfa) Scheme (400,000 feddans). The foreign 
exchange costs of both projects were secured from development loans 
from the World Bank in 1960 and 1961, Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic 
Development 1965, and Italy 1961. A third major agricultural 
project which was financed by foreign aid resources is the Rahad 
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project. The completion of phase 1 of this project in 1976 
increased the irrigated areas by about 300,000 feddans. The pro- 
ject produces mainly export crops, namely cotton and groundnuts. 
All the foreign exchange costs of this project have been secured 
from development loans from the IDA (1973,1975) Kuwait Fund for 
Arab Economic Development (1973,1975), Saudi Fund for Development 
(1975) and US AID (1973). The area under mechanized rainfed farm- 
ing has also increased sharply from about 220 thousand feddans 
in 1960 to about 4 million feddans in 1980. It is undeniable that 
the development of mechanized rainfed farming in the Sudan - in 
Kassala, Blue Nile, Southern Kordfan and Upper Nile provinces - 
is associated with the external development loans received from 
the World Bank in 1968, '1972 and 1978 and the Kuwait Fund for 
Arab Economic Development in 1972, which financed the foreign 
exchange costs of the mechanized farming projects in these 
provinces. 
Undoubtedly, the economic growth of the Sudan has been 
influenced by the increases in the agricultural output of these 
schemes. As we noted in Chapter 4, total agricultural production 
in volume terms, for the major food and export crops, grew at an 
average annual rate of 5.1% during the past two decades. Food 
grain production (sorghum, millets and wheat) has grown at even 
a faster average annual rate of 9.2%. Moreover, the rapid devel- 
opment of the irrigated areas and the mechanized rainfed farms, 
which was made possible by foreign aid resources, has enabled the 
use of a valuable resource of the country - sparsely settled or 
empty productive land - which would otherwise be difficult or 
impossible to utilize. Furthermore, apart from their direct 
valuable contribution to the expansion of food supplies for domestic.; 
consumption and of export crops, these schemes did contribute to 
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the growth and development of the country through the employment 
opportunities they opened up, the transformation of vast areas 
from traditional to non-traditional sectors of the economy and 
through the other social benefits - settlement, education, health - 
which are difficult to quantify even individual cost-benefit analy- 
sis is undertaken to each project separately. 
However, it is true that there has been an apparent 
decline in the growth of production of cotton - the major export 
crop - after the year 1974, with its subsequent adverse effects 
on exports and the balance of payments. To recapitulate, the 
major causes for the deterioration in cotton production which 
we pointed out in Chapters 4 and 5 were: first, the government 
policy of diversification in 1974 and the adoption of an incentive 
scheme which has been advantageous to non-cotton producers 
(through unfavourable exchange rate, export levies and costs 
distribution). Secondly, the severe shortage in foreign exchange 
following the external shocks of the year 1974 onwards and the tyi4r" 
of foreign aid resources to specific projects - mainly new projects 
- rather than to improve the productive capacity of the old 
projects particularly the Gezera Scheme and New Halfa projects, 
led to shortages in essential maintenance equipment and spare parts 
with the subsequent failure to maintain the irrigation systems at 
the required level of efficiency. Thirdly, shortages in labour 
requirements for cotton picking and weather conditions such 
as the 1978 floods in the Gezera. 
The adverse effects of the government policy on cotton 
production and the donor/government policy of aid allocation - 
favouring the creation of new capacity rather than improving the 
existing capacity - have been lately identified. It wasn't until 1979 
that the government adopted policy measures designed to encourage 
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the production of cotton under the Export Action Programme. The 
exchange rate applicable to cotton exports was reduced from 
US$2.5 to US$2.0 to the Sudanese pound and the export tax for 
cotton was abolished. With regard to foreign aid allocation 
programme loans for agricultural rehabilitation in Gezera and New 
Haifa have been secured from the World Bank, African Development 
Bank and the International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD). The effectiveness of these policy changes in enhancing the 
productivity in these schemes is yet to be investigated. But it 
is clear that a timely provision of these programme loans - 
perhaps during the early 1970s - together with policy measures 
designed to encourage cotton production would have been much 
more effective in increasing agricultural production of the export 
crops - that is cotton and groundnuts - thereby relieving the 
general scarcity in foreign exchange that hampered the growth 
process of the country during the decade of the 1970s. 
In the field of infrastructure, the major significant 
contribution of foreign aid resources has been the construction of 
vital inter-city roads. The number of road projects that have 
been planned financed and executed with the use of foreign aid 
loans, technical assistance, and grants during the 1970s 
indicate something of a transport revolution in the country. As 
we have seen in Chapter 4 (Table 4.4) the length of the road 
network has increased by about 325% over the pre-1970 length, 
and if we add the length of the roads currently under construction 
this rate will be about 528%. As a result of this remarkable 
performance, the share of the road sector in GDP has increased 
substantially from 2.7% in 1972 to 7.5 in 1977/78. The number 
of licenced lorries and trucks increased from 11.0 to 34.0 
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thousand between 1970 and 19781. Clearly this performance is assoc-16 
iated with the foreign aid resources that financed about 84%, 
on the average, of the road construction investment programme dur- 
ing the 1970s. Table 8.4 shows that Ls 224.8 million of external 
development loans and grants, that is, 35% of the total foreign 
resources allocated to infrastructure during the past two decades 
- with a high grant element of 77.6% on the average - has been 
allocated for financing road construction during the 1970s. 
it is true that investment in transport is generally capital 
intensive. To begin with the unit cost of it is relatively high, 
and for the Sudan in particular this cost is greater than in many 
other countries as economic activities are spread over a vast 
land mass. But the long run effects of such investment on growth 
and development will be substantial. The development of roads in 
the Sudan during the decade of the 1970s - made possible by 
foreign aid resources - would lead in the long run to considerable 
reductions in the operating and maintenance costs of the normal, 
diverted and generated road traffic, saving in time for both 
freight and passengers, expanding employment in trucking and 
bussing operations and in repair and maintenance shops for trucks 
and automobiles, and the stimulation of the overall economic 
development of the country by bridging considerable distances in 
the central and eastern parts of the country (including the 
single port) where the major share of agricultural, industrial and 
commercial activities are concentrated. 
The contribution of foreign aid resources to transport 
sector development in the Sudan can also be seen in the construct- 
ion of the Khartoum-Portsudan petrolium products pipeline which 
1 
Transport and Statistical Bulletin'1978/79. Ministry of 
National Planning. 
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Table 8.4 Magnitude, Sources and Grant Element of 
Foreign Financing of Asphalted Road 
Projects during the 1970s 
Road Projects length Source of Foreign Magniti3e Grant 
in Financing in Ls m Elanait 
Km 
1. Wadmedani/Elgedarif 228 Government of the Peoples 16.0 82.9 
Republic of China 
2. E1Gedarif/Kassala 220 Arab Fund for Economic & 
Soc. Dev. 25.3 48.3 
African Dev't Bank 2.0 88.2 
3. Kassala/Haya 348 Saudi Find for Dev't 13.7 66.8 
Saudi Government 5.0 66.8 
OPEC Fund 5.5 71.6 
4. Haya/Suakin/Port Sudan 204 Goverment of Abixithbi 27.0 100.0 
5. Wadmedani/Sennar/Kosti 217 UK (ODA) 12.1 100.0 
OPEC Fund 1.6 71.6 
6. Sennar/bamazin 285 Kuwait Fund for Arab Ec. Dev. 17.2 62.5 
Arab Fund for Econ. & Soc. Dev. 21.2 57.7 
7. Neyaia/Kas/Zalenji 210 Government of F. R. of Germany 9.2 1n0.0 
Saudi Fund for Dev. 35.0 66.8 
Islamic Dev. Bank 4.5 66.5 
8. Jebel Auli. a/Dueim 158 International Dev. Assn (IDA) 15.6 91.7 
9. Dueim/ýak 109 West Germany 13.9 100.0 
Total 1979 224.8 77.6* 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Eccnanic Planning, Transport Sector 
Administraticn, Foreign Aid and Technical Assistance Administration 
Notes: Projects. 6,7,8,9 are currently under construction. 
* This is the average grant element. Figures for the grant element are 
estimated in Chapter 6 (Table 6.7). 
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was financed by two external development loans from the Kuwait 
Foreign Trading and Contracting Company. The pipeline - though 
working well below its design capacity since its completion in 
1977 - has helped in relieving congestion on railway traffic from 
the port to the major production and consumption areas as well as 
in supplying petroleum products to the major consumption areas 
during the rainy season when the rail track washouts are 
frequent. But a major drawback in financing this project is 
that despite the fact that it is an infrastructural project, the 
repayment terms of the two loans were almost commercial terms 
with a grant element - estimated in Chapter 6- of only 8.7%. 
The appropriate type of finance for such projects which can neither 
earn or save foreign exchange and whose output-capital ratio is 
low, is long term concessional loans with high grant element. 
The railways - which have occupied a predominant place in 
the Sudan's transport system - have also benefited from foreign 
aid resources during the past two decades. They enabled the 
construction of important extensions of the railway line in the 
early 1960s, adding 767 kilometers to the total length of the 
linel. The most notable of these extensions were the lines to 
Nyala in Southern Darfur and Wau in the Southern region which 
connected most of the resourceful south-western part of the 
country with the central and eastern parts (including the port). 
During the 1970s when the railway suffered frequently from 
insufficient locomotives and rolling stock as well as shortages 
of spare parts and maintenance equipment, foreign aid resources 
have helped to a great extent in relieving these shortages. 
1 The Economic Survey 1961 p. 37 Ministry of Finance and 
Economics. 
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However, in spite of this contribution, the operational perform- 
ance of the railways - as we noted in Chapter 4- has generally 
been poor during the 1970s. This can be explained in part by the 
insufficient and untimely supplies of the required foreign 
exchange caused mainly by the limited amounts of the foreign 
aid resources available to the country with many other foreign 
exchange starved sectors competing to obtain such scarce resources; 
and - as we shall explain in the next chapter - by the lengthy' 
procedures of obtaining foreign aid resources. But among the major 
reasons for the declining railway traffic performance during the 
1970s were: first, the effect of traffic diversion to the 
relatively faster road transport which grew rapidly during the 
1970s. Secondly, inefficiency in the management of the industry, 
overstaffing1 and low productivity of workers at the main 
workshop at Atbara caused by frequent industrial and political 
unrest. Thirdly, weather conditions such as washouts in the 
rainy season and sand storms and excessive heat in the dry season 
frequently caused considerable delays. 
Among other important contributions of foreign aid resources 
to the development of infrastructure were the financing of two 
major telecommunications projects during the 1970s. Namely 
the Microwave Transmission Project connecting Khartoum with 
Atbara and Portsudan and the establishment of 14 domestic earth 
satellite stations in the rest of the major cities and provincial 
capitals. These two projects are essential for the development 
process particularly in a large country like the Sudan, as they 
provide direct telephone dialling services, telex and television 
services as well . as. 
improving. telecommunications with the rest of 
1 
"Growth, Employment Equity: a Comprehensive Strategy for the 
Sudan". ILO 1976. 
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the world. 
However; a drawback in financing the earth satellite 
stations project may as well be pinpointed. This project has been 
financed by a US$10 m concessional loan from the Saudi Develop- 
ment Fund with an estimated grant element of 66.8%. This is an 
appropriate type of financing, but the other two external loans 
which were used to finance the project with the first loan 
were non-concessional loans. Namely a US$12 m syndicated loan 
with an estimated grant element of 10% and a US$ 7 million loan 
from the Arab Investment Company with an estimated grant element 
of 17%. Clearly, a more concessional type of loan with a much 
higher grant element - perhaps similar to the Saudi Fund loan - 
would have been more appropriate in financing such a project. 
This example and the example cited earlier with regard to the 
financing of the Khartoum-Portsudan petroleum products pipeline 
represent an apparent deficiency in foreign aid allocation, policy 
in the Sudan. 
in the field of electric power generation - as we noted in 
Chapter 4- 70% of the total electricity generating capacity in 
the Sudan is hydro-generated. This hydro-generated capacity is 
associated directly with the external development loans that 
financed the construction of Sennar, Khashm El Girba and El Rosseris 
hydro-electric power stations. The construction of the dams at 
Khashm El Girba and El Rosseris has also been financed with 
foreign aid resources during the 1960s. Hence, the steady growth 
in electric power generation - which, as we noted in Chapter 4 
has been on the average about 10% over the period 1966-80 - was 
mainly due to foreign aid loans which permitted investment in such 
costly operations which otherwise may not have been possible. The 
contribution of the generated electricity of these stations in 
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the growth and development of agriculture (irrigation) and industry 
has been considerable over'the past two decades. But the electric- 
ity supply, since the mid-1970s, had been uncertain and inadequate 
causing a major bottleneck in industrial production and economic 
activity in general. The deficiency in electricity supply is 
explained mainly by large increases in demand for electricity for 
domestic and commercial sectors due to rapid urbanization, the 
importing of domestic electric appliances by the Sudanese migrant 
workers abroad, and the development of numerous new irrigation 
schemes and manufacturing industries. Electricity supply itself 
has also been affected frequently by the siltation problem. 
The role of foreign aid resources in the development of 
the industrial sector may be detected in two major import 
substitution industries, namely sugar and textiles. 
As far as the sugar industry is concerned, all the five 
sugar factories in the country at Elgenoid, El Girba, Sennar, 
Assalaya and Kinanal - with a total capacity of 670,000 tons 
per annum - were established during the past two decades (two 
during the 1960s and three during the 1970s) with concessional 
as well as non-concessional external loans. The contribution of 
these factories in realizing the import subsistation policy in 
sugar can be seen by the fact that in the year 1980, the com- 
bined production of these factories (284 thousand tons) covered 
about 71% of the total local consumption of 400 thousand tonst. 
This ratio, however is well below the sugar investment plan 
target set in the Six Years Plan to achieve by the year 1979/80 
self sufficiency and the export of about 160 thousand tons of 
sugar3.. Failure to achieve. the sugar investment programme targets 
1 Kinana sugar factory'is the largest with a capacity of 300 thousand tons per 
annum. This is partially supported by private foreign investment (a joint 
venture) . 2 Bank of Sudan Annual. Report 1980. 
3 The Six Year Plan of Eamcmic And Soc. Dev. 1977/78-1982/83, Vol. 2 p. 46. 
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is explained on the one hand by initial delays in implementation 
which led to escalations in the new projects costs due to inter- 
national inflation, the excessive delays in obtaining external 
loans plus the usual problem of management typical in most LDCs. 
On the other hand, the operation of both newly completed as well as 
the old ones (Elgenoid and Elgirba) has been well below their 
design capacity. In the newly established factories namely 
Sennar and Assalaya technical faults caused serious delays and 
low capacity utilization. For example in Sennar the factory 
foundations moved as a result of soil subsidence, there were' 
also troubles with steam control, the oiling mechanism, and 
overheating bearings. The delays in the operation of the 
factory put it out of phase with the sugar cane cycle causing 
further delays. In Assalaya technical problems were confined 
to the boiler house l. In the old factories the lack of spare 
parts, maintenance equipment needed for the factories as well 
as the cane plantations, shortages in petroleum products, 
shortages in electricity supply and production relationships 
were the main causes for the underutilization of capacity. 
The fact that the external development loans allocated 
for the sugar investment programme during the 1970s were used 
exclusively for creating new capacity rather than being partially 
used for improving the existing capacity could be a reason for 
the poor performance of the old sugar factories, particularly 
at a time when foreign exchange shortage was severe. Capacity 
utilization in the sugar factories would have been improved 
significantly if a timely balanced combination of both programme 
loans for the rehabilization of the existing projects - to be 
1 
Ministry of Industry, Sudanow February 1982, p. 12. 
L 
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used for the supply of spare parts, maintenance equipment, 
replacement of obsolete and inefficient machinery-as well as 
project loans for the new investments were obtained. 
However, despite the apparent deficiencies in the develop- 
ment of sugar industry in the Sudan with external development 
loans - which are attributable only partially to foreign loans 
allocation policy - the sugar production capacity created so far 
with the help of foreign resources would transform the country 
into a net exporter of sugar if the necessary measures to rehabil- 
itate the sugar factories and secure optimum capacity utilization 
were adopted. So far the present production levels - which are 
below the design capacity - cover 70 to 75% of domestic consumption 
of sugar thereby saving foreign exchange which would otherwise be 
used to import sugar. Apart from this direct contribution, the 
sugar factories and cane plantations have contributed significantly 
to employment, and economic activity in the areas where they were 
established; and as Dr Nicholas - an agricultural adviser to the 
Sudanese Sugar Corporation - put it "... the success side should 
not only be measured in terms of sugar produced, but also in 
the fact that something like one per cent of the population is now 
living in or around sugar factories in land which a few years back 
was desert and now is boasting towns, schools, hospitals and new 
communities"l. Moreover, the establishment of the sugar industry 
itself has opened up opportunities for the development of ancillary 
industries such as alcohol, paper from bagasse and animal feed. 
In the field of textile industry, all the public sector 
textile production capacity - which was installed relatively 
1 Sudanow Vol. 6 No. 11 November 1981, p. 23. 
232. 
recently - after 1975 - was created by the use of external devel- 
opment loans, namely the operation of El Hasa Heissa textile 
factory with a capacity of 14 million meters of popular cloth, 
six regional weaving factories at Shendi, Nyala, Kosti, Kadugli, 
Dueim and Mangalla with a capacity of 9.2 million meters per 
annum each; as well as three spinning factories at Hag Abdalla, 
Portsudan and Khartoum North, with a combined capacity of 17,050 
tons of fine yarn to feed the weaving factories and for export, 
and a spinning and weaving factory at Gado with a capacity of 
14 million tons 
1. 
The implementation of the latter three spinn- 
ing factories and the spinning and weaving factory at Gado has 
suffered from a number of problems that caused excessive delays 
in their operation. The problems range from technical problems 
as in Hag Abdalla which led to increases in costs and the sub- 
sequent delays in obtaining the extra funds from the donor, to 
electricity supply problems as in the case of Portsudan spinning 
factory, to other problems of shortages in building materials - 
cement in particular - transportation of equipment from the port 
to the site as well as shortages of local funds (liquidity 
problem y. 
However, as-a result of the operation of the weaving 
factories the output of public sector textile industry - as we 
noted in Chapter 4- has increased rapidly from 5.8 million meters 
in 1976/77 to 17.0 million meters in 1979/80, with an average 
annual increase of 43% over the four years. But the overall effect 
of the public sector investment in textile production - supported 
mainly by foreign development loans - on the growth of production 
of textiles and the consequent saving in foreign exchange and 
1 
The Six Year Plan of Economic and Soc. Dev. 1977/78-82/83 Vol. 2 
p. 47-8. 
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export earnings cannot be fully realized unless the three 
spinning factories become operational and the optimum capacity 
utilization in all factories is achieved. 
8.4 CONCLUSION 
Qualitative and rough quantitative analysis of the 
Sudan's growth performance with external development aid over the 
past two decades clearly indicates that the rejection of foreign 
aid on the grounds that it retards growth cannot be justified. 
Simple regression models - using few variables - show that 
the association between real GDP growth rates, real per capita 
growth rates and net foreign capital inflow over the period 1960- 
1978 is positive. It is true, however, that public sector savings 
performance has been poor particularly during the 1970s, but this 
did not prevent the financing of relatively high levels of public 
sector investment using mainly external development loans and 
domestic bank borrowing. The high level of public sector invest- 
ment has contributed significantly to the development performance 
of the. major sectors of the economy namely, agriculture (irrigated 
as well as mechanized rain-fed), infrastructure (roads, railways, 
telecommunications, pipe line and electric power generation), 
and industry (sugar and textile). 
Needless to say, the process of development with external 
aid in the Sudan has suffered from numerous setbacks on account 
of managerial &technical skills and policy deficiencies as well 
as on the account of factors outside domestic control such as 
international inflation, the high prices of oil and migration of 
skilled manpower'to the Gulf countries. Undoubtedly development 
is a complex process in which economic, social, political and 
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global factors are interrelated to produce growth and change. 
Therefore, the availability of foreign aid resources alone will 
not be sufficient in the absence of the other factors. Hence, 
when we claim that foreign aid resources promote growth and 
development we mean that it is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for growth. 
Most of the objections of the critics of foreign aid 
deal with the policies and practicalities of aid programmes, 
such as the forms of aid, repayment terms, and aid allocation 
policy. Such objections should not suggest that we bring it to a 
halt, but rather suggest the identification of the specific pro- 
blems and policies in the aid machinery and aid programmes as well 
as recipient and donor policies that hindered the effective use 
of aid resources so that the appropriate reform measures to over- 
come such problems can be suggested and adopted. For example, 
by reducing the extent to which aid is tied, by making it more 
appropriate to the resource requirements of the recipient, and 
by shortening the lengthy procedures involved in the aid machinery 
itself. 
In the next chapter we shall identify the specific problems 
and policies that hindered the effective utilization of foreign 
aid resources in the Sudan. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE FACTORS THAT LIMITED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FOREIGN 
AID RESOURCES IN PROMOTING GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE SUDAN 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
The discussion on the role of foreign aid resources in 
the growth process presented in the previous chapters as well 
as the experience of Sudan's growth and development with foreign 
aid resources over the past two decades, indicate that foreign 
aid resources did contribute to the growth process in the Sudan 
by financing higher levels of public sector investment than 
what would otherwise have been - particularly at a time when 
external shocks caused continuous balance of payments deterior- 
ation and by financing the foreign exchange costs of most - if 
not all - of the major projects in agricultural, infrastructural 
and industrial sectors of the economy. However, it was also 
apparent that shortcomings of foreign aid programmes and adminis- 
trative constraints were involved. These were due to aid policy 
inadequacies and administrative inefficiencies of both the Sudanese 
side and its donors. Such shortcomings were compounded by other 
problems, political, geographical, as well as other exogenous 
factors which together limited the effectiveness of aid resources 
in the growth and development of the country. 
Nevertheless, these shortcomings should not suggest the 
need to reject foreign aid resources altogether, but rather to 
build on what has been achieved so far by aid, identifying the 
specific factors and policies that limited the effectiveness of 
such resources and suggesting reform measures for recipients' 
policies and donor approaches as well as for the aid machinery 
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in general, thereby maximizing the efficiency with which such 
resources are translated into income and growth. This chapter 
examines some specific problems that hindered the effective 
utilization of foreign aid resources in the Sudan during the 
past two decades, and highlights the main areas in which 
fundamental reform measures are needed. 
9.2 THE EFFECT OF POLITICS AND DONORS OBJECTIVES 
It is argued by many economists that the effect of foreign 
aid resources in the growth process of the recipient is limited 
because the objective of the donors are political. It is true 
that the objectives of the donors generally range through a 
spectrum of humanitarian (moral), economic, strategic and histor- 
ical (colonial) grounds. In many cases these objectives are 
mixed and may not be mutually exclusive. However, among all 
these objectives, the political objective appears to be one of 
the limiting factors affecting the efficiency of development aid. 
Surely, politics influences not only foreign aid but also all 
other international economic activities such as trade, technology 
transfer, etc., but foreign aid by its nature is more vulnerable 
to the political constraint than the other forms of international 
transfers and payments, simply because of the grant element 
associated with it, and because it is tax payers' money collected 
through the political process and hence its allocation and the 
regulations that govern'its use are bound to take into consideration 
the political interest. 
In the Sudan two examples may be cited showing how politics 
can affect the effectiveness of development aid. After the 1967 
war in the Middle East, USA and West German development aid to the 
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Sudan has been cut off in response to the government's decision 
to break diplomatic relations with both donors. The flow of 
development aid from these two sources which were among the important 
donors to the country was not restored until the year 1972/73 
(after 5 years). Development loans from the USSR and most of the 
East European Socialist countries have also been suddenly 
suspended on political grounds following an abortive communist 
coup in 1971. Since that date no development aid has been 
received from the USSR. The sudden termination of development 
aid to Sudan on political grounds has limited the effectiveness 
of foreign aid in two ways: first, it reduced the magnitude of 
foreign development aid resources available to the country. 
Secondly, many of the projects financed by loans from those sources 
were either left incomplete such as the Khartoum-Meddani Road 
under the US AID or operate below their design capacity because 
of the lack of spare parts such as - in the case of the fruit 
and vegetable canning factories in Karima, Wau, the onions 
dehydration plant in Kassala and Babanosa milk processing factory 
under the USSR development aid. 
Although the possibility of removing foreign aid from the 
political arena is difficult to achieve, the adverse effects of 
this political constraint can be contained or restricted by laying 
more emphasis on multilateralism, more awareness of the need to 
increase international cooperation as emphasized by the Pearson 
Report (1969), and the recognition of the mutuality of interests 
and interdependence between nations stressed by the Brandt Report 
(1980). 
9.3 TYTNC. (1F ATT1 RF.. (1TTR['F'. C 
As we explained in Chapter 6, there are conditions - apart 
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from the repayment terms - and regulations adopted by almost all 
bilateral donors which tend to limit the effectiveness of aid 
resources, namely the tying of aid - procurement tying as well as 
end-use tying. Project tying, though advantageous as it controls 
tightly the opportunity for abuse of aid resources, always focuses 
on new projects, which is likely to lead to the neglect of capacity 
utilization in the existing productive capacity of the economy. 
In the Sudan, as we noted earlier, the project approach adopted 
during the 1970s has led to underutilization of capacity in the 
existing agricultural schemes and industrial plants. At a time, 
when the foreign exchange scarcity has been the major cause o¬ 
capacity underutilization, the foreign exchange made available 
by foreign aid loans and grants went to new projects. Perhaps a 
mixed balance between project and programme loans might have been 
much more effective in the overall output growth than project 
loans alone. However, towards the end of the 1970s more attention 
has been given to programme loans aiming at the rehabilitation of 
the major irrigation projects such as Gezera and New Halfa, and 
industry particularly sugar industry. However, the opportunity 
for abuse of programme loans can be - as in the project loans - 
tightly controlled through procurement practices which incorporate 
competitive bidding. 
Procurement tying on the other hand adds to the cost of 
borrowing. The recipient - as we noted in Chapter 6- is likely 
to purchase goods from the donors at prices often substantially 
above those in competitive world markets. And for procurement 
under the loans from the East European Socialist countries, this 
problem is compounded by the absence of competition within the 
donor country as all industrial corporations are owned by the State. 
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9.4 AID MACHINERY AND THE' DISBURSEMENT RATE 
9.4.1 Procedural'Problems 
The effectiveness of foreign aid resources in promoting 
growth is also influenced to a great extent by the efficiency of 
the recipient's and donor's aid machinery in completing without 
delay the procedures involved in the project/loan cycle, including 
feasibility studies, loan application, negotiation, approval and 
effectiveness, disbursement of loan funds, and implementation of 
the project. There are two aspects of the project/loan cycle 
where problems exist. First, the delays in the process of 
acquisition of the loan (or the grant) and the effectiveness of 
the loan (or grant) agreement - that is, making the funds ready 
for disbursement. Secondly, delays in the implementation of the 
project financed by foreign aid resources. Both factors lead to 
excessive delays and cost overruns which in turn cause further 
delays thereby Affecting the growth effects of the projects and 
programmes financed by foreign aid. 
The procedures required - from both the recipient and 
the donor - for completing the stages of acquisition of external 
loans and their effectiveness are very long, and sometimes are 
described as being complicatedl. The time lag between the initial 
stage of project identification to loan approval (identification 
missions, pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, preliminary and 
detailed engineering studies, and appraisal missions) takes as 
long as two to three or four years. 
Usually, prior to the approval of a certain loan, each 
donor either makes the feasibility study for the project in 
question by itself or asks the recipient government to undertake 
it. Undoubtedly, economic and technical feasibility studies are 
1. OECD Compendium of Aid Procedures (p. 59) Paris 1981. 
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indispensible for efficient utilization of aid resources, but 
in the Sudan - as in many other LDCs - the absence of an inventory 
of projects in varying stages of preparation which would enable 
the government to present a list of well defined priority projects 
to donors at any given time makes the process of foreign resources 
acquisition a lengthy one. And as the business (private as well 
as government) of project preparation is not yet well developed, 
project appraisal is mostly carried out by foreign consulting 
firms which is always time consuming and costly. 
There is also a time lag between commitment of aid funds 
and actual disbursement, that is, between the point at which 
funds are put aside for an agreed purpose (signing of the loan 
agreement) and the point where bills must actually, be paid. This 
lag may range - as shown in Table 9.1 - from six to fifty months. 
This prolonged delay is mainly due to the long procedures involved 
in satisfying the conditions precedent to the effectiveness of 
the loan agreement, and the failure of the government to establish 
an efficient aid machinery. 
Usually, the actions required to satisfy the conditions 
prior to the first disbursement from the loan include the 
provision to the donor of evidence of ratification of the agree- 
ment and the legal opinion, the procedures for competitive bidding 
(tendering and contracting documents), any subsidiary loan agree- 
ment between the recipient's government and a public enterprise 
involving on-lending arrangements, the recruitment of the project 
manager, specimen signatures, and in the case of co-financing, 
the effectiveness depends on the signing of similar agreements with 
other donors as well as satisfying the respective conditions prior 
to the first disbursement (cross-effectiveness condition). In 
the Sudan, in order to ensure a timely fulfilment of these 
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Table 9.1 Time Lag Between Signature of Loan Agreement and the 
First Disbursement from the Loan 
S 
ce and 
Date of Date of lst Time lag 
Narre of signature 
disbursenent in months 
Doan 
World Bank (IDA & IBFO) 
1. Mechanized Farming (1) 6.9.1968 22.3.69 6.5 
2. to If (2) 12.6.1972 22.9.73 15.5 
3. Road project, 29.9.1972 22.3.73 6.0 
4. Industrial Bank 14.12.1973 25.7.74 7.5 
5. Railways (3) 31.1.1974 9.4.75 14.5 
6. Project Preparation Unit 7.4.1976 30.10.78 31.0 
7. Railways (4) 8.7.1977 31.3.79 21.0 
8. Mechanized Fanning 13.7.1978 11.80 28.0 
9. Jebel Aulia Rabak Road 10.3.1979 3.80 12.0 
Kuwait old 
10. Rahad Project 
11. Project Preparation Unit 
12. Sennar/Caxazin Road 
13. Railways 
Saudi Fund 
14. Rahad Project 
15. Educaticei 
16. Kassala/Haya Road 
17. Portsudan Airport 
18. Civil Aviation 
19. Nyala/Zalengi Road 
African Develarment Bank 
20. Railways (1) 
21. Railways (2) 
22. Agro-Industrial Project 
23. Primary Health Care Project 
Arab Fund 
24. Gedarf/Kassala Road 
25. Sennar/Danazin Road 
26. Railways 
Abu Dahabi Fund 
27. Hag Alalla Spinning Factory 
17.4.1973 5.11.73 6.5 
19.8.1976 6.79 36.0 
5.6.1977 1.7.78 13.0 
4.7.1978 24.5.79 '11.0 
24.6.1975 24.2.76 8.0 
1.10.1977 29.11.79 26.0 
9.1.1977 10.77 9.0 
9.1.1977 3.81* 50.0 
2.7.1977 12.79 29.0 
29.6.1978 4.80 22.0 
7.12.1971 19.7.73 19.5 
12.3.1974 6.3.75 12.0 
9.5.1978 4.8.80 27.0 
26.2.1979 3.81* 24.0 
13.4.1974 12.5.75 13.0 
26.12.1976 5.78 16.0 
26.12.1977 15.1.79 13.0 
20.7.1976 8.12.77 17.0 
* To the date of collection of information in March 1981 no disbursement took 
place. 
Source: Collected fran the External Loans and Technical Assistance Section 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (Planning) February 1980. 
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conditions the External Loans and Technical Assistance Section 
must be efficient enough to complete these procedures which 
involve the executing ministry or agency, the Council of Ministers, 
the Peoples' Assembly, the Presidency of the Republic, the 
Attorney General's Chamber, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the Central Purchasing Administration of the Finance Ministry. 
In practice however, the completion of the requirement prior to 
the first disbursement took much longer than necessary. This is 
explained by the fact that during the 1970s, whereas Sudan's 
volume of external borrowing increased substantially (see Chapter 6) 
and the number of donor organizations expanded considerably (thirty 
or more), the aid machinery in the Sudan did not change to cope 
with these increasing tasks. The External Loans and Technical 
Assistance section in the Planning Ministry has been kept contin- 
uously understaffed and seriously underequipped with some simple 
and basic typewriting, photocopying and translation services. The 
available staff was kept fully occupied with fulfilling the required 
procedures for the conclusion and the effectiveness of the loan 
agreements. Hence, little or no attention was paid to the follow 
up and co-ordination of the actual implementation of the projects 
concerned, or to initiating new structures for policy making. 
Even the completion of the requirements of effectiveness (usually 
set in the loan agreements to be completed in 3-4 months) has by 
far lagged behind schedule. A sample of 27 loan agreements (from 
multilateral and bilateral sources), ' listed in Table 9.1, shows 
that it takes on the average 18 months from the signing of the loan 
agreement to the first disbursement from the loan. Undoubtedly, 
this excessive delay in completing procedural requirements has 
caused many projects to run behind schedule and the resulting cost 
overruns led to further delays. 
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Apart from these procedural delays there are also further 
delays which occur during the course of implementation of the 
projects owing to inadequacies in management and coordination 
between the executing agencies and the central planning depart- 
ment, bad project planning, shortages of building materials and 
local funds and transport problems. In the next section we shall 
examine these problems. 
9.4.2 Implementation Problems 
There were some problems associated with inadequacies in 
project preparation and coordination between the central planning 
department and the executing agencies which led to delays in 
the implementation of development projects financed by foreign 
aid funds. A typical case that combines all sorts of project 
planning and coordination deficiencies in the Sudan is the Port 
Sudan water supply project. This project - which was a high 
priority project in view of the severe shortages of water supply 
in the single port of the country - was studied by a French 
consulting firm in 1969. The executing agency - the Public 
Electricity and Water Corporation (PEWC) - submitted the project, 
which consists mainly of building an underground dam in Kho. r 
Arbaat, to the Planning Ministry for financing. The Planning 
Ministry formally submitted the project in December 1975 to the 
African Development Bank (ADB) for financing the foreign exchange 
costs. An appraisal report by an ADB mission identified the 
project as being technically feasible, economically viable and 
satisfying the criterion of African Development Fund (ADF) 
financing. Subsequently a loan was approved by the ADF and the 
agreement was signed in July 1976. Until the year 1979 all but 
one of the three conditions prior to the first disbursement had 
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been completed, namely the provision by the executing agency 
(PEWC) of a detailed list of goods and services to be financed 
from the loan agreement. Over the three years following the 
signature of the loan agreement the External Loans and Technical 
Assistance Section nearly lost communication with the project and 
its progress after many attempts to find an explanation from 
PEWC for the failure to provide a detailed list of goods and 
services. The reason - which the external loans section in the 
Planning Ministry discovered lately - was that the project was 
disputed by the Rural Water Corporation and the Geology Department 
on the grounds that the construction of the underground dam was 
not technically feasible. Neither the External Loans Section nor 
the donor were informed about this dispute but another section 
within the Planning Ministry was involved. Eventually the loan 
agreement was cancelled in 1980 and an alternative project was 
considered by another donor (West Germany). This case is surely 
indicative of bad project planning and lack of coordination even 
within the various sections of the Planning Ministry itself. The 
example cited earlier, of establishing six regional weaving 
factories before establishing the spinning factory which was 
planned to feed them with the yarn, is yet another proof of 
planning and coordination deficiencies. These inadequacies in 
project planning and co-ordination were exacerbated by the absence 
of a follow-up unit for aid funded projects and the continuous 
occupation of the external loans administration with the process 
of completing the lengthy requirements for effectiveness of new 
loan commitments. 
Another major problem that hampered the implementation of 
aid funded projects has been the shortage of the local currency 
component of projects. As most of the foreign development loans 
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finance only the foreign exchange costs of the projects in 
question, the government is obliged to secure the local currency 
component. In the Sudan budgetary problems during the financial 
year frequently lead to the rationing of local currency - usually 
referred to as the liquidity problem - that is, even if the funds 
are budgeted they may not be available when they are needed. 
Because. of this deficiency in the supply of local resources for 
development, the executing agencies had to queue for the funds in 
accordance with the priority list set by the Planning Ministry. 
This process entails the postponing and delaying of the implement- 
ation of the projects even though foreign aid resources are 
available to finance their foreign exchange cost. 
Among other major problems that hampered the execution of 
development projects financed by foreign aid resources we find 
the transport problem - which is emphasized earlier - caused 
prolonged delays in delivery and handling of materials to respect- 
ive sites, thereby leading to rises in the estimated erection 
prices. The shortages of building materials particularly cement, 
the shortages of basic petroleum products such as benzene and 
gazolene, the shortages of qualified and experienced personnel and 
high rates of turn-over in government services due to migration 
to oil rich Arab countries, and the absence of a well developed 
building and construction industry and the consequent reliance 
on foreign building and contracting firms which is again costly 
and time consuming, all caused excessive delays in the implement- 
ation of the development programmes financed by foreign aid 
resources. Hence, the available foreign aid resources in most 
cases were disbursed more slowly than programmed. The following 
table (Table 9.2) shows for example the disbursement rate of the 
IBRD/IDA loans over the period 1976-1979 compared to the bank-wide 
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Table 9.2 Disbursement Rate of World Bank Loans 1976-1980 
1976 1977 1978 
Disbursement rate*2 (Sudan) 17.2 21.5 20.6 
Bank-wide average 28.5 25.8 21.5 
1979 1980*1 
13.7 15.6 
20.9 16.0 
Source: World Bank: Country Implementation Review 1980 
1. Up to May 1980 
2. Disbursement rate = 
Total disbursement during the year%_ý 
Undisbursed balances during year 
average. It is clear from Table 9.2 that the disbursement ratet 
has been lower than the bank-wide average which itself is low. 
The lower the actual disbursement from available aid resources 
the longer the time it takes to transform such resources into 
output. 
9.5 OTHER PROBLEMS 
In the Sudan there were some specific problems, geograph- 
ical, political as well as regional and global which constrained 
the development process in general, and at the same time adversely 
affected directly or indirectly the role of foreign aid resources 
available to the country in promoting output growth. 
1 It is important to note that the disbursement rate should be 
viewed only as a rough indicator to loan disbursement, as it 
tends to underestimate or overestimate the actual disbursement 
rate given the magnitude of the new commitments during the year 
in question. 
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The country's size - as we noted in Chapter 4, poses 
special development problems. As many potentially rich parts of 
the country are 1000 miles or more away from the port, and given 
the population size (18.0 million) and its distribution, special 
transport problems arise. This special transport problem has 
limited the growth contribution of foreign aid resources in two 
ways. First, larger shares of the foreign resources available were 
allocated to transport and communication projects, which would 
otherwise be used to help more directly productive sectors of the 
economy (agricultural sector in particular). Secondly, the trans- 
port bottleneck itself - as we noted previously - turned out to be 
one of the major problems that delayed the implementation of 
development programmes which were mainly financed by foreign aid 
resources. 
The development process in the Sudan has been adversely 
affected by political instability. Since independence in 1956 
the Sudan has lived through periods of internal strife and 
political upheavals. The parliamentary instability after independ- 
ence invited a military coup in 1.958. In 1964 the Multiparty 
system was restored again following a civilian revolution. Five 
years later a military takeover in 1969 brought the present 
political system into power, which has survived three abortive 
coups in 1971,1975 and 1976. Moreover the development process has 
also been affected by the presence of an armed confrontation in the 
Southern region for 17 years (1955-72). During the 17 years,. the 
resource-rcckSouthern region - instead of positively contributing 
to the growth and development of the country - continued to be a 
heavy burden on the treasury on account of expenditure on defence 
and security. This political instability has led to frequent 
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changes in the ministries and departments carrying out the 
development programmes thereby affecting adversely the development 
effort. If we take for example the Planning Ministry itself - 
which is directly responsible for formulating development plans 
and executing those plans in coordination with the rest of the 
ministries - we find that it has been subjected to frequent changes. 
The structure of the Planning Ministry which was established in. 
1969, has changed from a Central Ministry to a National Planning 
Council, to a National Planning Commission, to a State Ministry, 
to a Central Ministry again and finally to a department within the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. Eleven ministers have 
taken the office of the Planning Minister in 13 years. The National 
Plans themselves - as we noted in Chapter 4- have either been 
suspended or significantly modified and extended. This adminis- 
trative instability could similarly be traced for the major 
ministries and departments responsible for the execution of 
development projects. Clearly, the adverse effects of this 
instability on the implementation capacity of the key ministries 
cannot be overlooked. 
Among other factors which have also affected the development 
performance in general and the effectiveness of aid resources at 
the same time we find some exogenous factors. In the Sudan a 
number of development problems - particularly during the 1970s - 
were caused to a large extent by factors outside the government's 
domestic control such as international inflation, high prices of oil 
and the severe and sudden brain drain. We explained in Chapter 5 
how global inflation and increasing oil prices led to balance of 
payments deterioration and the development performance in general. 
Moreover, with its geographical position, Sudan's trade 
was particularly affected when the Suez Canal was closed in 1967 
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following the 1967 war in the Middle East. Freight costs to and 
from West Europe (the main trade partner) increased and shipments 
were delayed. 
Regional problems also caused difficulties. With eight 
neighbouring countries political instability. and refugees 
from Chad, Uganda, Etheopia, Zaire and Central African Republic 
necessitating a high level of expenditure on security which would 
otherwise be saved. Moreover, because some of its neighbours are 
land-locked, considerable smuggling operations of domestic and 
imported commodities to those countries were undertaken. 
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CHAPTER 10 
ESTIMATING SAVINGS AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
GAPS FOR THE SUDAN 1983/84 - 1988/89 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter an estimate of the saving-investment and 
foreign exchange gaps for the Sudan over the period 1983/84- 
1988/89 is provided on the basis of the two-gap framework out-. 
lined and discussed in the previous chapters. As the latest 
published data on National Income Accounts are for the year 
1977/78, we use this year as the base year for projections of 
the two gaps. Hence the period for projections will cover the 
current Six Year Plan 1977/78-1982/83 and the forthcoming Second 
Six Year Plan 1983/84-88/89 representing the first and the 
second phases of Sudan's long term 18 year Perspective Plan set 
for the period 1977/78-1994/95. 
The theoretical framework of the two gap models reviewed 
in Chapters 2 and 3 is employed because it embraces the classic 
view of foreign resources as a means for supplementing domestic 
savings in the recipient country (Rosenstein-Rodan 1961, Fei and 
Paauw 1965) as well as the realistic view that in LDCs foreign 
resources are required to relieve a foreign exchange constraint - 
which is independent from the saving constraint - because invest- 
ment and import requirements in LDCs are bound to be rigid and 
the scope for substitutability between domestic and foreign 
resources is limited as many strategic capital goods and raw 
materials needed for growth cannot be produced domestically and 
must therefore be imported. 
., 
I 
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As we noted in Chapters 2 and 3, the existence of two 
gaps ex-ante has been criticized by several economists who 
questioned the validity of the assumptions of a fixed relation- 
ship between investment requirements, import requirements and 
growth and the lack of substitutability between domestic and foreign 
resources. However an ex-ante difference between the two gaps is 
possible as long as the substitution between foreign and domestic 
resources is slow and relatively inflexible. A situation which 
is foreseeable in a country like the Sudan in view of the early 
stage of development that the country is undergoing, the very low 
level of industrialization, dependence on imported capital goods 
and cn agricultural and. industrial inputs, and the heavy reliance on 
export of a single primary commodity (cotton). Even attempts to 
avoid this phenomenon through export diversification in 1974 has - 
as we have seen in Chapters 4 and 5- failed because of short-run 
structural rigidities in the agricultural sector. Moreover, in the 
Sudan following the 1973 oil price rises and the global inflation - 
like many other non-oil producing developing countries -a foreign 
exchange limit - as we have shown in Chapters 4 and 5- has 
developed and represented a separate limit to growth and develop- 
ment in the country. The-effects of such external factors on the 
development performance of the country are likely to persist in 
the rest of the 1980s. 
In order to estimate the saving gap the growth identity 
g= 
S/K is employed, where g is the target growth rate, S is the 
savings (investment) ratio, and K is the incremental capital output 
ratio (ICOR). Investment requirements can therefore be calculated 
as g. K given the target rate of growth (g) and the ICOR (K). The 
saving-investment gap is then calculated as the difference between 
investment requirements and the forecast saving at the target level 
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of income (Y). 
The foreign exchange gap is estimated as the difference 
between forecast export earnings and import requirements. The 
foreign resources requirement at any given target rate of growth 
will be determined by the larger of the two gaps. 
As the two gaps must be determined with careful attention 
to the conditions of the recipient country, its objectives and 
its ability to use external resources as manifested by its 
performance, the estimate derived is based on the following analy- 
tical elements: 
1. Past performance of the economy 1960-78. 
2. The objectives of the Perspective Plan (1977/78-1994/95) 
and the current Six Year Plan 1977/78-1982/83 represented by 
the Plan target rate of growth. 
3. Estimates of the principal parameters of the model that is 
the import function, estimates of past exports growth and 
savings. 
4. Estimates of foreign aid resources are provided in view of 
two alternative growth rate targets. An(optimistic)target 
growth rate of 0.075 representing the growth goals estab- 
lished by three successive development plans, and a (realistic) 
target rate of growth of 0.049 representing the past 
performance of the economy. 
10.2 ESTIMATING THE SAVING GAP 
10.2.1 Investment Requirements 
Taking the Harrod-Domer assumption that a specified 
amount of investment is needed to increase output, the ICOR is used 
to predict the level of investment required to achieve the target 
rate of growth of income. However, it is important to note that 
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the choice of the correct ICOR is of particular importance for 
the reliability of the calculation of foreign resources require- 
ments. Foreign resources requirements - as we explained in 
Chapter 2- are very sensitive to changes in the value of the 
ICOR. To determine the correct behaviour of ICOR is a problem- 
atic exercise as it is determined by a number of factors includ- 
ing the availability of human skills, the capacity to combine and 
organize the factors of production in an optimal way, natural 
resources endowment, the sectoral distribution of investment and 
the rate of capacity utilization. An attempt to estimate ICOR 
on the basis of historical time series over the period 1960-1978 
has failed in view of the very wide fluctuations in the ICOR which 
did not follow any uniform trend. However taking the average COR 
over the period 1960-1978 produced a figure of 2.91 which is almost 
similar to the assumed Six Year Plan figure of 3. Hence, in 
our alternative estimates for investment requirements the plan 
figure will be used. Given the two alternative target rates of 
growth and the ICOR of 3, the corresponding investment ratio 
I/GDP 
will be as follows: xK= GDP 
1. For the (high) optimistic target rate of growth 0.075 x3=0.225 
2. For the realistic target rate of growth 0.049 x3=0.147 
10.2.2 The Savings Function 
In general, the Keynesian explanation of saving behaviour 
in developing countries is widely accepted and empirically tested. 
However a number of econometric studies - as we have shown in 
.I 
Chapter 3- emphasize the need to modify the savings function 
in LDCs to include exports (Maizels 1968; Chenery and Eckstein 
1970; Papanek 1973), foreign capital inflow (Griffin & Enos 1970; 
Singh 1972; Papanek 1972; Weisskopf 1972) and the structure of the 
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financial markets and the density of financial intermediation 
(Hitiris and Wiseman 1981). 
The discussion in Chapter 7 on the relationship between 
foreign capital inflow and domestic savings indicates that the 
statistical findings of a negative relationship between the two 
variables is questionable on the grounds that the negative 
relationship may represent an ex-post accounting convention rather 
than a behavioural relationship, or it may be due to exogenous 
shocks leading to an increase in foreign capital inflow and a 
fall in domestic savings at the same time, or it may be due to 
the conditions (economic or otherwise) that prevailed during the 
time of the studies which were mainly undertaken for periods 
covering the 1950s and the early years of the 1960s. A cross 
country study for 50 LDCs - as we have shown in Chapter 7- for a 
more recent period 1977-1979, produced a significant non-negative 
relationship. 
Institutional factors such as the business structure, 
saving institutions emphasized by Hitiris & Wiseman (1981) are 
important factors affecting domestic saving, but the estimation 
of their effect on domestic saving is a difficult problem. 
In order to estimate the saving function for our project- 
ions, an attempt is made to include income and exports following 
the work of Maizels (1968) and Chenery and Eckstin (1970). But 
in regressing the level of domestic saving on GDP and export 
earnings for the period 1960-1976, the saving coefficient 
attached to exports is found to be statistically insignificant. A 
saving-income ratio of 0.121 reflecting the saving performance 
over the period 1960/61 - 1977/78 is therefore assumed and used 
in projecting domestic savings. 
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10.3 ESTIMATING THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE GAP 
10.3.1 Import Function 
Most foreign resources requirement models consider imports 
to be a function of income and estimate import requirements in a 
way analogous to the calculation of investment requirements 
shown in Section 10.2.1. However, some studies such as Chenery 
and Eckstein's. (1970), introduced additional variables to the import 
function to include in addition to changes in income, increases in 
investment, consumption, and the availability of foreign exchange 
measured by the reserves of gold and foreign exchange available to 
the country and export earnings from goods and services. The 
variations in the ICOR itself have also been emphasized as one of 
the factors affecting the propensity to import in LDCs, on the 
grounds that as most of the imports in LDCs are capital goods, 
improvements in the COR imply less capital investment and hence 
less imports. Moreover, government policies regarding foreign 
trade such as quotas, duties, foreign exchange control, changes in 
the prices of domestically produced substitutes, terms of trade, 
are factors which are also likely to affect imports behaviour. 
Recognizing the heavy dependence of the Sudan on imports 
of investment goods (capital goods and intermediate goods) as well 
as some basic consumption goods, a simplified version of Chenery 
and Eckstein's (1970) import function for Latin American countries, 
which includes investment and consumption as separate determinants 
of import requirements, seems to be practicable. Hence in estim- 
ating the import coefficients attached to consumption (C) 
and investment (I) the following equation is used: 
M=a+ al C+ a21 
where al and a2 are the import coefficients attached to consumption 
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and investment. al and a2 are then used in projecting import 
requirements consistent with the levels of consumption and 
investment as determined by the target rate of growth. 
In fitting the above equation to data from the Sudanese 
economy over the period 1960/61-1977/78 the following result is 
obtained: 
M= 25.8 + 0.10C + 0.411 R2 = 0.98 
(0.02) (0.08) 
The much higher import coefficient attached to investment 
is expected as it reflects the country's dependence on investment 
goods imports while a much higher proportion of consumption is on 
domestically produced goods as imported consumption goods are 
strictly controlled and some basic imported consumption goods 
(such as wheat flour and sugar) have been rationed during most 
of the 1970s. 
10.3.2 Export Growth Rate 
The export growth rate used in projecting foreign 
resources requirements is determined exogenously. The exogenous 
postulation of the export growth rate is explained - as in many 
aid requirement models - by the heavy dependence of the export of 
primary goods on exogenous factors which cannot be easily fore- 
casted; such as the unstable foreign demand conditions and prices, 
trade barriers as well as domestic supply conditions and weather 
conditions. Because of the difficulties in predicting export demand 
and supply a simple average rate of growth of exports of 0.091 for 
a ten-year period (1968/6.9-1977/78) is assumed. 
L 
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10.4 ESTIMATING THE TWO GAPS 
The parameter estimates are now used in calculating the 
saving-gap and the export-import-gap for each year for the two 
alternative growth paths. Table 10.1 and Table 10.2 show the 
annual estimates of the two gaps at a realistic 0.049 target 
growth rate and an optimistic (plan) target rate of growth of 
0.075 respectively. 
In examining the results of the estimates the projections 
are divided into two periods, the first period covers the current 
Six Year Plan (1977/78-1982/83) and the second one represents the 
second phase of the 18 year long term Perspective Plan (1977/78- 
1994/95) namely the second Six Year Plan (1983/84-1988/89). Ideally 
one should test the reasonabliness of the estimates we made for 
the current Six Year Plan with the actual performance of the Plan 
and then use the model (if appropriate) to estimate the require- 
ments of foreign resources for the second Six Year Plan. Unfortun- 
ately, the comparison of our estimates with the actual performance 
of the Six Year Plan is not possible because the latest published 
figures on National Income Accounts is for the year 1977/78 which 
is the first year of the Six Year Plan. 
However, given the assumptions of our projections, a 
comparison of our estimates of foreign resources requirements for 
the Six Year Plan (1977/78-1982/83) with the initial plan estimates 
- shown by Table 10.3 - indicates that the initial plan projections 
have underestimated the magnitudes of both gaps. Moreover, whereas 
the initial plan estimates make the saving-investment gap the 
larger (or the dominant) gap, our estimates indicate that the two 
gaps are of roughly the same magnitude with the export-import gap 
being the-larger. And in considering our estimates using the 
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Table 10.3 A Comparison Between the Initial Plan Estimates and 
Our Estimates: at 0.075 GDP Growth Rate ('in Ls m) 
Six Year Plan Initial Our Estimates 
Estimates 1977/78-1982/83 1977/78-1982/83 
Saving Investment Gap 1583 2105 
Export Import Gap 1327 2180 
Source: The Six Year Plan of Econcmic & Social Develognent - Ministry of 
National Planning 1977, Vol. 1, P. 34. 
- Table 10.2 
realistic 0.049 GDP growth rate the export-import gap is found to 
be - as Figure 10.1 clearly illustrates - the dominant gap during 
the plan period. A situation which more or less represents the 
actual performance of the economy during the past six years with 
four successive currency devaluations in 1978,79,81 and 82 - 
emphasized in Chapter 5- and two debt rescheduling arrangements 
in 1980 and 1981 that clearly point to the dominance of the external 
sectors constraint on growth. 
Turning now to the estimate of the foreign resources 
requirements for the forthcoming Six Year Plan (1983/84-1988/89) 
which is the main aim of this chapter, we give in Table 10.4 an 
estimate for the magnitudes of the two gaps at 1977/78 prices for 
the realistic 0.049 GDP target growth rate and for the optimistic 
(plan) GDP target rate of growth of 0.075, given the assumptions 
about the parameter estimates for investment, saving, exports and 
imports explained in Sections 10.2 and 10.3 
It is clear from Table 10.4 and Figure 10.1 that at the 
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Table 10.4 An Estimate for the Saving-Investment Gap and Export 
Import Gap for the Second Six Year Plan 1983/84- 
1988/89 at 0.049 and 0.075 GDP Growth Rates 
(Cumulative Totals In Ls million) 
Growth Rate 
0.049 0.075 
Saving - Investrnent Gap 672.3 3346.9 
Export - Irport Gap 1235.2 3177.1 
Source: Derived fron Tables 10.1 and. 10.2 
realistic target rate of growth of 0.049, the dominant gap will 
continue to be the export-import gap, as the foreign resources 
requirements will be determined by the foreign exchange gap with 
a magnitude of Ls 1235.2 at 1977/78 prices. However, for the 
higher optimistic plan target rate of growth of 0.075 the two gaps 
are of roughly the same magnitude with the saving-investment gap 
slightly larger than the export-import gap. This may be explained 
by the high level of investment needed to sustain the higher level 
of output growth rate. Hence, assuming a 0.075 plan target rate 
of growth, the foreign resources requirements will be determined 
by the saving-investment gap with a magnitude of Ls3346.9 million 
at 1977/78 prices. 
It is important to note, however, that, in order to 
determine the overall foreign resources requirements we need to 
adjust the magnitude of the dominant gap to take into consideration 
the following factors: First, the magnitudes of the two gaps 
will increase in absolute terms by inflation and the export-import 
gap will also widen by deterioration in the terms of trade. 
Secondly, the amortization of foreign debts outstanding at the 
beginning of the plan period and of new loans to be contracted 
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during the plan should be added to the estimate. Thirdly, the 
undisbursed balances of foreign loans at the beginning of the 
plan and the newly committed loans and grants should be sub- 
tracted from the estimates. 
Clearly, the projection results indicate that the Sudan 
will continue to depend on foreign resources during the rest 
of the 1980s in order to maintain a realistic 4.9% or an optim- 
istic 7.5% GDP growth rate. And as shown by Figs 10.1 and-10.2 
both gaps are not likely to close thereafter. The question 
that poses itself here is that although foreign aid resources 
had been flowing to the Sudan since 1960,, after 30 years - that is 
in 1989 - the country will continue to depend on foreign resources. 
This would appear to contradict the basic assumptions of aid 
growth models that the gaps can be closed and that the existence 
of structural rigidities - on which two gap models are based - is 
a short term phenomenon. 
However, a recapitulation of the factors that caused a 
prolonged period of dependence on foreign aid without a forseeable 
aid termination date to the end of the 1980s, would explain this 
seemingly inconsistant experience. As we noted earlier - in 
Chapter 9 in particular - there were external (exogenous) as well 
as internal factors that hampered the effective use of foreign 
aid resources leading to excessive delays in the process of 
structural transformation. First: the oil crises of the 1973- 
onwards period, and the consequent international inflation and 
recession in the major industrial countries have, as we noted in 
Chapter 5, adversely affected the balance of payments position 
and the performance of the economy as a whole. These external 
shocks, which were sudden and excessive, occurred (unfortunately) 
at a time when the country had already embarked on the implementation 
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of an ambitious development programme through The Interim Action 
Programme which aimed at achieving self sufficiency in basic 
imported goods, and breaking infrastructural bottlenecks partic- 
ularly transport bottlenecks. The external shocks compounded 
by other internal implementation problems, transport problems, 
scarcities in basic inputs (including skilled manpower) have led 
to excessive delays in the implementation of the development 
programme. These delays caused cost escalations which in turn 
led to further delays. 
Secondly, there are institutional constraints which also 
adversely affected the process of growth with foreign aid. The 
shortcomings in the aid machinery itself (particularly at the 
recipients' end) with regard to the proceedures of acquisition c 
external loans and their effectiveness, as well as the coordination 
and implementation of aid financed projects, have adversely affected 
the speed with which foriegn aid resources are transformed into 
income and growth. 
Thirdly, as we noted in Chapter 6,72% of the total author- 
ized external development loans to the Sudan had been secured during 
the period 1974-1980. The years preceding 1974 were characterized 
by very low levels of foreign capital inflow (only 18% of the total 
in the 20 year period studied, representing on the average 2.9% 
of GDP annually). This time profile of the flows should be taken 
into account when we consider the length of the period of dependence 
on aid resources. In other words, the period of Sudan's dependence 
on foreign aid, in effect may be considered as 1974 onwards. More- 
over, the fact that about 5010 of foreign aid resources were allocatedl, 
to infrastructural activities - which is justifiable in view of 
Sudan's natural and economic characteristics - which can neither 
earn or save foreign exchange directly and their impact on the 
I 
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economy is long term should also be taken into account. 
Fourthly, political instability in the Sudan and the 
consequent administrative instability have also contributed to 
the delay in the process of structural transformation. 
However, one is inclined to suggest that the possibility 
of closing the gap during the next decade cannot be ruled out. 
There are good prospects for a start of a marked improvement in 
foreign exchange earnings towards the end of the 1980s. This is 
likely to occur because it is expected that the country will start 
exporting oil (which was discovered in 1979) towards the end of 
the decade. Though the quantities to be exported are relatively 
small (50 thousand barrels per day) it is likely to help in 
relieving the balance of payments pressures. Moreover, the Export 
Action Programme launched in 1979, which is now under implementation, 
is likely to increase export earnings from Sudan's major export 
crops (cotton and groundnuts). Furthermore, the rising trend 
in the magnitude of the remittances of the Sudanese migrant 
workers is likely to have considerable contribution to the 
country's foreign exchange earnings if appropriate policies towards 
attracting such remittances are pursued. Finally, as most of the 
basic infrastructure (the roads network in particular) is likely 
to be completed by 1985, foreign aid resources are likely to be - 
perhaps they should be - allocated to export promotion and import 
substitution activities. As a matter of fact, for the export- 
import gap to disappear, a greater proportion of foreign aid 
resources (the available as well as the forthcoming) should be 
devoted to structural changes in the export sector so that export 
1 
These prospects are not accounted for in our projection of export 
earnings, as our export projections are based on the export 
performance of the period up to 1978. 
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earnings rise to a level sufficient to meet the import 
requirements of the target rate of growth set. As the room 
for import controls is very limited due to long periods of 
imports restriction, emphasis should also be placed on import 
substitution activities. 
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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
The two gap approach to the theory of foreign aid is a 
useful framework for analysing the role of foreign aid resources 
in the growth process in LDCs and in estimating foreign resources 
requirements. Given the structural rigidities and the limited 
transformation possibilities in developing countries, it correctly 
focuses on the probable limits to accelerate growth and the extent 
to which they can be overcome through the use of foreign aid 
resources. It also incorporates estimates of the effects over 
time of policies designed to accomplish structural changes lead- 
ing to increased savings and export earnings needed to support 
self sustained growth in the future. 
The main criticisms of the two gap models can be summarized 
in first: a neoclassical critique which denies the validity of 
the trade limit concept and secondly, the claim that foreign 
resources inflow discourages domestic saving and is likely to 
retard growth rather than promote it. 
The analysis of the features and development performance 
of the Sudanese economy over the past two decades - particularly 
during the 1970s - suggest that the existence of a foreign exchange 
limit - separate from the saving limit - is a real possibility. 
The weak external sector's performance has been the major impedi- 
ment to growth and development. It has been mainly due to the 
heavy dependence on a single export crop (cotton), and structural 
rigidities in the agricultural sector have limited the possibilities 
of diversification of exports. Moreover, dependence on imported 
capital goods, raw materials and other vital inputs needed for 
agricultural and industrial production which are not produced 
domestically made it difficult to reduce imports without adversely 
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affecting domestic production. These rigidities were exacerbated 
by the international inflation during the 1970s which was 
fuelled by excessive rises in energy prices (oil), and the sluggish 
export demand caused mainly by the recession that characterized 
the economies of most of the industrial-primary products importer- 
countries. As a result of these structural and exogenous factors 
a foreign exchange limit has developed and represented a major 
constraint to the growth and development of the country. Attempts 
to relieve this constraint by currency depreciation in 1972 
were undermined by the rigid dependence on imports, the limited 
scope of import substitution, supply rigidities in the export 
sector and sluggish export demand as well as the adverse inflation- 
ary effects of devaluation itself on the external sector perform- 
ance. The series of devaluations adopted in 1978,1979,1981 and 
1982 are also likely to be undermined by such structural rigidities. 
The statistical finding of a negative relationship between 
foreign capital inflow and domestic savings is questionable on 
the grounds that it may represent an ex-post accounting relation- 
ship rather than a behavioural relationship, or it may be due to 
exogenous shocks causing an increase in foreign aid and a fall in 
domestic savings at the same time, or it may be due to the 
conditions (economic or otherwise) that prevailed during the time 
of the studies which were mainly carried out for periods covering 
the 1950s and the early 1960s. Nevertheless in analysing the 
argument that aid discourages domestic savings and retards growth 
in view of Sudan's experience, we found that whereas the external 
development aid to the Sudan during the past two decades has been 
rising, public sectors savings has been declining and totally 
inadequate to finance the local cost component of aid financed 
investment programmes. The government has not adopted the 
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appropriate policy of mobilizing public savings - through increased 
taxation or reduced government expenditure - needed to finance the 
local cost components of aid financed development programmes 
but rather relied on borrowing from the Central Bank thereby 
causing inflationary pressures on the economy. 
The poor public sector savings performance, which may be 
explained by inadequate policy measures, inefficient management 
of public enterprise as well as exogenous factors, should not 
lead us to the conclusion that foreign aid retards growth and 
development. The discussion on the role of foreign aid resources 
in the growth process in the light of Sudan's experience over the 
past two decades indicate that foreign aid resources did contribute 
to the growth process in the Sudan by financing higher levels of 
public sectors investment than what would otherwise have been, 
particularly at a time (1973/74 onwards) when external shocks 
caused continuous and severe foreign exchange scarcity. The high 
level of investment made possible by foreign aid resources has 
contributed significantly to the development of the major sectors 
of the economy and raised the overall output growth rates. More- 
over, the impact of foreign aid on development should also be 
examined on what might otherwise have been if the Sudan did not 
have access to foreign aid resources. The Sudan, according to 
our estimate of the grant element in the foreign aid received 
during the period 1960-1980, would have paid 66% of the total face 
value of the aid received as additional cost of borrowing from 
international capital markets if it did not have access to 
external development assistance. 
The rejection of foreign aid on the grounds that it retards 
growth cannot be justified in the light of Sudan's experience of 
growth with foreign aid in the past two decades. The criticisms 
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raised against the forms and use of aid resources, should not 
suggest the termination of aid flows but indicate the need for 
identifying the specific factors and policies that limited the 
effectiveness of such resources and suggesting reform measures for 
recipient's policies and donor's approaches as well as the aid 
machinery in general, so that the efficiency with which such 
resources are translated into income and growth is maximized. 
This can be achieved by untying of procurement under aid resources, 
adopting the appropriate mix between project and programme loans 
to be tailored to the stage of development and conditions pre- 
vailing in the economy of the recipient, and introducing fundamental 
changes in the aid machinery and procedures for the acquisition 
and effectiveness of loan agreements so that the excessive 
delays involved in such process is minimized. 
Finally, an estimate of the saving-investment gap and 
exports-imports gap for the forthcoming Six Year Plan 1983/84- 
1988/89, indicates that - given the structure of Sudan's economy 
during the period 1960-1978 - the Sudan will continue to depend 
on foreign resources if a realistic 4.9% or an optimistic 7.5% 
target rate of growth is to be maintained during the rest of 
the 1980s. 
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Appendix Table 6.1 Sources, Amounts, Repayment Terrns, and 
Areas of Utilization of Authorized External 
Developm ent Loans 1960-1980 
Authorized Amount & 
Source, Date & Repayment Tenns Sectoral Allocation 
Titl fL eo oan Soc. Multi 
q r g. t AC-R. III'. IND. Ser. Sec. 
I Multilateral & Regional. 
Sources 
A. The World Bank Group: 
i. IBI D 
1. Managil Extension 6.1960 5.4 6.0 3 17 5.4 - -" -- 
2. Rosseris Dan 6,1961 6.8 5.75 7 18 - 6.8 - - -- 
3. Railways II 12,1965 10.8 5.5 5 20 - 10.8 - -- 
4. Mechanized 
Fanning 9,1968 1.9 6.25 5 20 1.9 -- -- 
5. Power I 1,1968 8.3 6.25 5 20 - 8.3 - -- 
6. Civil Aviation 7,1976 7.0 4.75 5 20 - 7.0 - -- 
7. Railways IV 7,1977 4.8 8.2 5 20 - 4.8 - -- 
ii . IDA 
8. Mechanized 
Fanning II 6,1972 3.9 0.0 10 40 3.9 -- -- 
9. Highway I 9,1972 2.4 0.0 10 40 - 2.4 - -- 
10. Rahad Project I 3,1973 14.6 0.0 10 40 14.6 -- -- 
11. Industrial Bank 1 12,1973 1.4 0.0 10 40 - -- 1.4 - 
12. Railways III 1,1974 8.4 0.0 10 40 - 8.4 - -- 
13. Southern Regicn 6,1974 3.7 0.0 10 40 3.7 -- -- 
14. Rosseris Dan 6,1961 4.5 0.0 10 40 - 4.5 - -- 
15. Education I 6,1968 2.9 0.0 10 40 - -- 2.9 - 
16. Education II 5,1975 3.5 0.0 10 40 - -- 3.5 - 
17. Rahad Project II 7,1975 7.0 0.0 10 40 7.0 -- -- 
18. Posy r II 6,1975 8.0 0.0 10 40 - 8.0 - -- 
19. Industrial 
Bank II 11,1975 2.4 0.0 10, 40 - - 2.4 -- 
20. Civil Aviation 7,1976 3.1 0.0 10 40 - 3.1 - -- 
21. Project Prepar- 
ation Unit 4,1976 1.4 0.0 10 40 - 1.4 - -- 
22. Savanah Devel- 
opnent 6,1977 6.8 0.0 10 40 6.8 -- -- 
23. Railways IV 7,1977 3.2 0.0 10 40 - 3.2 - -- 
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24. Port Develognent 6,1978 8.8 0.0 10 40 - 8.8 --- 
25. Meat Marketing 
Project 6,1978 10.0 0.0 10 40 10.0 ---- 
26. Mechanized 
Fanning III 7,1978 6.4 0.0 10 40 6.4 ---- 
27. Agric. Research 7,1978 6.0 0.0 10 40 6.0 ---- 
28. Highway II 3,1979 16.4 0.0 10 40 - 16.4 --- 
29. Agric. (Southern 
Region) 5,1979 6.0 0.0 10 40 6.0 ---- 
30. Agricultural 
Rehabilitation 4,1980 52.0 0.0 10 40 52.0 ---- 
31. Power III 4,1980 52.0 0.0 10 40 - 52.0 --- 
32. New Haifa Agric- 
ultural Project 5,1980 32.0 0.0 10 40 32.0 ---- 
B. Regional Sources 
i. Arab Fund for Eccnanic & Social Dev. 
1. Gedarif/Kassala 
Highway 4,1974 9.6 4.0 5 15 - 9.6 --- 
2. Telec iinmicaticn 1,1975 5.7 4.0 5 15 - 5.7 --- 
4. Rahad Roads 1975 6.4 4.0 5 15 - 6.4 --- 
5. Sennar/Daanazin 
Highway 12,1976 15.9 4.0 5 15 - 15.9 --- 
6. Railways 12,1977 6.3 4.0 5 15 - 6.3 --- 
7. Gedarif/Kassal 
Highway 1,1980 14.9 4.0 2 12 - 14.9 --- 
ii. Kuwait Fund for Develourdent 
1. Railways 3,1962 6.8 4.0 4 6 - 6.8 --- 
2. Girba Sugar Factory 7,1965 1.7 3.5 3 11 --1.7 -- 
3. Land Reclanation 8,1967 4.9 2.5 3 17 4.9 ---- 
4. Mechanized Fanning 3,1972 1.6 2.5 5 20 1.6 ---- 
5. Sennar Sugar Factary 7,1973 4.4 4.0 5 10 --4.4 
6. Rahad Project I 4,1973 3.2 3.0 5 25 3.2 ---- 
7. Rahad Project II 6,1975 14.2 3.0 5 25 14.2 ---- 
8. Industrial Bank 6,1975 1.9 4.0 5 10 --1.9 -- 
9. Project Preparation 
Unit 8,1976 1.1 1.0 10 20 - 1.1 --- 
10. Sennar/Danazin Rd 6,1977 10.8 3.0 5 15 - 10.8 --- 
11. Railways 7,1978 6.0 3.5 5 15 - 6.0 --- 
12. Kennana Sugar Fact. 5,1979 10.7 3.5 5 15 -- 10.7 -- 
13. Rahad Roads 1,1980 2.3 3.0 3 25 - 2.3 --- 
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iii. Saudi. Fund for Develoment 
1. Rahad Project 6,1975 9.7 3.0 5 15 
2. Port Sudan Airport 1,1977 3.5 2.0 5 15 
3. Kassala4iaya Rd 1,1977 9.2 2.0 5 15 
4. Savanah Developnent 7,1977 3.9 2.0 5 15 
5. Earth Satellite Stns . 7,1977 3.5 2.0 5 15 
6. Civil Aviation 7,1977 2.4 2.0 5 15 
7. Education 10,1977 1.2 2.0 5 15 
8. Nayala/Zalengi Rd 6,1978 14.0 2.0 5 15 
9. Kennana Sugar Fact. 3,1979 17.8 2.0 5 15 
iv. Abu Dahabi Fund 
1. Hag Abd Allah 
Spinning Factory 7,1976 6.4 5.0 3 10 
2. South Darfor Dev. 12,1976 1.3 3.0 5 15 
3. Railways 12,1977 3.8 3.0 5 15 
4. Hag Abd Allah 
Spinning Factory 
II. 9,1977 0.4 3.0 5 15 
v. African Develogne nt Bank 
9.7 -- 
- 3.5 - 
- 9.2 - 
3.9 -- 
- 3.5 - 
- 2.4 - 
- 14.0 - 
-- 17.8 
1.2 
1. Quarantine Station 12,1971 0.3 6.0 2 8 0.3 - 
2. Railways I 12,1971 1.0 6.0 3 10 - 1.0 
3. Railways II 3,1974 1.1 6.0 3 10 - 1.1 
4. Power 7,1974 1.5 6.0 5 10 - 1.5 
5. Bridges 7,1974 1.5 0.0 10 40 - 1.5 
6. Water Supply 7,1976 2.0 0.0 10 40 - 2.0 
7. Milk Farm 5,1978 1.9 7.0 5 15 1.9 - 
8. Health Care 2,1978 4.2 0.0 10 40 --- - 
vi. Islariic D2ye1op nent Bank 
1. Education 5,1977 1.3 0.0 2 16 
2. Nayala/Zalengi Rd. 5,1977 1.9 0.0 2 28 
vii. OPEC Special Fund 
1. Kassa14/Haya Rd 10,1977 1.7 0.0 5 15 
2. Power 12,1978 3.8 0.0 5 15 
3. Kassal0laya Rd II 1,1980 3.9 0.0 5 10 
viii. International Fund for Agricultural Develop ment 
1. Southern Region Agric. 5,1979 7.6 0.0 10 40 
2. New Halfa Agric. 
Project 6,1980 7.5 0.0 10 40 
--6.4 -- 
1.3 ---- 
- 3.8 --- 
0.4 -- 
- 4.2 - 
---1.3 - 
- 1.9 --- 
- 1.7 ---, 
- 3.8 --- 
- 3.9 --- 
7.6 
7.5 ----4 
1 
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II Bilateral Sources 
A. OECD Group 
i. United King= 
1. Aircraft 1962 2.7 5.5 2 8 - 2.7 - -- 
2. General Devt 5,1963 4.9 5.5 5 10 - - - 4.9 - 
3. Railways 12,1968 0.2 0.0 2 23 - 0.2 - -- 
4. Sehrar Dan I 8,1969 0.4 0.0 2 23 - 0.4 - -- 
5. Sennar Dan II 1,1972 0.3 0.0 2 23 - 0.3 - -- 
6. Northern Province 
Puunp Schemes 1,1972 1.1 0.0 2 23 1.1 - - -- 
7. Medanj/Sennar/Kasti 8111,1973 8.6 0.0 5 10 - 8.6 - -- 
8. Agriculture 2,1976 3.4 - - - 3.4 - - -- 
9. "& Infrastructure 1,1978 9.5 - - - 5.6 3.9 - -- 
10. to 12,1978 10.2 - - - 1.3 8.9 - -- 
11. Canent Factory 1979 3.6 - - - - - 3.6 --, 
12. Power 1980 62.2 - - - - 62.2 - -- 
ii. West Germany 
1. Gen id Sugar Fact. 1960 3.9 5.0 1 4 - - 3.9 -- 
2. Rosseris Dan 1961 6.4 4.75 8 12 - 6.4 - -- 
3. Girba Sugar Factory 1962 1.9 6.0 1 12 - - 1.9 -- 
4. General Devt 3,1972 5.5 2.0 10 40 - 1.5 - - ý. @. 
5. 1973 Loan 7,1973 6.0 0.75 10 40 - 1.0 - - 5.6. 
6. 1974 Loan 6,1974 5.9 0.75 10 40 1.2 2.9 - - I. ý. 
7. 1975 Loan 6,1975 11.1 0.75 10 40 - 6.8 0.7 0.3 3.3. 
8. 1976/77 Loan 10,1976 22.0 0.75 10 40 - 19.8 - - 2"2 
9. 1978 (grant) 4,1978 15.2 - - - - 11.4 - - 3.8. 
10. 1979 4,1979 17.1 - - - - 13.3 - - 
11. 1980 " 2,1980 44.3 - - - - 17.5 - - 26 8. 
iii. Netherlands 
1. Aircrafts 1962 1.3 5.75 - 5 - 1.3 - -- 
2. General Devt 2,1965 1.0 5.75 7 19 0.1 0.1 0.7o[ 
3. 1975 Loan 4,1975 1.5 2.5 8 30 0.1 0.7 0.5 0.1 o. i 
4. 1976 Loan 3,1976 1.7 0.75 10 40 0.2 1.2 0.3 -- 
5. Teleccamunication 3,1977 0.6 4.75 3 13 - 0.6 - -- 
6. Trucks 3,1977 0.6 4.75 3 13 - 0.6 - -- 
7. 1977 Grant 3,1977 5.2 - - - 2.3 1.5 0.6 0.8 
8.. 1978 Grant 3 , 1978 6.7 - - - 2.2 2.3 1.0 0.8e. t- 
9. 1979 Grant (1) 4,1979 6.7 - - - 2.2 2.2 0.1 1.90";,, 
10. 1979 Grant (2) 6,1979 8.0 - - - 3.8 3.0 - - 1"`_ 
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11. 1980 Grant 3,1980 11.0 - - 
iv. U. S. A. 
1. Industrial Bank 1962 0,7 0.75 5 
2. Rahad Project 3,1973 3.8 2. f? 10 
3. Rural Agriculture 9,1978 4.8 - - 
4. Primary Health Care 8,1978 2.3 - - 
5. Manpower 8,1978 2.1 - - 
6. Agricultural Research 9,1978 8.0 - - 
v. Italy 
1. Girba Agric. Project 1961 2.5 5.5 2 
2. 11 11 if 1961 0.9 5.4 2 
3. General Devt 12,1967 4.0 4.5 2 
4. Airport Feasibility 1972 0.4 6.5 2 
5. Highway Study 1971 0. C$7 6.5 1 
6. Kassa1141aya R 1973 1.5 6.5 1 
7. Kosti Bridge I 6,1975 5.5 6.5 3 
8. Kosti Bridge II 2,1979 6.9 6.5 3 
vi. Denmark 
1. Loan I 1971 0.7 0.0 8 
2. loan II 3,1974 1.1 0.0 10 
3. Loan III 3,1978 2.4 0.0 10 
vii. Sweden 
1. Loan I 1,1966 2.4 2.0 5 
2. Loan II 4,1970 1.0 2.0 10 
viii. Norway 
1. River Transport 2,1979 13.9 5.65 10 
ix. Japan 
1. Road Ccnstruatici 8,1976 3.4 3.0 10 
2. Railways & Rural 
Water 2,1978 6.8 2.0 10 
x. Canada 
1. Road Constructicn 6,1977 0.53 - - 
xi. France 
1. Loan I 2,1978 5.6 8.5 2 
2. Loan II 11,1979 19.6 8.5 2 
- 1.9 6.9 0.3 - 1°9 
25 -- 
40 3.8 - 
- 4.8 - 
- 8.0 - 
8 2.5 -- 
8 0.9 -- 
10 0.2 3.3 - 
8 - 0.4 - 
5 - 0.07 - 
5 - 1.5 - 
10 - 5.5 - 
10 - 6.9 - 
0.7 -- 
- 2.3 - 
2.1 
17 0.7 -- 
25 1.1 -- 
25 0.3 2.1 - 
20 2.4 -- 
15 1.0 -- 
15 - 13.9 - 
20 - 3.4 - 
20 2.4 4.4 - 
--0.53 - 
i 
0.5 - 
6-5.6 --- II 
6- 14.6 2.4 -"6, tI 
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B. Canecon Group 
I. USSR 
1. Loan I 11,1961 8.0 2.5 0.0 12 - 3.5 
2. Loan II 11,1969 2.0 2.5 ---- 
II. Yugoslavia 
3.5 - 1.1 
- 2.0 
1. Loan 1. 7,1959 7.8 3.0 0.0 8 - 6.0 1.8 -- 
III. Czechoslovakia 
1. Iman I 1,1965 3.5 3.0 0.0 8 0.9 1.2 - 0.8 0.6 
2. Loan II 7,1973 7.0 3.0 0.0 8 - 3.5 3.5 -- 
IV. East Germany 
1. 1969 Loan 11,1969 3.3 2.5 3 12 - 1.0 - 0.4 1.9 
V. Hungary 
1. 1970 Loan 6,1970 3.5 2.5 3 10 - 3.5 --- 
VI. Romania 
1.1972 Loan 4,1972 25.0 2.5 28-- 
M. Bulgaria 
1.1969 loan 3,1967 5.0 2.5 0.0 8-- 
C. Other Bilateral 
I. Peoples Republic of China 
2.9 7.4 14.7 
--5.0 
1. Loan I 8,1970 14.1 0.0 15 10 
8.6 9.8 3 5.6 4.2 - 2. Loan II 12,1971 14.1 0.0 15 10 
3. Loan III 12,1979 8.5 0.0 - 10 - 8.5 --- 
II. North Korea 
1. 1970 Loan 8,1970 1.3 0.0 1 10 -- - 1.3 
III. Credit Facilities, Suppliers' Credits & Ccmnercial Credits 
A. CECD Countries 
I. United Kingdan 
1. Sennar Sugar Factory 1,1974 8.3 6.0 2.5 7-- 8.3 -- 
2. Satellite Project 12,1976 4.2 10.0 2.0 8-4.2 --- 
3. Rural Water 1969 0.14 6.25 - 5 0.14 - --- 
4. Assalaya Sugar Fact. 7,1975 9.95 9.0 2 4-- 9.95 -- 
II. West Germany 
1. Port Su'ian Spinning 
Factory 11,1975 2.8 8.95 3 5--- 2.8 -- 
2. "" 11,1975 5.1 8.0 3 5-- 5.1 -- 
3. "" 11,1975 1.4 7.5 3 5-- 1.4 -- 
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III. Netherlands 
1. Telex anunication 12,1965 0.9 6.5 - 
2. 3,1966 0.04 6.5 - 
3. 3,1967 0.03 7.75 - 
4. 10,1967 0.02 6.75 - 
5. 4,1968 0.036 7.0 - 
6. 6,1968 0.045 7.0 - 
7. 8,1969 0.08 7.75 - 
8. 9,1969 0.40 7.75 - 
9. 11,1970 0.18 7.75 - 
10. 1,1971 0.02 7.75 - 
IV. U. S. A. 
1. Aircraft 1 1973 3.6 8.0 2 
2. 2 1973 3.6 6.0 7 
3. 3- 1973 1.4 8.5 2 
4. Satellite Statics 1973 1.2. 7.0 3 
V. Italy 
1. Rural Water 1968 0.4 6.5 2 
2. Rural Water 1969 1.0 5.0 3 
3. Kenaf Factory (Abu 
Naana) 7,1972 1.6 6.0 4 
4. Tong Kenaf 11,1973 2.4 6.5 4 
5. "" (Agric. ) 7,1975 4.1 8.5 2.5 
6. Gado Weaving Fact. 3,1975 13.7 8.0 3 
7. Kenaf Ag. Equi nervt 7,1975 2.9 8.5 3 
VI. Denmark 
1. Rural Water 1969 0.5 0.0 - 
2. Agric. (Southern 
Region) 12,1974 2.3 9.0 2 
VII. France 
1. Nledani Tannery 8,1972 1.7 7.9 3 
2. Hag Abdalla Spinning 
Factory 1976 6.2 7.5 3 
3. Port Sudan Spinning 
Factory 11,1975 1.5 7.2 3 
VIII. Belgian 
1. Melut Sugar Fact. 11,1974 12.6 8.5 3.5 
2. Six Weaving 11,1974 8.5 9.0 - 
3. Wau Brewery 1974 1.3 6.5 1 
4. " 1974 0.8 9.5 3 
5. River Transport 9,1976 1.8 7.0 2 
10 - 0.9 --- 
10 - 0.04 --- 
10 - 0.03 --- 
10 - 0.02 --- 
10 - 0.036 --- 
10 - 0.045 --- 
10 - 0.08 --- 
10 - 0.40 --- 
10 - 0.18 --- 
10 - 0.02 --- 
5- 3.6 - -. - 
5- 3.6 --- 
7- 1.4 --- 
7- 1.2 --- 
5 0.4 
4 1.0 
8-- 
8-- 
5 4.1 - 
7-- 
5 2.9 - 
1.6 -- 
2.4 -- 
13.7 -- 
9 0.5 
8 2.3 
7 - 1.7 
7 - 6.2 
5 - 1.5 
7-- 
5.5 -- 
5-- 
4-- 
3-1.8 
12.6 -- 
8.5 -- 
1.3 -- 
0.8 -- 
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IX. Austria 
1. Suki Irrigation 
Project 1969 0.5 5.5 - 
2. Kenaf Agriculture 1973 0.4 6.5 - 
3. Southern Region Agric. 7,1975 2.7 8.0 1 
4. 11,1976 4.8 7.5 3 
5. Rural Water 7,1977 2.0 6.5 1.5 
B. CaTecon Countries 
I. Yugoslavia 
1. Rural Water 1969 3.9 3.0 - 
2. Govt. Buildings 
(Juba) 1973 1.0 6.0 - 
3. White Nile Tannery 1973 1.3 3.0 2 
II. East Geýanany 
1. IQzartoun North 
Spinning Factory 3,1975 1.5 2.5 2 
III. Poland 
1. Electrical Equip- 
r nt 5,1977 8.4 6.0 2 
C. Other 
1. Pipe Line 1 12,1973 8.3 8.5 3 
2. Pipe Line 2 4,1975 12.5 8.5 3 
3. Assalya Sugar 4,1975 0.6 9.0 1 
4. Six Weaving 
Factories 12,1974 7.3 9.5 4 
5. Satellite Project 7,1976 2.4 5.0 4 
5 0.5 ---- 
5 0.4 ---- 
8 2.7 ---- 
8 4.8 ---- 
8 2.0 ---- 
7 3.9 ---- 
7---1.0 - 
8--1.3 - 
8--1.5 -- 
8-8.4 ---I 
7-8.3 
7- 12.5 
2-- 
2-- 
6-2.4 
Source: Published and Unpublished Data Collected 'fron the Ministry of National 
Planning (Foreign Aid and Technical Assistance Section) Bank of Sudan, 
Ministry of Industry Feb 1981. 
Note: q= authorized amount of loan 
r= rate of interest in percentage 
g= grace period (in years) 
t= repayirent period (in years) 
AGR = agriculture 
INF = infrastructure 
IND = industry 
Soc. Ser. = social services 
Multi. Sec. = multi sectors 
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Appendix Table 8.1 Expenditure on Gross Domestic Product 
at Current Market Prices 1960-1978 
(in Ls million) 
Year 
GDP 
(Y) 
Consumption (C) Savings 
S 
Invest- Net Exports Irrorts 
ments Foreign of Gxx s of GoodE 
Private Public Zbtal I Capital and and 
Inflow Services Service 
F X M 
1960/61 386.8 303.3 34.8 338.1 48.7 46.2 2.5* 65.6 63.1 
61/62 420.0 323.7 38.3 362.0 58.0 68.4 10.4 65.1 75.5 
62/63 456.2 345.9 42.0 387.9 68.3 76.6 8.3 77.7 86.0 
63/64 463.8 361.4 47.9 409.3 54.5 69.1 14.6 90.3 104.9 
64/65 476.8 370.9 55.9 426.8 50.0 70.9 20.9 86.3 107.2 
65/66 492.0 377.3 63.2 440.5 51.5 62.9 11.4 82.3 93.7 
66/67 497.6 342.7 93.6 436.3 61.3 75.6 14.3 89.0 103.3 
67/68 536.3 371.7 105.2 476.9 59.4 73.2 13.8 93.4 107.2 
68/69 583.3 409.2 112.1 521.3 62.0 80.8 18.8 103.4 122.2 
69/70 602.6 348.5 147.7 496.2 106.7 96.0 10.5* 115.6 104.9 
70/71 637.6 400.6 159.0 559.6 78.0 89.6 11.6 123.4 135.0 
71/72 752.1 543.4 141.0 684.4 67.7 76.1 8.4 125.8 134.2 
72/73 896.8 611.0 165.5 776.5 120.3 105.2 15.1* 151.3 136.2 
73/74 1246.2 846.0 180.5 1026.5 219.7 229.3 9.6 167.1 176.7 
74/75 1510.8 1170.7 207.8 1378.5 132.3 265.0 132.7 183.5 316.2 
75/76 1848.0 1340.6 236.0 1576.6 271.4 427.5 156.1 206.4 362.5 
76/77 2339.7 1827.1 278.3 2105.4 234.3 399.7 165.4 230.1 395.5 
77/78 2878.4 2375.2 330.7 2705.9 172.5 413.7 241.2 218.2 459.4 
Source: 1. Department of Statistics - National Accounts Secticn 
2. UN Statistical Office, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, random 
issues. 
* Indicates an outflow 
